

German Evaluations of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1950-1956

by

Louis Kriesberg

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GERMAN EVALUATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, 1950-1956¹

In May, 1950, the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed that the coal and steel industries of France and Germany and other European countries be pooled. In 1952 the Schuman Plan was enacted. Six nations, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg, agreed to the establishment of a supranational organization: the European Coal and Steel Community. The ECSC has wide powers to control the iron, steel, scrap and coal industries within the member nations' territories.²

In this paper, the development of opinions toward the ECSC will be analyzed in a framework which is applicable to all organizations. This is done on the premise that despite the uniqueness of the structure of this organization, the processes of opinion formation toward it are comparable to those toward all organizations. The basic data for this paper are provided by a secondary analysis of four German national surveys; the surveys were conducted in March, 1951; May, 1951; September, 1951; and December, 1956³. In this kind of secondary analysis, the fact that many questions are not identical makes comparison difficult; yet it is only through such analyses that we are likely to be able to trace the development of opinion over several years.

The framework used in the analysis encompasses two determinants; (1) the influence of other persons and (2) predispositions formed by previous socialization and experience. The predispositions are of two kinds: (a) the framework of values, beliefs and sentiments within which the proposed organization is perceived-- the directly relevant predispositions and (b) the projection upon the organization of general predispositions such as those related to authority, innovation, or general satisfaction--the indirectly relevant predispositions.

In the first part of the paper the state of German public opinion in early 1951 will be analyzed in terms of the framework outlined above. Then, the determinants will be used to explain the shift in evaluations of the proposed ECSC until its establishment in 1952. Finally, the shift in evaluations after the establishment of the Community will be analyzed and the adequacy of the determinants in explaining that shift will also be tested.

German Opinion in Early 1951

In early 1951, over two thirds of the German population claimed to have heard of the Schuman Plan. In March, 1951, 26 percent and in May, 36 percent of the population were able to correctly identify the Plan. "Correct" identification means that the respondent at least roughly described the Plan as one to pool heavy industry in West Europe in which France, Germany and other countries of Western Europe were to cooperate. Only those who correctly identified the Plan will be discussed.

In order to understand the evaluations of an organization, it is necessary to consider the perception of it. Discussions of the Schuman Plan emphasized either its political or economic character. Some people stressed the political character of the Plan: it was perceived as a step toward European Union, a means of reconciliation with France, the entrance of Germany on an equal basis within the international community, or a means of preventing Germany from attaining full sovereignty, or a device to exploit Germany for non-German political and military purposes. Or, the economic character of the Plan was emphasized: it was seen as a way of building a large competitive--and therefore more efficient-- market, a means toward more

production and lowered prices, or a means of controlling and limiting German resources, particularly coal.

At the beginning of the discussion of the proposed ECSC, it was perceived largely as a politically significant institution--one which would be a step toward European Union. On the whole there was popular support for the Schuman Plan. In March, 1951, of those who correctly identified the Plan, 62 percent agreed with it, 27 percent did not, and 11 percent did not have an opinion; in May, the percentages were 62 percent, 25 percent and 13 percent.

Predispositions-- The first determinant of evaluations of the ECSC to be considered are the predispositions; the directly relevant predispositions will be discussed first. Before the establishment of an organization it is likely, of course, that the perception and evaluation of the organization be in high agreement; lacking almost all reality tests, cognitions can be easily altered since the image of the Plan is likely to be vague. This vagueness of the image means that the same values can be used to judge the Plan favorably or negatively. This is indicated by some results of the May, 1951 survey. Nearly all those who opposed the Plan explained that they believed that the Plan would mean the exploitation of Germany, many of these respondents emphasized their distrust of the French. However, 18 percent of those favoring the Plan also used national standards; they argued that Germany would benefit, economically--by a better exchange of products, or politically-- by attaining equal status with their former victors. Most of those who favored the Plan mentioned benefits for all partners. They emphasized the economic advantages of a large common market and the dominant response was to see the ECSC as a step toward European Union, which was believed to mean mutual understanding and peace with France, security against Russia, and prosperity. Yet a few of those who opposed the Plan did so on "European" grounds: the union of heavy industry would not help the establishment of a

proper united Europe. Surprisingly, the concern for German reunification was rarely mentioned as an objection.⁴

Three sets of values and beliefs are especially important in determining the evaluation of the proposed ECSC: values and beliefs about Germany, European integration, and the French and Russians. As Table 1 indicates there is some association between general "nationalism" and a rejection of the Schuman Plan. But one might have expected an even higher association between this predisposition and evaluations of the Schuman Plan. The association probably is not higher because the image of the Plan is still vague enough for it to be consistent with many different values. Thus, when the perception of the Plan is directly related to an important value, the association with the evaluation of the Plan is very high. See Table 2.⁵

In addition to the directly relevant predispositions, other predispositions may be important determinants of the evaluation of a proposed organization. Dissatisfaction, hostility to authority, or distrust of innovations may be extended to the new institution and help produce a negative evaluation of it. There were no questions in 1951 which directly tapped such attitudes. Yet, one question in the May, 1951 survey did seem to have some relationship to such variables. The respondents were asked, "In general are you satisfied or dissatisfied with what the West German Federal Government has done for the economy in the past six months?" The surprising thing about the responses to this question was that they were not associated with the objective economic position of the respondents. There was, however, a close relationship between party adherence and satisfaction with the government's action. We know that party adherence and evaluation of the ECSC were highly associated but, as Table 3 shows, even holding party adherence constant there is an association between satisfaction with the government and evaluation of the Schuman Plan.

It is not clear whether the question is measuring attitudes toward authority or general satisfaction. But it seems reasonable to conclude that such variables probably played a role in the evaluation of the proposed organization, explaining some of the variance in evaluations which cannot be explained by the directly relevant values and beliefs or by the direct influence of others.

Influence from others-- We would expect that the influence of other persons would be an important factor in the formation of evaluations, particularly when the situation is relatively unstructured. There are only two measures for the influence of others available in the 1951 surveys: trade union membership and political party adherence. The union leaders announced their support for the idea of the Schuman Plan on May 9, but in 1951, anyway, there apparently was no significant union influence.⁶

Political party influence is another matter. The government coalition, Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Free Democratic Party (FDP) and minor parties, supported the Plan. The opposition party, the Social Democrats (SPD), was critical and in April formally took a clear stand in opposition. As we would expect, evaluation of the proposed ECSC was related to party adherence; see Table 4, A and B. Significantly, as Table 5 shows, holding, e.g., Nationalist/European predispositions constant, the CDU/FDP drew support for the Schuman Plan; however, SPD adherence did not seem to induce greater opposition to the Plan-- when compared to respondents with no party adherence. The pattern is the same when the other predispositions are held constant. Party adherence, then, acted as an independent factor in effecting evaluations of the proposed organization, particularly in gaining support from followers of the government parties who had predispositions which would not-- if extrapolated-- have led

to support of the Plan. But note that this means that there are predispositions which, once the SPD campaign increased, might lead to increased opposition to the proposed ECSC.

Changes in the Evaluation of the ECSC Before its Functioning

During 1951 and 1952 there was much attention given to the Schuman Plan in Germany. The press was overwhelmingly favorable to this first step toward European integration, however, they carried accounts of difficulties and counter arguments; and there was considerable political discussion culminating in the Bundestag debate and ratification of the treaty in January, 1952. What was the effect of all this upon the public's evaluation of the Plan? In a sense, the situation is comparable to Sherif's dark room and his studies of the autokinetic effect; judgment had to be passed on something new and untried, with no firm standards by which to judge it.⁷

Drawing upon other surveys in addition to the ones being reanalyzed here, let us trace the general trend of support for the Schuman Plan until the ratification of the Treaty establishing the ECSC. One difficulty is that the evaluative questions used in the various surveys are worded differently. Furthermore, different proportions of the population provide the base for the responses, depending upon the level of information required of the respondent before he is asked to evaluate the Plan. On the basis of surveys in which it was possible to compare the responses to the evaluation question by the level of information about the Plan, it is clear that at this time the less informed are somewhat more likely to oppose it. The less informed are also more likely to have no opinion about its evaluation. In order to minimize this last difficulty, percentages were calculated omitting those with no opinions. The trend of evaluations seems clear.

In June, 1950, 75 percent of the respondents favored the Plan;⁸ in March, 1951, 70 percent;⁹ in May, 1951, 71 percent;¹⁰ in June, 1951, 63 percent and 56 percent;¹¹ September 1951, 52 percent;¹² and in January, 1952, 47 percent.¹³

Taking all the difficulties into account, the decline in public support of the Schuman Plan, from the time of its original announcement until immediately after its ratification by the Bundestag, is undoubtedly a real one. Thus, at the time of the ratification, it seems that there was more opposition than support for the Plan.¹⁴

On the basis of the preceding scheme of analysis, three explanations are possible. First, there was a change in the perception of the Plan so that with the same beliefs and values, the Plan was evaluated differently. Second, there was a change in the position of the influential political leaders or an increased influence by those attacking the Plan. Third, there was a shift in the directly and/or indirectly relevant predispositions.

A shift in values and beliefs does not seem to be an adequate explanation. It is very unlikely that within several months there would be a significant shift in the indirectly relevant predispositions such as attitudes toward authority or innovation, or general levels of satisfaction. Indeed, if there were any shift it would be one making for a more favorable evaluation of the Plan since there was a generally rising standard of living and economic satisfaction. An analysis of directly relevant values and beliefs presented later, reveals no consistent shift that might explain the decline in support for the proposed ECSC.

Another possible explanation is that there had been a change in the perception of the proposed ECSC. Other surveys have shown that while German support for European Union in general is high, support for specific proposals is lower. The discussion of the Schuman Plan might have raised doubts about its contribution to European Union or it might have brought other evaluative frameworks, e.g., national welfare, into greater prominence. This does seem to have been the case. For one thing, the discussion of the specifics of the Plan focused upon the economic significance of the Plan, and this had interesting consequences. In March, 1951 well

over half of the evaluations of the Plan were based upon political criteria and only a little more than a third upon economic criteria (the remainder gave other reasons, e.g., military reasons). In May, 1951, there was some decline in the percentage mentioning political criteria and an increase in those mentioning economic ones. In a June, 1951 Demoskopie survey, the respondents were given a series of statements about the Schuman Plan and they were requested to state which ones expressed their opinion. About 40 percent of the statements selected referred to economic matters. In the September, 1951 survey, the respondents were asked whether they thought the goals of the Plan were economic, political, or military; only 13 percent said political, while 85 percent answered they were economic.

Consideration of the economic merits of the Plan made a calculation of its consequences for the German nation more likely than if consideration were centered upon political ends-which would usually have connotations of the positive imagery of European Union. Further evidence of a shift in perception of the proposed ECSC and of the increased relevance of other evaluative frameworks will be given when we consider the third possible explanation.¹⁵

The remaining possible explanation is that there was change in position among the influential leaders or those attacking the Plan became more influential. As a matter of fact, there was no significant change in position among the political leaders, but the SPD made an intensive campaign against the Plan. The SPD leaders argued that a truly democratic united Europe would not be created by the creation of an institution which was based upon a divided Germany, in which representation was discriminatory, and which lacked an effective parliament.

As a result of this campaign, adherents of the SPD became increasingly hostile to the Plan. This is shown in Table 4. Note that in March, 1951, respondents with no party adherence were less approving of the Plan than were SPD supporters; by September, 1951--despite the

general decline in approval of the proposed ECSC--those without any party adherence were more approving of the Plan than were SPD adherents. At the same time, the disparity in evaluations of the Plan between SPD and CDU/FDP adherents continuously increased.

The Shift in Evaluations of the ECSC, 1952-1956

In considering the changes in evaluation of the ECSC after it began to function, a serious difficulty is that the wording of the questions are not identical. Yet, some conclusions can be drawn. First, let us consider how the ECSC is judged to affect Germany. In March, 1953,¹⁶ and in April, 1956,¹⁷ a national cross-section of Germans were asked how they thought Germany fared under the ECSC. A split ballot was used in the 1953 survey; half of the respondents had to clearly identify the Schuman Plan and the other half merely had to indicate familiarity with the Montan Union. (The ECSC is known as the Montan Union in Germany.) The results are presented in Table 6.

The interpretation that there has been a decline in the belief that the ECSC is good for Germany seems warranted. This interpretation is supported by noting that in the April, 1951 survey, 18 percent of those who supported the Schuman Plan volunteered the explanation that it would be good for Germany and a few of those who opposed the Plan argued that it would not help the establishment of a United Europe. In the December, 1956 survey, of those who supported the Plan, only one percent volunteered that it was good for Germany as an explanation for their support of it and all those who opposed it mentioned its disadvantages for Germany.

A comparison of the general evaluation of the ECSC is more difficult to make because the questions and the proportion of the sample considered informed varies. In October, 1952, the question was, "Are you in favor of or against Germany taking part in the Schuman Plan?" Fifty-

three percent of the sample were asked the question.¹⁸ In March, 1953,¹⁹ and April, 1956, the question was, "Would you say it was a mistake or not a mistake that we joined?" In December, 1956, the question was, "What do you think of the Montan Union, do you believe it is a good thing or not such a good thing?" Only the replies of the 35 percent of the sample whose identification of the ECSC was judged to be correct are presented in Table 7.

It is difficult to discern any real change in the general evaluation of the ECSC from the data presented. Taking into account the wording of the questions and differences in the percentage of the population passing judgment, it seems safe to infer that after January, 1952, after the establishment of the ECSC, approval of it rose and remained high. The general approval persisted despite the decline in the belief that the ECSC is good for Germany.

An explanation for these findings will be sought within the analytic framework used thus far. Predispositions and political party influence seem adequate to explain the changes before the ECSC was in operation. But these factors may prove inadequate to explain the new situation.

Predispositions-- First of all, in analyzing the role of relevant predispositions in the evaluation of the ECSC, it is necessary to determine if there has been any shift in these predispositions between 1952 and 1956. Observers often assert that sentiment for European Union rises and falls significantly and frequently. This may be the case if one uses actual political action as an index of sentiment for European Union. The public opinion data presented in Table 8 does not support the assertion. Support for European Union in Germany seems generally stable. Within the time presented there may have been a slight decline from the high of October, 1954. Perhaps too, there was some increase in support for European Union from April to December, 1956. The events of October, 1956 in Hungary and Egypt were interpreted, in the press anyway, as proving the value of European Union. In any case, the variations are small.

Belief in the likelihood of attaining a united Europe may be more unstable than the wish for it. The belief in the possibility of attaining European Union seems to have declined slightly in the period under review. To the question, “Do you believe you will yet witness the West European nations joining together into the United States of Europe?”, the answers in February, 1953, were: 41 percent yes, 29 percent no, and 30 percent undecided; in January, 1955, the answers were 37 percent yes, 35 percent no, and 28 percent undecided.²⁰ Comparing the results between January, 1955 and January, 1956, a smaller percentage in 1956 (24 percent) than in 1955 (35 percent), asked if they thought that in the preceding year European cooperation in the sense of European Union had improved, 24 percent in 1956 compared to 1955 thought it had.²¹ Probably there was no upturn in belief in the likelihood of European Union until after the public attention to the steps leading toward a common market in the beginning of 1957.

The second set of relevant values and beliefs that requires special attention are those concerning France and Russia. Support for Adenauer’s efforts to achieve good relations with France was higher in September, 1954 than in February, 1952 (it was highest in November, 1953).²² To the question, "Do you think that France now has the good will to cooperate with us?" in October, 1954 only 23 percent replied yes, but in June, 1952 even fewer did: 12 percent.²³ From these and other data, it seems that mistrust and prejudice against the French was widespread, but decreasing.

Feeling threatened by the Russians and being confident that in the event of an attack the Russians could be thrown back are both associated with a more positive evaluation of the ECSC. Between August, 1953 and October, 1954, the considerable mistrust of the Russians even increased slightly; 55 percent compared to 51 percent said that they did not think that Russia now

had the good will to cooperate with Germany.²⁴ But confidence in defending themselves against the Soviet Union declined somewhat.²⁵

The third set of values and beliefs that require attention are nationalist ones. As economic conditions improved in Germany, the percentage of the population mentioning an economic problem as the chief issue facing Germany strikingly declined and the percentage mentioning reunification of Germany has correspondingly risen; more people are more likely to mention this as Germany's chief problem than any other issue.²⁶ Nevertheless, there does not seem to be a burning concern for reunification or for reunification at any price. For example, the following question was posed, "If you had to decide, which is more important to you, security against the Russians or German unification?"²⁷ The responses were:

	July, 1952	July, 1953	October, 1954
Security	51%	52%	59%
Unification	33	36	27
Undecided	16	12	14
	100%	100%	100%

The emphasis upon security is striking, particularly when one recognizes that the demand for unification is constantly made by leaders from every segment of the public. But it is also revealing that the appeals are often made in a tone that seems to reveal fear that the German people themselves may grow quiescent; there are admonishing questions to the effect of, "Are we so satisfied with our prosperity that we are forgetting our unfortunate brothers and sisters in the Russian zone of occupation?"

Supporting this interpretation of the concern about reunification is the trend of answers to another question, one that is even more directly related to evaluation of the ECSC. In August, 1951, the following survey question was posed, "Supposing a United States of Europe were

realized in the near future: Do you think West Germany should join without East Germany, or should it withhold its decision until Germany is reunited?" Thirty-seven percent said wait for reunification, 33 percent said join at once, and 30 percent did not know. Incidentally, only two percent thought Germany would in fact wait.²⁸ In October, 1954, the question was, "Which in your opinion should come first: admission of West Germany in the Western Defense Alliance or reunification with the East Zone?" Thirty-nine percent said reunification, 35 percent the Alliance, and 26 percent were undecided.²⁹ It is at least clear, then, that there has been no increase in the demand to put reunification above all else.

Another index of nationalist perspective is the judgment of who was responsible for World War II. To the question, "Who, in your opinion, is responsible that war broke out in 1939?" in October, 1951, 32 percent said Germany and 24 percent said the other countries; but in April, 1956, the percentages were 41 and nine.³⁰

What then has been the shift in values and beliefs that are relevant to the evaluation of the ECSC? It seems that support for the "Europe Idea," at least until October, 1956, has been generally stable. There has been an increase in confidence regarding France in relation to Germany and more mistrust and less confidence vis-a-vis the Russians. There seems to have been a decline in nationalist sentiments and no rising demand for reunification at the price of a withdrawal from Western Europe.

Some of these changes are small, but others are significant; however, the direction of the changes--insofar as they are related to the evaluation of the ECSC--are not all in the same direction. On the whole, the shifts in values and beliefs do indicate some basis for the sustained approval of the ECSC, but they certainly do not explain the decline in the belief that the ECSC is good for Germany.

If the gross shifts in the values and beliefs do not explain the complexity of the 1956 evaluations of the ECSC, perhaps their relevance for its evaluation is different in 1956. It is impossible to compare the relative degree of association between the relevant predispositions and evaluation of the ECSC in 1951 and 1956. There are no identical questions for the two time periods. Table 9 is comparable to Table 1 to only a limited degree. This comparison suggests that the association between a pro-European predisposition and a favorable evaluation of the ECSC is higher in 1956 than in 1951. But the comparison is not in itself very convincing and other evidence from other studies casts further doubt on this conclusion.³¹ All that seems safe to conclude is that there is a significant association between relevant predispositions and evaluations of the ECSC. This fact and the slight rise in predispositions associated with favorable evaluations of the Community help to explain why a favorable evaluation of the Community persists despite an increased belief that Germany does not fare well under the ECSC. But it does not help explain the increase in the latter belief, nor the sudden rise in general approval of the Community from the nadir reached in January, 1952. Let us see if the second factor, influence of others, helps to fill out the explanation.

After the Community was established, the SPD cooperated in its functioning. Although they continued to say that they had been right in their opposition, the campaign against the ECSC died. And as Table 10 shows, the differences among party adherents in their evaluation of the ECSC declined markedly as compared to September, 1951. The CDU adherents declined in their support of the ECSC and the SPD adherents and those with no party attachment increased in support of the ECSC.³²

The decline in differences among political party adherents in their evaluations of the ECSC strengthens the earlier analysis that the political discussion was an important determinant

of evaluations of the Community before it was established. The differences rose as the political discussion did and waned as the discussion did. But the findings only partly explain the evaluations of the ECSC 1956; and they do not explain the rise in approval of the Community after it was established, the stable approval, and the decline in the belief that it is good for Germany.

Conclusions

Secondary analysis of survey data has many limitations, but it is through it that we are most likely to be able to analyze the development of public opinion over an extended period of time. Here, the trend of German evaluations of the ECSC was followed from 1950 to 1956. A scheme for the analysis of evaluations of a new organization was presented and applied. It was argued that evaluations of an organization, as perceived, is determined by (1) the directly and indirectly relevant predispositions and (2) the evaluations of influential others.

For evaluations of the ECSC before it was established, the scheme did seem to be adequate. In a situation in which there are few firm bases upon which to judge an organization, perceptions and evaluations are labile and are partly dependent upon predispositions and particularly dependent upon the views of influential others. Thus, within a year in which there was a heated political debate about the ECSC, political party allegiance markedly increased as a factor determining evaluations of the ECSC. Differences between CDU and SPD adherents in their evaluations markedly increased. At the same time the discussion seemed to have affected everyone's perception of the proposed organization and the evaluative framework within which it was judged; this seemed to largely explain the overall decline in its support.

After the ECSC was established and began to function, however, the explanatory value of the scheme of analysis seemed inadequate. Predispositions and the influence of others were still

discriminatory factors in the evaluation of the ECSC. But they only partly explained the stable approval of the ECSC despite a decline in the belief that the Community was good for Germany and only partly explained the rise in approval of the Community. Additional factors seem necessary to fully understand the evaluations of an institution after it is in existence. Analyses reported elsewhere indicate what these additional factors are.³³ First, while the indirectly relevant predispositions may not have changed after the establishment of the ECSC, additional ones may have become operative. Thus, habituation to what is and transference of feelings about authority and the legitimacy of laws was related to the general approval of the ECSC. Second, experience with an institution, obviously possible only after it is functioning, becomes relevant. In this case, self-identification as a German consumer--particularly of coal--was important in making some respondents believe that Germany fared poorly under the ECSC. Of course, this experience was modified by predispositions and the influence of other persons and was not necessarily based upon reasonable reflection. Thus, persons who concerned themselves about obtaining household coal were more likely to think Germany fared poorly than were those who did not so concern themselves. Yet, this experience was not perceived as so deprivational that widespread directly and indirectly relevant predispositions could not be the basis for widespread German support for the ECSC.

Table 1

Evaluation of the Schuman Plan by Nationalist/European Predispositions
 March, 1951

Predisposition*	Agreement with the Schuman Plan					(N)
	Agree	Do not agree	No opinion			
European	66	23	11	=	100%	(193)
Nationalist	53	37	10	=	100%	(76)
Qualified replies and no opinion	43	—	57	=	100%	(7)

*The question was: "Herr Braun and Herr Schulze are discussing what Germany's policy should be when East and West Germany are reunited and the four occupations powers have left Germany. (CARD)

“1. Herr Schulze says: ‘I am of the opinion that Germany should try to form a common government together with the other West European nations. This would contribute not only to the common welfare of the Germans but to that of the other West European nations as well.’

“2. Herr Braun says: ‘I am of the opinion that Germany should rather remain by herself - as she did in the past, because the Germans know best what is good for them. Only then will the common welfare of all Germans be achieved.’

“Which of these two opinions comes closest to your own?”

Table 2

Evaluation of the Schuman Plan by Belief in its Contribution toward the Unification of Europe
March, 1951

Contribution*	Agreement with the Schuman Plan			=	100%	(N)
	Agree	Do not agree	No opinion			
Considerable	90	7	3	=	100%	(160)
Little	42	48	10	=	100%	(59)
No	3	91	6	=	100%	(33)
No Opinion	4	13	83		100%	(24)

*The question was: "Would the carrying out of this Plan, in your opinion mean a considerable step toward the unification of West Europe, or are you of the opinion that it would mean little or no progress in this respect?"

Table 3

Evaluation of the Schuman Plan by Satisfaction with Government's Actions for the Economy,
Party Adherence Constant, May, 1951

A. CDU/FDP Adherents

Satisfaction with the government	Agreement with Schuman Plan			=		(N)
	Agree	Do not agree	No opinion			
Satisfied	85	4	12	=	101%	(52)
Somewhat unsatisfied	76	24	--	=	100%	(21)
Very unsatisfied	29	43	29	=	101%	(14)

B. SPD Adherents

Satisfaction with the government	Agreement with Schuman Plan			=		(N)
	Agree	Do not agree	No opinion			
Satisfied	63	23	14	=	100%	(22)
Somewhat unsatisfied	73	27	--	=	100%	(22)
Very unsatisfied	44	47	8	=	99%	(36)

C. Adherents of No Party

Satisfaction with the government	Agreement with Schuman Plan			=		(N)
	Agree	Do not agree	No opinion			
Satisfied	81	5	14	=	100%	(21)
Somewhat unsatisfied	61	39	--	=	100%	(23)
Very unsatisfied	48	39	13	=	100%	(23)

Table 4

Comparison of Evaluation of the Schuman Plan by Party Adherence March and May 1951

<u>A. March, 1951</u>						
Party ¹	Agreement with the Schuman Plan					(N)
	Agree	Do not agree	No opinion			
No Party	48	28	24	=	100%	(76)
CDU/FDP	75	17	8	=	100%	(84)
SDP	62	31	7	=	100%	(91)
Differences between CDU and SPD	-13	-14	-1			
<u>B. May, 1951</u>						
Party ²	Agreement with the Schuman Plan					(N)
	Agree	Do not agree	No opinion			
No Party	53	27	20	=	100%	(79)
CDU/FDP	70	15	15	=	100%	(96)
SDP	56	34	10	=	100%	(86)
Differences between CDU and SPD	-14	-19	-5			
<u>C. September, 1951</u>						
Party ³	Agreement with the Schuman Plan					(N)
	Agree	Do not agree	No opinion			
No Party	33	37	30	=	100%	(190)
CDU/FDP	61	19	19	=	99%	(165)
SDP	27	50	23	=	100%	(129)
Differences between CDU and SPD	-34	-31	-4			

¹ and ². The question was: "If there were an election tomorrow, for which party would you vote?"

³. The question was: "Which party is closest to your point of view?"

Table 5

Evaluation of the Schuman Plan by Political Party Adherence, European/Nationalist Predispositions Held Constant, March, 1951

A. European Predisposition

Party Adherence	Agreement with the Schuman Plan					(N)
	Agree	Do not agree	No opinion			
No Party	59	24	17	=	100%	(42)
CDU/FDP	74	17	9	=	100%	(65)
SPD	67	27	6	=	100%	(66)
Differences between CDU and SPD	+7	-10	+3			

B. Nationalist Predisposition

Party Adherence	Agreement with the Schuman Plan					(N)
	Agree	Do not agree	No opinion			
No Party	38	41	21	=	100%	(29)
CDU/FDP	76	18	6	=	100%	(17)
SPD	48	48	4	=	100%	(25)
Differences between CDU and SPD	+28	-30	+2			

Table 6

Beliefs about German Experience under the ECSC, 1953 and 1956

Germany fares:*

	March, 1953		April, 1956
	Schuman Plan	Montan Union	Montan Union
Well	25	25	21
Middlingly	28	20	32
Poorly	23	25	32
Do not know	23	30	15
	99%	100%	100%
Percent of sample informed	26%	40%	26%
(N)	(268)	(415)	(528)

*The question was: "From all that you have heard, do you have the impression that Germany fares well or poorly under the Montan Union (Schuman Plan)?"

Table 7

Evaluations of the ECSC, 1952-1956

	Oct., 1952		March, 1953		April, 1956		Dec., 1956
			Schuman Plan	Montan Plan			
Favor	53%	No mistake ^a	54%	48%	No mistake ^b	57%	49%
Not favor	28	Mistake	15	15	Mistake	20	24
		Undecided	19	19	Undecided	14	
Do not know	19	Do not know	12	17	Do not know	9	27
	<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100%		100%	100%	100%		100%
Percent favorable, of those with opinions	61%		78%	76%	75%		67%
Percent informed	53%		27%	40%	26%		35%
(N)	(1060)		(268)	(415)	(528)		(713)

^a. All respondents were asked whether or not they thought it was a mistake.

^b. Only respondents who did not say it was good for Germany were asked whether or not it was a mistake to have joined; therefore the respondents who said it was good for Germany are added to those who said it was not a mistake to have joined .

Table 8

Support for European Union, 1951-1956

European Union*	Aug. ^a 1951	Sept. ^b 1952	Oct. ^c 1954	Feb. ^d 1955	Sept. ^e 1955	Dec. ^f 1955	April ^g 1956	Dec. ^h 1956
For	68%	70%	82%	73%	68%	69%	67%	73%
Against	6	10	4	7	7	6	6	5
Qualified answer	4							
Do not know	22	20	14	20	25	25	27	22
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*The question was: "Are you, in general, for or against making efforts toward uniting West Europe?" In September, 1955 and April, 1956, the question read, "If there were a referendum in Europe: would you vote for or against the establishment of the United States or Europe?"

Surveys a, b, c, d, f, and h were conducted by DIVO, N= 800 except b, N = 1,600 and h. N = 2,000; e and g were conducted by Demoskopie, N = 2,000.

Table 9

Evaluations of ECSC by Support for European Union Dec., 1956

Efforts toward European Union	Evaluation of ECSC				(N)
	Good	Not good	No opinion		
Favor	54	22	24	= 100%	(609)
Oppose	23	52	25	= 100%	(44)
DK	15	28	57	= 100%	(60)

Table 10

Evaluations of the ECSC by Party Adherence, December, 1956

Party ¹	Evaluation of the ECSC				(N)
	Approve	Do not Approve	No opinion		
No Party	44	22	34	= 100%	(178)
CDU ²	54	23	23	= 100%	(217)
SPD	47	30	23	= 100%	(201)
Differences between CDU and SPD	-7	-7	0		

¹ The question was: "If there were a Federal election in the near future, for which party would you vote?"

²The FDP, in 1956, was no longer part of the Government coalition and therefore its adherents are not included as they were in the earlier surveys. Calculating them together with the CDU adherents, the percentages are the same: 54, 22, 24, (43).

Endnotes

¹ An abridged version of this paper was read at the Society for Social Research, Chicago, May 24, 1958. I am indebted to the University of Chicago Law School where, as a Senior Fellow in Law and Behavioral Science 1957/1958, I had the opportunity to complete the analysis reported here. The data were collected while I was in Germany as a Fulbright Research Scholar, 1956/1957. I am also indebted to many persons in Germany for their personal help and their cooperation in making the resources of their institutions available to me. I would particularly like to mention my thanks to: Rene Koenig, Erwin Scheuch and others of the Soziologische Seminar, University of Cologne; Nels Anderson and the staff of the UNESCO Institute for Social Sciences, Cologne; Gerhard Baumert, Peter Schmitt, and the staff of DIVO, Bad Godesberg; and Elisabeth Noelle Neumann and the staff of Demoskopie, Allensbach am Bodensee. I am indebted to J.J. Feldman of NORC, Chicago, for his critical reading of an earlier version of this paper.

² For a full description of the origins, structure, and activities of the ECSC, see: Henry L. Mason, The European Coal and Steel Community, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955); John Goormatigh, "European Coal and Steel Community," International Conciliation, no. 503, 1955, pp. 343-408. Ernest B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1958.

³ The March 1951, May 1951, and December 1956 surveys were conducted by DIVO, Bad Godesberg, national stratified probability sample, N-1,000, 800, and 2,000; the September 1951 survey was conducted by Demoskopie, Allensbach am Bodensee, national quota sample, N-2,000.

⁴ For a good popular account of public opinion in Germany, see Fritz Rene Allemann, Bonn ist nicht Weimar, (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1956), est. pp. 101-130.

⁵ Thus, too, when the respondents were asked, "What do you think France hopes to achieve by the Schuman Plan: does she mainly hope to get an advantage for herself at the expense of other nations, or do you think she wants to promote economic cooperation among all the nations concerned?". Of those replying "economic cooperation," 86% favored the Plan and 6% did not; of those replying "own advantage," 44% favored the plan and 45% did not.

⁶ Indeed, union membership was associated with less support for the Plan; in the March 1951 survey, of the union members, 59% approved of the Plan and 35% did not (N-68); of the non-members, 64% approved and 21% did not (N-205). Presumably, this is due to the fact that union members were predominately Social Democratic Party (SPD) adherents. Thus, among the SPD adherents in the March 1951 survey, among the members 51% approved and 40% did not (N-35); of the non-members, 68% approved and 27% did not (N-56). Even later, in the September 1951 survey, the results were similar. Of the union members, 32% approved and 45% did not (N-139); while among the non-members, 43% approved and 34% did not (N-432). Among the SPD adherents, among the union members, 29% approved and 54% did not (N-69); while among the non-members, 25% approved and 45% did not (N-60).

⁷ Muzafer Sherif, "Group Influences upon the Formation of Norms and Attitudes," Readings in Social Psychology, ed. By Guy E. Swanson, Theodore M. Newcomb, and Eugene L. Hartley, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1952, pp. 249-262.

⁸ "What do you think from what you have already heard about the Plan: should West Germany accept or reject the Plan?" Of the 77% of the respondents who had heard of the Plan, 51% said Germany should accept, 17%, it should not, and 32% had no opinion. National quota sample, N = 2,000. Conducted by Demoskopie. Adapted from Elisabeth Noelle Neumann and Erick Peter Neumann, Jahrbuch der Offentlichen Meinung 1947-1955, (Allensbach am Bodensee: Verlag fur Demoskopie, 1956), p.343.

⁹ "Do you, on the whole, agree with the Schuman Plan or not?"

¹⁰ "Do you, on the whole, agree with the Schuman Plan or not?"

¹¹ "Recently the Schuman Plan was signed. Do you think it right or wrong that Adenauer signed the Plan?" Of the 87% of the sample claiming to have heard of the Plan, 15% said it was right, 23% said it was right with qualifications, 22% said it was wrong, and 40% had no opinion.

"The signing of the Schuman Plan is valid when the Bundestag gives its agreement. Should the Bundestag, in your opinion, ratify or reject the Schuman Plan?" Apparently the following percentages are based upon the entire sample, 25% said the Bundestag should ratify, 20% that it should reject, 15% were undecided, and 40% did not know. Both questions from a national quota sample N = 1,500-1,800, conducted by Demoskopie. Adapted from Neumann, *op. cit.* pp.343-344.

¹² In Bonn at present the Schuman Plan is being discussed: Should the Bundestag, in your opinion, support or reject German participation?" Of the 29% of the sample who had accurate knowledge of the Plan, 40% said support, 37% reject, 23% were undecided. N = 1,943, national quota sample. Demoskopie reanalysis.

¹³ "As is known, the Bundestag in Bonn has ratified the Schuman Plan. In your opinion, was that right or wrong?" Of the 89% of the sample claiming to have heard of the Plan, 24% said it was right, 27% wrong, 13% were undecided, and 36% did not know. .Adapted from Neumann, *op. cit.*, p.344.

¹⁴ It is noteworthy that the January, 1952 question is preceded by the statement, "As is known, the Bundestag in Bonn has ratified the Schuman Plan." Nevertheless, support for the plan was at its nadir at this time. Does this mean that the proposition that a legitimately enacted law or institution cannot be expected to automatically garner support simply upon the basis that it already exists and legitimately does so? Findings noted later indicate that the proposition does hold, but apparently this process is not so automatic that immediately after enactment a mere assertion that a law or institution exists will win it much support.

¹⁵ Another shift in perception and evaluative framework is suggested by William Diebold, Jr., in a personal communication. After the outbreak of the Korean War, American policy emphasized the essential military contribution Germany could make to Western defense. There may have been two reactions related to the Schuman Plan. Germany's bargaining power being strengthened, the price of the Schuman Plan might seem unnecessary to gain the advantages anticipated from the Plan. Second, the Schuman Plan itself might be perceived as part of a military build-up. This explanation for the fall in support of the Plan seems reasonable to me and I believe it may have been a factor, at least among the more politically sophisticated; but I have no evidence on this point in the survey data.

¹⁶ Survey conducted by Demoskopie, national sample, N = 2,080.

¹⁷ In April, 1956, the proportion of the sample judged to have knowledge of ECSC was determined by a series of screening questions. First, the respondent must claim to have heard of it, then know that Germany is a member, then at least not to admit to not knowing what other nations were members, and finally choose the proper brief description of the ECSC from among three alternatives. This is probably a more stringent definition of being informed about the ECSC than used in the other surveys being analyzed here, in which answers to open ended questions were coded. Survey conducted by Demoskopie, national stratified probability sample, N = 2,000.

¹⁸ Survey conducted by DIVO, national probability sample, N = 2,000.

¹⁹ Results are adapted from Neumann, *op. cit.*, p.345, survey conducted by Demoskopie, N =1,000.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

²¹ *Emnid Informationen*, Emnid, Bielefeld, No.9, p.3.

²² Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 345.

²³ ibid., p. 345.

²⁴ ibid., p. 334.

²⁵ ibid., p. 350 and April, 1956 survey.

²⁶ ibid., p. 392.

²⁷ ibid., p. 315.

²⁸ DIVO survey conducted in August, 1951, N = 800.

²⁹ Neumann, op. cit., p. 319.

³⁰ ibid., p. 137 and April, 1956 survey.

³¹ See: Louis Kriesberg, "German Public Opinion and the European Coal and Steel Community," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIII (Spring, 1959), pp .28-42.

³² In part, the change among SPD adherents may be due to influence of the union leaders. The union leaders had become more enthusiastic in their support of the Community. (See Louis Kriesberg, "German Businessmen and Union Leaders and the European Coal and Steel Community," Social Science 34 (April 1960) pp. 114-121. and file than is the case for the SPD leaders, or the union leaders 'position became particularly influential when the SPD campaign ceased. In any case, while in 1951 trade union members were less approving of the proposed ECSC than were non-members, in 1956 there was no difference: of the union members, 51% thought it was good, 27% did not (N - 178) and of the non-members, 48% thought it good, and 24 thought it not so good (N -488).

³³ See: Louis Kriesberg, "German Public Opinion and the European Coal and Steel Community," Public Opinion Quarterly, op. cit.