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*The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1. (Spring, 1959), pp. 28-42.

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*The Public Opinion Quarterly* is currently published by Oxford University Press.

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# German Public Opinion and the European Coal and Steel Community\*

By LOUIS KRIESBERG

Six Western European nations, which less than ten years earlier had been fighting on opposite sides during World War II, took a major step toward the solution of their common economic problems in 1952 when they established the European Coal and Steel Community. The attitudes of West Germans to this new economic entity and to its effects on their lives are analyzed in the following article.

The author is on the staff of the National Opinion Research Center. He started this study in 1956 when he was in Germany as a Fulbright Research Scholar.

**I**N JUNE 1952 the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was ratified by the parliaments of six nations: West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The ECSC is a supranational institution with sovereign rights over the coal and steel industries of the member nations.<sup>1</sup> Now further steps toward the integration of Western Europe are being taken. What were the perceived consequences of the ECSC and what difference has that experience made in the evaluations of this first step toward European integration?

In an earlier paper, I traced the development of German public opinion from 1950 to 1956.<sup>2</sup> I showed that two sets of determinants seemed to explain the development of evaluations of the ECSC: (1) the influence of others, particularly political parties, and (2) predispositions—(a) directly

\* The data were collected while I was in Germany as a Fulbright Research Scholar, 1956–1957. I am indebted to many persons in Germany for their personal help and their cooperation in making the resources of their institutions available to me. I would particularly like to mention my gratitude to Elisabeth Noelle Neumann and the staff of Demoskopie, Allensbach am Bodensee; Rene Koenig, Erwin Scheuch, and others of the Soziologische Seminar, University of Cologne; Nels Anderson and the staff of the UNESCO Institute for Social Sciences, Cologne; and Gerhard Baumert and Peter Schmitt of DIVO, Bad Godesberg. The year 1957–1958 as Senior Fellow in Law and the Behavioral Sciences at the University of Chicago Law School facilitated my work. Finally, I am indebted to J. J. Feldman of the National Opinion Research Center and Leo Goodman of the University of Chicago for their suggestions on aspects of this paper.

<sup>1</sup> For a description of the origins, structure, and activities of the ECSC, see Henry L. Mason, *The European Coal and Steel Community*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1955. John Goormaghtigh, "European Coal and Steel Community," *International Conciliation*, No. 503, 1955, pp. 343-408. Ernest B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1958.

<sup>2</sup> Louis Kriesberg, "German Evaluations of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1950–1956," mimeographed.

relevant ones, such as beliefs about France, European Union, and Germany, and (b) indirectly relevant ones, such as values and beliefs about authority and innovations, and general state of satisfaction. These determinants seemed adequate to explain the initial evaluations of the Schuman Plan and also the decline in approval from 1950 through 1951. Of those with opinions, favorable evaluations of the proposed ECSC dropped from 75 per cent in June 1950 to 47 per cent in January 1952. Adherence to a political party increasingly determined evaluations of the Schuman Plan, and political discussion of it apparently affected perception of the Plan so that adherents of both the government and opposition parties became less favorable to it.

Once the ECSC was functioning, however, general approval rose to 61 per cent in October 1952 and ranged even higher for the period afterward; at the same time, there was a decline in the percentage of the population who thought Germany fared well under the ECSC. The two sets of determinants did not entirely explain these more complex developments. Obviously, after an institution is established, experience with it may be an important determinant of evaluations. Accordingly, in this report experience with the ECSC is also considered in an effort to explain German evaluations of the ECSC four years after its establishment.

The analysis presented here is based upon a public opinion survey conducted in April 1956.<sup>3</sup> A series of screening questions was used to determine whether or not the respondent was informed about the ECSC. If the respondent replied that he had heard of the ECSC, knew that Germany was a member, did not admit that he did not know what other nations were members, and chose the proper brief description of the ECSC from among three alternatives, he was considered informed. On this basis 26 per cent of the sample were informed about the ECSC. The analysis here is concerned only with the informed persons.<sup>4</sup>

The respondents were asked two general evaluative questions. First they were asked, "From all that you have heard, do you have the impression that Germany fares well or poorly under the Montan-Union?" (Montan-Union is the name by which the ECSC is known in Germany.) Of the informed respondents, 21 per cent replied Germany fared well, 32 per cent said fair, 32 per cent said poorly, and 15 per cent said they did not know. All those who did not say that Germany fared well under the ECSC were asked, "Would you say that it was a mistake or not a mistake that we joined?" Of the respondents asked this question, 47 per cent said it was not a mistake, 18 per

<sup>3</sup> The survey was conducted by Demoskopie, Allensbach am Bodensee: stratified probability sample of 2,000 persons in West Germany and West Berlin.

<sup>4</sup> Of the sample of informed persons, 74% were men; 21% were under 30 years of age, 33% between 30 and 44 years, 33% between 45 and 59 years, and 13% 60 and older; 66% had schooling only until the conclusion of Volksschule, 21% had schooling up through Mittlere Reife, and 13% had Gymnasium or university training.

cent were undecided, 24 per cent said it was a mistake, and 11 per cent had no opinion.<sup>5</sup>

On the basis of the answers to the above two questions, the respondents were classified into five categories. (I) "Good" consisting of the 107 respondents who thought that Germany fared well under the ECSC; (II) "Middle-Pro" consisting of those respondents who did not say Germany had fared well and yet believed it was not a mistake to have joined, 125 of whom said it was fair for Germany and 32 of whom said they did not know whether it was good or bad; (III) "Bad, not anti" consisting of 38 who said it was bad for Germany and that it was not a mistake to have joined, 37 who were undecided whether it was a mistake, and 5 who said they did not know whether it was a mistake; (IV) "Bad, anti" consisting of 91 respondents who said that Germany fared badly under the ECSC and that it was a mistake to have joined it; and (V) "Undecided" consisting of 46 who thought Germany fared fairly well plus 45 who did not know how Germany had fared, all 91 of whom had also responded in some other way than by saying that they thought it had not been a mistake. Of the last category, 11 thought it was a mistake, 37 had no opinion, and 37 were undecided.

#### DETERMINANTS OF EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC

*Influence of others.* The political debate leading to the ratification of the treaty establishing the ECSC was highly partisan. The governing party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), under the leadership of Adenauer, lead support for the Community. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) was strongly opposed to the establishment of the ECSC. Until the ratification of the treaty, party adherence was increasingly associated with evaluations of the ECSC. Afterward, however, party adherence became a less discriminating factor. This was probably due to the fact that the debate quieted down. The SPD leaders continued to assert that their opposition had proved to be justified; nevertheless, they participated in the organs of the ECSC.

In Table 1, adherents of minor parties making up the government coalition were added to CDU adherents, and adherents of the minor opposition parties were added to the SPD adherents; these additions do not change the distribution of evaluations of the ECSC, but they slightly increase the size of the sample. According to Table 1, party adherence tended to make a difference in evaluations of the Community. Considering only those respondents who either thought Germany fared well or fair (I and II) or thought Germany fared poorly (III and IV) and omitting the undecided (V), we see that only 27 per cent of the adherents of the government parties thought Germany fared poorly, while 43 per cent of the adherents of the opposition parties did

<sup>5</sup> When the respondents who answered that Germany fared well under the ECSC are added to those who said it was not a mistake to have joined, the percentages are 57, 14, 20, and 9.

so. Similarly, recalculating the percentages of those who thought Germany fared poorly, 43 per cent of the adherents of the government party said it was a mistake for Germany to have joined the Community, while 57 per cent of the opposition parties' adherents said it was a mistake [IV/(III + IV)]. Finally, among those who did not feel Germany fared badly (I and II), 45 per cent of the government party adherents said Germany fared well compared to 37 per cent of the adherents of the opposition parties. The differences in the last two comparisons, however, do not reach the .05 level of significance.<sup>6</sup>

TABLE 1  
EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY POLITICAL PARTY ADHERENCE

Party Adherence	Good	Middle, Pro	Bad, Not Anti	Bad, Anti	Undecided	Per Cent	(N)
	I	II	III	IV	V		
Government party	28	34	13	10	15	100	(174)
Opposition party	18	31	16	21	14	100	(195)
No party	13	24	16	23	24	100	(104)
(N)	(96)	(144)	(72)	(79)	(82)		(473)*

\*Refusals not included.

Interestingly, those who did not adhere to any party appeared to be at least as much in opposition in all three comparisons as were the adherents of the opposition parties. This suggests that party adherence as such was not a dominant determinant of evaluations of the ECSC.

There are many other sources of influence of others. Data on the most direct one, friends, were not available, but an analysis of reference groups did give some information. Among manual workers, those who believed management favored the ECSC were slightly less approving of the Community than those who did not, while, among white collar workers, those who believed management was favorable were more favorable to the Community than those who did not. However, among the non-union workers as well as union members, those who believed the unions approved the Community were more likely to favor it than those who did not. Of course, without further data it is impossible to be certain that beliefs about the position of other groups were not projections from the respondent's own commitments rather than influences upon his evaluations.

*Predispositions.* The respondents' directly and indirectly relevant values and beliefs also provide bases for the evaluation of a new institution. This is obviously the case for a proposed institution.<sup>7</sup> It is also true for an established institution, particularly if it is as distant and complex, and therefore as vague, as the ECSC is for most persons.

The directly relevant predispositions will be considered first. In Table 2

<sup>6</sup> Statistical significance was measured by computing chi squares; in these comparisons, e.g., three separate chi squares, each with one degree of freedom, were computed.

<sup>7</sup> See Kriesberg, *op. cit.*

we can see the relationship between types of evaluation of the ECSC and support for European Union. Respondents who would vote for a United States of Europe were somewhat more likely to think that Germany fared well or fair (I and II); those who would not so vote were more likely to think that Germany fared poorly. Similarly, the predisposition of support for European Union seemed to affect judgments of whether or not it was a mistake to have joined. Among those who thought Germany fared poorly, those opposing European Union were more likely to think it was a mistake to have joined (*cf.* III and IV) than were the supporters of European Union. However, this predisposition did not seem to make any difference between respondents who thought Germany fared well (I) and those who thought it fared fairly well (II).

TABLE 2  
EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNION

<i>Vote for U.S. of Europe*</i>	<i>Good</i> I	<i>Middle,</i> <i>Pro</i>	<i>Bad,</i> <i>Not</i>	<i>Bad,</i> <i>Anti</i>	<i>Undecided</i> V	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>(N)</i>
		II	III	IV			
For	21	32	16	16	15	100	(439)
Against	19	22	6	45	8	100	(36)
Do not know	15	20	10	10	45	100	(40)
(N)	(104)	(154)	(78)	(91)	(88)		(515)

\*The question was: "If there were a vote taken in Europe, would you yourself vote for or against the establishment of a United States of Europe?"

Allowing the respondent himself to judge the relevance of the ECSC to European Union, the pattern remained the same (Table 3). Respondents who thought the collapse of the ECSC would be a major blow to European Union were more likely to think Germany fared well or fair (I and II) than those who thought its collapse would be an unfortunate event or irrelevant to European Union. Similarly, among those who thought Germany fared poorly (III and IV), those who attributed greater importance to a possible collapse of the ECSC were more likely to think it was not a mistake for Germany to have joined (*cf.* III and IV). However, among those who did not think Germany fared poorly (I and II), there was no clear relationship between beliefs about the relevance of the ECSC to European Union and evaluations of the ECSC.

The respondents were asked whether or not they believed it was possible to reach a lasting understanding with France (Table 4). Those who believed a lasting understanding was possible were more likely to think Germany did not fare poorly than were those who believed that too much divided Germany and France. Among those who thought Germany fared poorly, those who did not believe an understanding with France was possible tended to think it was a mistake to have joined the ECSC; however, this tendency does not reach the

TABLE 3  
EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY JUDGMENT OF ITS RELEVANCE FOR EUROPE

<i>Breakdown of the Montan-Union*</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>Middle, Bad,</i>		<i>Bad,</i>		<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>(N)</i>
	I	<i>Pro</i>	<i>Not Anti</i>	<i>Anti</i>	<i>Undecided</i>		
Heavy blow for Europe	28	44	15	6	7	100	(107)
Sad fact	22	39	16	10	13	100	(186)
Unimportant	15	15	17	39	14	100	(136)
Do not know	16	16	12	14	42	100	(92)
(N)	(106)	(155)	(80)	(90)	(90)		(521)

\*The question was: "If the Montan-Union broke down, would that, in your opinion be a heavy blow for Europe, or only a sad fact, or entirely without importance?"

.05 level of significance. Among those who did not think Germany fared poorly, belief about an understanding with France was statistically independent of their evaluations of the ECSC.

TABLE 4  
EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY BELIEF IN UNDERSTANDING WITH FRANCE

<i>Understanding with France*</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>Middle, Bad,</i>		<i>Bad,</i>		<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>(N)</i>
	I	<i>Pro</i>	<i>Not Anti</i>	<i>Anti</i>	<i>Undecided</i>		
Possible	23	34	14	14	14	99	(288)
Not possible	19	23	18	25	15	100	(175)
Do not know	10	28	14	9	40	101	(58)
(N)	(106)	(154)	(80)	(90)	(91)		(521)

\*The question was: "Do you believe in general that it is possible for us to reach a lasting understanding with France, or do you believe that too much divides us?"

A similar pattern is revealed when we consider beliefs about the Russian menace, as presented in Table 5. Again, we find that those respondents who believed that Germany was menaced by Russia were more likely to think that Germany did not fare poorly under the ECSC than those who thought Russia was not a menace. Again, this belief is associated with the evaluation that it was not a mistake to have joined the ECSC (*cf.* III and IV), but there was no association between those who thought Germany fared well rather than fair (*cf.* I and II).

TABLE 5  
EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY BELIEF IN RUSSIAN MENACE

<i>Russia*</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>Middle, Bad,</i>		<i>Bad,</i>		<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>(N)</i>
	I	<i>Pro</i>	<i>Not Anti</i>	<i>Anti</i>	<i>Undecided</i>		
Menace	21	33	15	13	17	99	(245)
No menace	21	26	15	26	12	100	(198)
Do not know	12	31	16	9	31	99	(80)
(N)	(104)	(157)	(80)	(91)	(91)		(523)

\*The question was: "Do you have the feeling that we are or are not menaced by Russia?"

The final directly relevant predisposition to be considered is nationalist sentiments. The survey question which came closest to this area concerned the allocation of responsibility for the outbreak of World War II. Examining Table 6, we find, as would be expected, that those respondents who thought other nations were responsible for the outbreak of the war were much more likely to believe that Germany fared poorly under the ECSC than were those who attributed the war to other causes. Among those who thought Germany fared badly, again, those who considered other nations responsible for the war were much more likely to think it was a mistake for Germany to have joined the ECSC. Allocation of responsibility for the war was also associated with evaluations of the ECSC among those who did not think it was bad for Germany. Strikingly, those who said both sides were responsible were more likely to evaluate the Community as fair for Germany; while those who said "fate" was responsible for the war were more likely to say the Community was good. This last finding may be related to the finding that the politically passive were more likely to say Germany fared well than were those who discussed politics often or occasionally (see Table 8).

TABLE 6

## EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY BELIEF IN RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORLD WAR II

<i>Responsibility for War*</i>	<i>Good</i> I	<i>Middle,</i> <i>Pro</i> II	<i>Bad,</i> <i>Not Anti</i> III	<i>Bad,</i> <i>Anti</i> IV	<i>Undecided</i> V	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>(N)</i>
Germany (Us, Hitler)	24	32	14	17	13	100	(229)
Other nations (Russia, West)	14	24	14	35	14	99	(66)
Both sides	15	41	13	10	21	100	(86)
Fate	27	20	13	13	27	100	(30)
International capitalism	10	25	16	29	19	100	(31)
Do not know and other responses (N)	26 (107)	22 (156)	16 (74)	8 (90)	28 (91)	100	(76) (518)

\*The question was: "Certainly it is difficult to say, but what would you think—who was responsible for war breaking out in 1939?"

Before the establishment of the ECSC, general predispositions such as attitudes toward authority or general level of satisfaction appeared to be projected upon the proposed institution. After its establishment, such general predispositions were perhaps still operative but additional general predispositions may also have become relevant. It is often said that once a law has been enacted or an institution established predispositions about authority and habituation to what exists serve to give it support. This probably has occurred in the case of the ECSC and helps to explain the fact that, despite the decreased belief that Germany fared well under the ECSC, approval of it rose and re-



mained high after its establishment. However, it is difficult to test this hypothesis.

In Table 7 there is some evidence that authority predispositions were relevant to evaluations of the ECSC. Only about 20 per cent of the respondents condemned a common and petty violation of the law—smuggling a pound of coffee into Germany (coffee is heavily taxed in Germany). These respondents would appear to have a particularly strong sense of the sacredness of law. The respondents who condemned the smuggling of a pound of coffee through customs were less likely to think Germany fared badly under the ECSC than those who did not condemn it. Similarly, among those who thought Germany fared badly, the condemners were less likely to think it was a mistake to have joined the ECSC than those who did not condemn smuggling. Finally, among those who did not think Germany fared badly, those who condemned smuggling were more likely to say that Germany fared well than were those who did not condemn it.

TABLE 7  
EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY CONDEMNATION OF SMUGGLING

<i>Condemnation of Smuggling*</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>Middle, Pro</i>	<i>Bad, Not Anti</i>	<i>Bad, Anti</i>	<i>Undecided</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>(N)</i>
	I	II	III	IV			
Condemn	31	31	14	5	18	99	(108)
Not condemn	17	30	16	21	16	100	(398)
Undecided	21	21	5	37	11	100	(19)
(N)	(106)	(157)	(80)	(91)	(91)		(525)

\*The question was: "If someone returned from a trip out of the country and smuggled a pound of coffee through customs, would you condemn it or not condemn it?"

Data showing the relevance of political passivity and habituation to an institution are provided in Table 8. One might hypothesize that respondents who did not frequently talk about politics were politically passive and would be likely to support an established institution. However, we find that respondents who often talked about politics tended to think that Germany did not fare badly, compared to those who rarely discussed politics. Moreover, among those who thought Germany fared badly, frequency of political conversations was not consistently related to beliefs that it was or was not a mistake for Germany to have joined the Community. It is among those respondents who did not think that Germany fared badly that support for the hypothesis may be found. Those who rarely or never discussed politics were more likely to say that Germany fared well than were those who discussed politics often or occasionally. The finding related earlier that respondents who thought "fate" was responsible for the outbreak of World War II were particularly likely to think that Germany fared well under the ECSC also supports the hypothesis. Apparently, political passivity is associated with an un-

reflecting belief that the institution is good; other evaluations are more influenced by other determinants.

TABLE 8  
EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY FREQUENCY OF POLITICAL CONVERSATIONS

Frequency of Political Conversations*	Good	Middle, Pro	Bad, Not Anti	Bad, Anti	Undecided	Per Cent	(N)
	I	II	III	IV	V		
Often	18	34	14	24	10	100	(126)
Occasionally	19	32	18	14	16	99	(261)
Rarely or never	23	22	9	18	27	99	(135)
(N)	(103)	(157)	(80)	(91)	(91)		(522)

\*The question was: "Do you sometimes converse about politics?"

*Experience with the ECSC.* After an institution has been functioning for more than four years, experience could be an important determinant of evaluations of it. But with an institution as distant from the daily life of nearly all persons as is the ECSC, what does "experience" with it mean? It means, here, the attributed consequences of the ECSC for the respondent's self. The consequences may be changes in power, status, or economic position; the self may be whatever the respondent identifies himself with—Europe, Germany, a social class, an occupational role, or an economic role such as consumer.

In the above sense, the respondents did have experience with the Community. When they were asked what the results of the ECSC have been, only half of them could mention anything, but of these nearly all referred to economic consequences; only 3 per cent referred to political integration. Half the responses concerned prices, a fifth the allocation of coal, 6 per cent the liberalization of trade, and 4 per cent increased production. Despite the many possible consequences attributable to the ECSC, only one was dominant—the economic consequences for Germany as seen from the consumer perspective. This makes the task of analysis easier. We will consider only this set of consequences.

The respondents were asked if the ECSC had reduced or eliminated any tariffs or had not yet done so. As Table 9 shows, respondents who wrongly believed that the Community had not yet ended or lowered tariffs were more likely to think that Germany fared badly than those who knew the Community had done so. Similarly, among those who thought Germany did not fare badly under the ECSC, those who knew tariffs had been eliminated or reduced were more likely to think that Germany fared well than those who thought that tariffs were unchanged. This difference, however, is not statistically significant. Among those who thought Germany fared badly, beliefs about the tariffs were not associated with thinking it was or was not a mistake for Germany to have joined the ECSC.

TABLE 9  
EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY BELIEFS ABOUT ECSC ACTION ON TARIFFS

<i>ECSC Action on Tariffs*</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>Middle, Pro</i>	<i>Bad, Not Anti</i>	<i>Bad, Anti</i>	<i>Undecided</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>(N)</i>
	I	II	III	IV			
Tariffs reduced or eliminated	26	35	13	15	12	101	(178)
No action yet	14	27	20	22	17	100	(137)
Do not know	19	28	14	16	23	100	(207)
(N)	(105)	(156)	(80)	(90)	(91)		(522)

\*The question was: "Do you happen to know, has the Montan-Union already reduced or eliminated the tariffs on coal and steel among the member nations, or hasn't it yet achieved that?"

The pattern was the same when the respondents were asked to allocate responsibility for increased coal prices (Table 10). Alleged responsibility for increased prices was associated with judgments about how Germany fared under the ECSC, but was not associated with judgment as to whether or not it was a mistake to have joined. Of course, beliefs about tariff action and price responsibility are not independent of each other, but each continues to be associated with evaluations of the ECSC when the other is held constant.

TABLE 10  
EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY BELIEFS ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR COAL PRICE INCREASES

<i>Responsibility for Coal Prices*</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>Middle, Pro</i>	<i>Bad, Not Anti</i>	<i>Bad, Anti</i>	<i>Undecided</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>(N)</i>
	I	II	III	IV			
ECSC not responsible	27	27	9	16	21	100	(96)
ECSC partly responsible	14	32	21	21	11	100	(28)
ECSC responsible	4	25	22	36	13	100	(55)
Coal prices same or do not know if raised	19	39	20	5	17	100	(119)*
(N)	(55)	(95)	(51)	(47)	(50)		(298)

\*All respondents were asked: "Have you noticed whether the price for household coal in this area has risen or remained the same in the last quarter of a year?" A split ballot was used in the study and half the respondents were asked, if they answered that prices had risen, "In your opinion, is the ECSC responsible or would they have risen without the ECSC?"

Consequently, the respondents in the table reported as answering that coal prices are the same or that they do not know if they were raised are about twice as numerous as they actually are proportionally.

It is possible that these beliefs about the effects of the Community were actually decided by the other determinants we have considered. Indeed, some of the other determinants were related to these beliefs. This is the case for party adherence and for some of the predispositions, e.g., belief in the possibility of a lasting understanding with France, or the judgment that the collapse of the Community would be a blow to the unification of Europe.

Nevertheless, holding political party adherence or these predispositions constant, beliefs about the consequences of the ECSC were still associated with evaluations of the ECSC. Other predispositions were independent of beliefs about the consequences.

There is one other aspect of experience with the Community which could not be determined by predispositions. The respondents were asked who in the household was concerned with getting coal. Obtaining coal for heating purposes is an important task. Ninety per cent of the dwelling units in Germany do not have central heating; the small ovens in each room are heated by coal briquettes, which were often in short supply and represented an important expenditure. It is possible that those who were concerned with household coal projected irritations to the Community.

In Table 11 we see that those respondents who reported that other persons obtained the coal or that coal was not used in their household were less likely to think that Germany fared badly under the ECSC than those respondents who alone or with others were concerned with obtaining coal. The hypothesis is further supported when we consider only those respondents who thought Germany did not fare badly: those who were not concerned with household coal were more likely than those who were concerned to say Germany fared well; those who were concerned were more likely to say Germany fared fairly well. However, among those who thought Germany fared badly, the relationship goes in the other direction: those who did not bother with household coal tended to think it was a mistake for Germany to have joined the ECSC; those who did bother with coal did not think it was a mistake to have joined. In other words, bothering about household coal tended to make the respondent think that Germany fared poorly under the ECSC but not to think that it was a mistake to have joined the Community. This finding requires a more detailed analysis.<sup>8</sup>

TABLE 11  
EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY CONCERN ABOUT HOUSEHOLD COAL

<i>Who Gets Coal*</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>Middle, Pro</i>	<i>Bad, Not Anti</i>	<i>Bad, Anti</i>	<i>Undecided</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>(N)</i>
	I	II	III	IV	V		
Others or do not use coal	25	28	10	16	21	100	(175)
Respondent and others	17	29	20	17	16	99	(123)
Respondent alone	17	32	17	19	16	101	(222)
(N)	(102)	(156)	(80)	(91)	(91)		(520)

\*The question was "Who, in general, concerns himself in your household with getting coal?"

<sup>8</sup> Persons concerned with obtaining coal, although less educated than those who were not concerned, were more likely to report that they read the economic section of their newspapers. Persons concerned with household coal surprisingly were no more or less likely to believe the

Perhaps for some persons concern with coal was not merely an irritation which might be projected upon the ECSC but an important deprivation which would be associated with a rejection of it. One way of estimating this possibility is to compare respondents at different income levels. The data are presented in Table 12. Respondents who bothered with coal again appeared more likely to believe that Germany fared badly than did those who did not bother with coal, but the association does not vary systematically by income level; at the 400-599 DM level, the direction of the association is reversed. Similarly, considering only those who did not think Germany fared badly, we find that those who did not bother with coal were more likely to believe that Germany fared well than were those who did bother; this is not the case at the 249 DM or less income level, perhaps because political passivity is more widespread at the lower income levels.<sup>9</sup>

TABLE 12  
EVALUATIONS OF THE ECSC BY CONCERN ABOUT HOUSEHOLD COAL  
BY INCOME LEVEL

<i>Income: D Marks per Month</i>	<i>Who Gets Coal</i>	<i>Good I</i>	<i>Middle, Pro II</i>	<i>Bad, Not Anti III</i>	<i>Bad, Anti IV</i>	<i>Undecided V</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>(N)</i>
249 or less	Others*	24	29	10	14	24	101	(21)
	Respondent† (N)	24 (14)	21 (14)	11 (6)	29 (14)	16 (11)	101	(38) (59)
250- 399	Others	25	32	13	9	20	99	(54)
	Respondent (N)	17 (34)	26 (48)	18 (29)	18 (27)	20 (35)	100	(119) (173)
400- 599	Others	21	20	11	27	21	100	(56)
	Respondent (N)	16 (31)	35 (52)	17 (26)	15 (33)	16 (31)	99	(117) (173)
600 or more	Others	32	37	5	13	13	100	(38)
	Respondent (N)	18 (24)	36 (38)	20 (15)	17 (16)	9 (11)	100	(66) (104)

\*Others and those who do not use coal.

†Respondent alone and respondent with others.

When we consider those respondents who thought Germany fared badly, the results do support the hypothesis. At the 249 DM or less income level, of the respondents who were concerned with getting coal, 27 per cent [III/

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Community was responsible for increases in coal prices or even to know that coal prices have risen. Those who were concerned with coal were less likely, however, to know that tariffs have been eliminated. In any case, the pattern noted above persists even when the beliefs about the consequences of the ECSC are held constant. Similarly, the impact of being concerned with household coal is the same when other determinants of evaluation of the ECSC are held constant.

<sup>9</sup> None of the chi squares computed for each of the eight comparisons reach the .05 level of significance, because of the small sample sizes.

(III + IV)] said it was not a mistake to have joined, while of the others, 40 per cent said it was not a mistake. At the 250-399 DM income level, 50 per cent of those who were concerned with coal said it was not a mistake to have joined, while 58 per cent of the others said it was not. On the other hand, at the higher income levels the reverse was the case. Of the respondents who were concerned with coal, 54 per cent said it was not a mistake to have joined while only 29 per cent of the others said it was not a mistake.<sup>10</sup>

This seems to support the hypothesis suggested above. At the lower income levels, those who bothered with household coal—to a greater extent than those who did not—tended to say that it was a mistake to have joined the Community. At the higher income levels, those who bothered with coal tended to say that it was not a mistake. A possible explanation of this finding will be tentatively offered.

Having to obtain coal may be associated with deprivations, but presumably the more reflective respondents would not project irritations upon the Community in such a simple and total way as to reject it completely. Some evidence to support this interpretation will be cited but not presented here. Holding education constant, the evidence showed that among those respondents with only a grammar (Volk) school education, being concerned with coal and evaluations of the ECSC were barely associated. With the more educated the association was more marked; among those who thought Germany fared badly, the association was strong and reversed. Sixty-one per cent of those who bothered with coal said it was not a mistake to have joined, while only 25 per cent of the others said it was not a mistake. There were similar findings when discussion of politics was held constant. Of those who discussed politics often or occasionally and thought Germany fared badly, those who bothered with coal tended to say it was not a mistake to have joined the Community. Of those who rarely or never discussed politics, those who bothered with coal were just as likely as the others to say that it was not a mistake to have joined the Community. Of course, the more educated respondents who discussed politics were likely to have higher incomes and the directly relevant predispositions associated with support of the ECSC; it was impossible to hold enough variables constant to determine to what extent ability to generalize from experience reflectively was an independent factor.

#### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Three factors were thought to explain the evaluations of the ECSC four years after its establishment: (1) the influence of others, (2) directly and indirectly relevant predispositions, and (3) experience with the new institution. All these factors were associated with whether or not the respondent thought

<sup>10</sup> Chi squares computed for each of the four comparisons, because of the small sample sizes, did not reach the .05 level of significance.

Germany fared badly under the ECSC, and the direction of the association was straightforward.

We found that the significance of these factors in explaining evaluations varied markedly. First, let us compare those respondents who said Germany fared well (I) with those who said Germany fared only fairly well and that it was not a mistake to have joined the Community (II). More adherents of the government parties than adherents of the opposition parties tended to say Germany fared well under the ECSC. The role of predisposition is more complex and gives added meaning to the apparently obvious role of party adherence.

The directly relevant predispositions were not associated with whether or not the respondents thought Germany fared well or fairly well. Support for a United States of Europe, belief in the relationship of the ECSC to European unification, faith in France, fear of Russia, and German nationalism were all independent of this particular evaluation of the Community. The indirectly relevant predispositions, on the other hand, were not independent. Those respondents who seemed to give more respect to the law (condemned smuggling) and were more politically passive (did not discuss politics and thought "fate" was responsible for the outbreak of the war) were more likely to say Germany fared well than only fairly well under the ECSC. It appears that some of the persons who gave simple unqualified approval to the ECSC did so on the basis of unreflecting support of a legally established institution.

Experience with the Community also determined evaluations of it among those who did not think Germany fared badly under the ECSC. Not unexpectedly, more of the respondents who believed tariffs had been lowered or eliminated or that the ECSC was not responsible for increased coal prices, or who were not concerned with getting coal tended to think Germany fared well rather than fair. For some persons, then, some calculation based upon their experience with the institution presumably affected their judgments of it.

When we consider those respondents who thought Germany fared badly under the ECSC, we find that adherents of government parties tended to think it was not a mistake for Germany to have joined the Community, while adherents of the opposition parties tended to think it was a mistake.

The directly relevant predispositions were associated with the judgment that it was or was not a mistake to have joined. One of the indirectly relevant predispositions, condemnation of smuggling, was also associated.

Although experience with the institution seemed to affect opinions as to how Germany fared under the Community, it did not seem to be associated with the judgment that it was or was not a mistake to have joined the Community. This judgment was more dependent upon party influence and particularly upon the directly relevant predispositions and one of the indirectly relevant ones.

On the basis of this analysis, we can venture an explanation of the fact that after the establishment of the ECSC approval of it rose, while at the same time belief that Germany fared well under the ECSC declined. Apparently after its establishment the ECSC received some support based upon habituation to what exists and transference of feelings about authority and the sacredness of laws. At the same time, experience with the ECSC from the viewpoint of a German consumer seems to have made some respondents believe that Germany fared badly under the ECSC. However, since the experience had not made the respondents feel very deprived and since the predispositions supporting the ECSC—particularly support of European Union—were strong, the respondents generally did not conclude that it was a mistake to have joined the ECSC.

In addition to giving substantive findings, the study of which this article is a part shows that at different times the importance of the several determinants varied. Before the institution was established, predispositions and the influence of others adequately explained evaluations of it. After the institution was functioning, experience with it as well as additional predispositions became relevant, while the decline in partisan debate reduced the influence of party adherence as a determinant. The study also shows that the importance of the several determinants varied with the significance of the determinant for the respondent. For example, the significance of experience varied at different income levels. Again experience was an especially important determinant for German businessmen and union leaders in the coal and steel industries, who had more direct experience with the ECSC than the general public, and not from the viewpoint of the consumer.<sup>11</sup> Finally, the study shows that the determinants had varying relevance for different opinions. Thus, whether or not the respondents felt that it was a mistake for Germany to have joined ECSC was particularly influenced by their predispositions, while their judgment of how well Germany fared under the ECSC was especially influenced by their experience.

<sup>11</sup> See Louis Kriesberg, "German Businessmen and Union Leaders and the European Coal and Steel Community," *Social Science*, forthcoming.