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Conciliation, Confrontation, and Approval of the President[1]

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Whether people are naturally peaceful or warlike obviously is a matter of long dispute. Whether democracies tend to be peaceful and less aggressive than policies dominated by one person, family, or group has also been the subject of argumentation and study.[2] More specifically, analysts have disagreed about the aggressive or nonaggressive character of the culture of the people in the U.S.[3] Others have identified particular cultural patterns which characterize American foreign policy orientations. For example, Blanchard has stressed that American aggression is inadvertent; that is, that Americans are not aware of being aggressive but see themselves only innocently and virtuously responding to the enemy's attack.[4]

Whatever the general level of public militancy in the U.S. may be, it certainly has varied in different periods of time. In this study, we will examine the prevailing tendency to support confrontational and conciliatory international action and to specify some of the conditions which affect the relative support for them.

We expect that in general the American people favor peace making actions by their government. Militant action is supported when it is viewed as a defense against the external threat. However, that sense of external threat may rise and fall due to domestic as well as external reasons and may reflect more or less readiness to resort to militancy to counter the presumed threat. Furthermore, what is viewed as an appropriate level of militancy is affected by previous historical experience and the balance of confrontation and conciliation practiced by the current government.

To specify these general expectations, we will examine data pertaining to (1) changes in approval of the U.S. President as affected by international confrontational and conciliation events; (2) public evaluations of various specific foreign policy actions; and (3) changes in the U.S. public's views of the Soviet Union and support for military spending.

That U.S. Presidents can rally support for their foreign policy and for themselves by taking foreign initiatives or responding to international crises is a widely-held belief. The public is generally not well informed or highly concerned about foreign policy and tends to defer to its leaders on foreign policy questions. Furthermore, when the President acts internationally he is representing the country vis-a-vis outsiders. This evokes a Rally-Round-the-Flag response.[5] As Hughes writes, "It appears that, almost regardless of prior attitudes of the public, regardless of the popularity of the president and regardless of how well the president handles the crises, a large proportion of the population will support him."[6] The support for the policy redounds to approval of the President. Many analyses of shifts in public opinion about issues and changes in approval of Presidents are consistent with these arguments.[7] An alternative view is that approval or disapproval of the U.S. Government's role in an international event is transferred to approval or disapproval of the President. The public reaction

to the Vietnam War and the failure of President Lyndon Johnson to rally support for himself or his policies in Vietnam appears to contradict the proposition that "Presidents and others in high national office are primarily responsive to the mass opinions that they themselves have created."[8] Even when one turns to responses to single dramatic vents analysts contend that the President does not always simply win over opinion, even in the short run. For example, Sigelman has analyzed public response to President Johnson and to his halt in the bombing of North Vietnam announced in March 196 , when he stated his decision not to be a candidate for President.[9] Sigelman argues that general orientations about the war affected people's support or lack of support of the bombing halt and that the President was following opinion rather than leading it.

We will test these two views by examining changes in the public's approval of the President following all major "Rally-Round-the-Flag" events between the Truman and Carter presidencies. If we find that confrontational and peace events have different impacts upon presidential approval, we can see what the variations are for such impacts in different periods and conditions.

The second set of data includes regularly asked survey questions about possible future actions which would be regarded as peace making. We will also examine the publics evaluations of past American actions which were confrontational and which were peace making or conciliatory.

The third set of data includes changing evaluations of the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. An examination of the degree and source of changes in the evaluations of our principle adversary can help interpret the other findings as well as contribute to our understanding of the circumstances in which the public tends to support confrontational and conciliatory policies. We will also review the trends in support of increased military spending.

Methods

To assess the relative effects of confrontational and conciliation events on presidential approval, we must hold constant other major determinant of presidential approval. To do so, we are using a regression model first developed by Mueller.[10] He was able to account for a large amount of the variation in public approval of the president by taking into account rally events. Length of time in office is intended to measure the gradual erosion of the coalition of minorities which gave the President his initial victory. Unemployment was used as the indicator of economic lump. War referred to the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Presidents varied in their initial levels of approval and had their own curves and so were treated as another variable in the regression.

The model and the indicators used by Mueller have been subjected to criticism and other models and indicators have been used.[11] For our purposes, however, we believe that the model and indicators developed by Mueller are adequate.[12] Furthermore, we can compare our findings with rally events distinguished between confrontation and conciliation events with his original findings using rally events in the aggregate.

Mueller developed a list of rally events which were international, directly involved the United States, and were clearly demarcated. Kernell performed a content analysis of three newspapers for the week in which each event received

maximum coverage.[13] He found that the coverage was sufficient to assure widespread public awareness. We added rally events for the later presidential terms by selecting similar kinds of events. We used the summary of recent history in annual almanacs to identify the major international events.[14] We divided the events constituting the Rally-Round-the-Flag variable into two sets of events: (1) those indicating a confrontational stance against a foreign adversary and (2) those indicating a conciliatory action with an adversary or a mediating action among foreign adversaries. Two conciliation events (Kennedy's American University speech and the initialing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban agreement) were added for Kennedy's term.[15]

Mueller studied the changes in presidential approval from Truman's first term through Johnson's second. We extended the analysis to include the first term of President Nixon and the four-year term of President Carter. The Nixon second term was short and dominated by the Watergate revelations and Ford was President too short a time for the methods used in the present analysis to be appropriately comparable.[16] Chart 1 lists the events used by Mueller and the events we added for Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter and our categorization of these events as confrontation or conciliatory actions. Some actions are categorized as both conciliation and confrontation because they involve both qualities or cannot be categorized, such as the beginning of an administration which is an event in Mueller's analysis, but does not fit as either a conciliation or confrontation event.

We converted conciliation and confrontation events into variables in the same way Mueller constructed rally points into the Rally-Round-the-Flag variable. We calculated the length of time in years (and fractions of years) since the last such event. Each variable can range from zero to a theoretical maximum of four (full term in office). In this way of calculating the variables, a *negative* correlation with presidential popularity means that the president *loses* popularity as time passes after an event.

Time in office and unemployment are continually changing events. Therefore, a negative coefficient would be interpreted as saying that an increase in time in office is associated with a decline in approval. Rally-Round-the-Flag events are different in their effects on approval. We expect such an event to have an immediate effect and then for the event to lose its impact over time as it becomes less prominent in the minds of the public and the more usual determinants of approval (such as time in office or the state of the economy) assert their influence. In this case a negative coefficient for the length of time since the event could result from sudden *increase* in approval at the time of the event, followed by a gradual decrease in approval as the event becomes less important. While it is possible that a negative slope could result from a steady decrease in approval after the event, this is not consistent with the idea of an event as something which produces an immediate public reaction. An inspection of the data shows that most events produce a very short term reaction in either a positive or negative direction.[17]

The time in office is a control variable because we are assuming that the coalition that elected the president gradually breaks down. Again, a negative correlation indicates that as the President remains in office approval of his handling of the job declines. Economic slump is measured by changes in the rate of unemployment. Presidential popularity is measured by approval ratings in Gallup polls.

Changes in Approval of the President

Mueller presented several models, but these differ only in the addition of new variables to further specify the relationship between Rally-Round-the-Flag events and approval. The R for his final model is .86, indicating a very high proportion of "explained" variance. In this model, there are, in addition to the Rally-Round-the-Flag and Economic Slump variables, dummy variables for each Presidential term, separate Time in Office variables for each presidential term, and dummy variables for war in Korea and Vietnam. The purpose of the dummy variables for each presidential term is to allow for the fact that each president starts his term in office with a different approval rating. The purpose of the separate Time in Office variables for each presidential term is to allow each presidential term to have its own rate of decline in approval ratings. In fact, the results show that presidents do begin their terms at different levels of approval and that the changes over time in level of approval do differ by presidential term. The dummy variables for Korea and Vietnam reflect the possibility that these wars would affect the level of approval, and possibly the reaction to Rally-Round-the-Flag events.

For our purposes all these other variables represent control variables. Our main interest is in the Rally-Round-the-Flag variable, but we need to control for as many other relevant variables as possible. In Table 1 our equation is compared with Mueller's. They are identical except that the Rally-Round-the-Flag variable is divided into two variables: a Conciliation variable and a Confrontation variable. The coefficient for Rally-Round-the-Flag in Mueller's equation and the coefficients for Conciliation and Confrontation in our equation are all negative and statistically significant, indicating that events are usually followed by an immediate increase in approval and then a gradual decline in approval over time as the impact of the event diminishes. From these equations it appears that this is true for both Conciliation and Confrontation events.

Mueller's analysis only extended to the end of Johnson's second term. When the Nixon and Carter terms are added (Table 2) the R2 remains very high (.84) and the Conciliation and Confrontation variables are still both negative and significant, but their relative magnitudes have changed, with the Confrontation coefficient becoming more highly significant and larger in size.

The fact that the addition of more data could significantly affect the relative sizes of the coefficients suggests a change in the way the model was specified by Mueller. His model allows for the possibility that Time in Office would affect different presidents in a different way, but it does not allow for the possibility that the public reaction to peace or confrontation events could differ by president. The way to test for this is to run a separate regression for each president with Time in Office, Conciliation, Confrontation, and Economic Slump as independent variables. The results of this model are presented in Table 3.

Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon show a pattern of negative coefficients for Conciliation and positive coefficients for Confrontation (all statistically significant except for the Confrontation coefficient for Johnson). This indicates that for these three presidents Conciliation events were followed by an immediate *increase* in public approval but Confrontation events were not, and in two out of three cases Confrontation events were followed by an immediate *decrease* in public approval. Kennedy and Carter show a very different pattern; negative

coefficients for Confrontation and nonsignificant coefficients for Conciliation events. For Kennedy and Carter Confrontation events were followed by an *increase* in approval. One may summarize these results by noting that Conciliation events either resulted in immediate increases in approval (Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon) or they had no effect (Truman, Kennedy, and Carter). Confrontation events resulted in immediate increases in approval in two cases (Eisenhower and Nixon) and had no affect in two cases (Truman and Johnson) where we were actually involved in armed combat in Korea and Vietnam.

Conciliation events seem to offer the better strategy for public approval; however, these results support the view that general orientations affect presidential support rather than the view that there is an automatic Rally-Round-the-Flag response to any foreign policy initiative. Because public approval for the president is given in the context of public opinion on other subjects which may change over time, we can gain some insight into the changing support for conciliation and confrontation events by looking at public evaluations of specific foreign policy actions and changes in public views of the Soviet Union and support for military spending.

Public Evaluations of Public Policy Actions

The evidence thus far indicates that the President's approval rating is more consistently enhanced by his involvement in conciliatory and cooperative international events to a greater degree than by his involvement in confrontational international events. This supports the view that the American public is more supportive in conciliatory and peace making policies than militant and confrontational ones. We assess this view further by considering the public's evaluation of a variety of foreign policy events. In late 1974, a national sample of Americans were asked to say if they thought each of thirteen international events involving the United States was a proud moment, a dark moment, or neither, in American history. In Table 4 we can see that Conciliatory events are much more likely to be regarded as proud moments than are Confrontational international events. For example pride in Nixon's trip to Communist China was much more extensive than the U.S. role in Korean War (1950-53), in the Dominican Republic strife (1965), in the Vietnam war (1964-1973), or the anti-Allende campaign in Chile (1970-1973).

Questions that ask people if they would approve or disapprove a meeting between the President of the U.S. and the leader of the Soviet Union have been asked repeatedly since the end of World War II. There is consistent support of summit meetings; usually two or three times as many people approving as disapproving.[18]

Seventy-two percent of the public approved of President Johnson's decision to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, announced in his speech of March 31, 1968. On the contrary, only 35 percent of the people approved of President Nixon's bombing of Laos and Cambodia in 1973. This difference does not mean that people always generally approve stopping of bombing and disapprove its initiation. Both of these actions occurred in the context of a war which was not widely supported. The context in which these actions occur gives them a meaning and hence affects the nature of the impact the events have upon presidential approval. Considering the context of the events will help us understand the

anomaly of Kennedy's and Carter's presidencies. They, alone among the presidents considered, fared better as a result of their confrontational than of their conciliatory international involvements.

In order to interpret the results for Kennedy, we should consider the particular confrontational and conciliatory events in his time in office. The Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962 was the major confrontation; highly dramatic, visible, and considered successful, it was followed by a particularly large rise in public approval. The only conciliation event in the early years of his term was a summit meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna which was ambiguous as a conciliation event and not obviously successful. The other conciliation events, the American University Speech and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Agreement, may have been significant, but lacked the drama of the confrontation events.

We have additional information to help interpret why Carter's approval rating was increased by involvement in confrontation rather than by conciliation events. Although many of the policies Carter pursued at the beginning of his administration may have been viewed as confrontational by the leaders of the Soviet Union, Carter was viewed by large segments of the U.S. as too conciliatory and not sufficiently assertive or aggressive vis-a-vis the Soviets. National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) polls asked respondents, "Do you think President Carter has been too tough in dealing with the Soviet Union, not tough enough, or do you think he has set the right tone in his dealings with the Soviet government?" In January, 1978, 35 percent thought he set the right tone, 45 percent that he was not tough enough, 5 percent that he was too tough, and 15 percent were not sure. These percentages did not change much in the next two years, except in the January 1980 survey, 56 percent thought he was not tough enough and the proportion not sure had fallen to 4 percent.

On the whole, nevertheless, there was widespread public support for President Carter's handling of the particular crises. A rallying behind the president in a foreign crisis may be seen in the responses to questions about the Iranian crisis when U.S. Embassy personnel were taken hostage. In a Gallup survey conducted in January 4-7, 1980, 61 percent of the respondents approved and 30 percent disapproved of Carter's handling of the crisis in Iran.[19]

Disapproval of President Carter's handling of the Iranian crisis may have been greater among people who thought he was not being tough enough than among people who thought he was not being sufficiently conciliatory. Thus, respondents were also asked in the same survey, "If one or more of the hostages is harmed, which one of the following do you think the U.S. should do with respect to Iran?" Two percent said do nothing; 52 percent said attempt to punish Iran diplomatically and economically; 36 percent said use military force against Iran; and 10 percent said they did not know. Of those who said use diplomatic and economic means of punishment, 75 percent approved of Carter's handling the crisis; but among those who said use military force, 58 percent said they approved of Carter's handling of the Iranian crisis.

Further evidence that Carter was supported in his initial handling of an international crisis is provided in answers to a special Gallup survey conducted January 11-12, 1980 regarding the Soviet army's movement into Afghanistan. There was substantial, but not overwhelming support for Carter's handling of the intervention: 57 percent approved of his handling of the situation and 25

percent disapproved. Even higher proportions approved of the halt to grain sales in the Soviet Union (76 percent approved) and the proposal to move the Summer Olympics to another country (72 percent approved). The national sample of respondents in the same survey were also asked: "Some people feel the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan because U.S. foreign policy has not been tough enough. Others feel the Soviets would have intervened in Afghanistan no matter what U.S. policy was. Which position comes closest to your view?" Thirty-two percent said the policy was not tough enough, 53 percent said the Soviets would have intervened regardless of U.S. policy, and 15 percent had no opinion. It is true that most people did not think U.S. lack of toughness had caused the Soviet intervention, but about a third of the population did.

Public Views of the Soviet Union and Military Spending

How the public evaluates a particular international action depends on the context of that action, as provided by the President and by his previous actions. It also depends upon the context provided by the public itself. We will review some trends in American public opinion about military spending and about the Soviet Union. We have published more detailed analyses elsewhere.[20] This review will also help us better understand the public's preference for conciliatory relative to confrontational international events and how that varies with different presidents.

During the Cold War of the 1950s, antagonistic views toward the Soviet Union were widespread; there was a high degree of consensus that the Soviet Union was expansionist and needed to be contained by military counterforce. Support for military spending was strong. During the 1960s, the antagonism toward the Soviet Union became less prevalent. The Soviet Union increasingly was viewed as an adversary and rival rather than an evil enemy bent on world conquest and domination. This shift may have been partially due to changes in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin and to the increasingly apparent differences between the Soviet government and the People's Republic of China. But it was also related significantly to domestic developments: the general trend toward acceptance of diverse views and practices, a reaction to the excesses of the McCarthyism hysteria, and later a reaction against the anti-Communist wars in Vietnam.

Public support for military expenditures remained strong until the late 1960s, when it plummeted.[21] There was a profound shift away, not only from support for military expenditures but also away from reliance upon military force as an instrument of foreign policy, and from goals which seemed to depend upon the use of military force. The conjunction of these changed views about military force and the trends in views about the Soviet Union played a crucial role in the initiation of detente in 1969 and 1970.

Beginning around 1973 and 1974, however, there were signs of a shift toward increased antagonism toward the Soviet Union and also of increased support for more military spending (see Figures 1 and 2). Surprisingly, this shift began when the governments and elites of the U.S. and the Soviet Union were pursuing a joint policy of detente. The changes in the U.S. had many domestic sources. It was part of general shift among a segment of the population to more support

for toughness and away from what some people regarded as excessive looseness of the 1960s. It was also a return to a more normal support of the military as the Vietnam war experience ended. It was also a response to the concerns about a Soviet threat which were aroused by the efforts of elite groups who were out of power but who had been influential during the Cold War period.[22] This mov toward increased support for militant confrontation g als and means gradually increased and then gained much momentum with the seizure of U.S. Embassy personnel in Teheran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

These trends help account for some anomalies in the previous findings. Carter entered office with the objectives of lessening the attention to the rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet governments and to negotiating significant arms control agreement and ven strategic arms reductions. But pursuing such goals was out of pha e with the shifting climate of opinion. The difficultie , of course, were compounded by the failure to quickly achiev th objectiv s. The inv lvement of Nixon in conciliati n events was not only placed in a ontext of his image as a tough anticommuni t, but was in a peri d of when such involvement wa e particularly likely to be supported. The shift away fr m supp rt for militant confrontation occurred m st sharply within Johnson' administration, and it would contribute to his gaining approval for involvement in conciliation events, particularly in the latter portion of his term. Kennedy's involvement in conciliation events did not contribute to increased approval of his handling of the job of president while involvement in confrontation events did. We have already suggested some reasons for this anomalous finding. We do not believe that consideration of the particular level of public preferences for conciliation or confrontation will add to those explanations.

Truman and Eisenhower were presidents during the time of cold war consensus supporting militant confrontation. Interestingly, even within that context, involvement in c n iliation events contributed more to public approval of the pr sident than U.S. involvement in confrontation events. This reflects, we believe, an important prevailing preference, even within a context of militance.

Conclusions

On the whole, the findings reported here indicate that the American public tends to support U.S. involvement in conciliation events more than involvement in militant confrontation events, with the President gaining more in approval as a result of the former; efforts at reaching conciliatory accommodations are generally supp rted. his general preference, however, varies considerably with the particular context in which the events occur. The tendency to favor militancy or accommodation in relations with the Soviet Uni n, the primary adversary since World War II, has certainly varied. To a significant degree, those variations are due to domestic changes, and those changes interact with external developments. The variations are not a simple and direct function of Soviet conduct but they interact with that conduct. They help interpret it and to me degree may even influence it.

The analyses also indicate that confrontational and conciliatory involvements are interpreted within the context of other events. For example, President Carter entered the presidency having stressed the importance of arms control and deemphasized the centrality of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Charges of weakening the

military defense capability of the U.S. in the face of growing Soviet military power are more successfully made when a Democrat is President. Democrats usually feel more vulnerable than Republicans to such charges, since these charges are more readily made by Republicans and others who would be constrained when a Republican president pursues similar policies. In the past, this has meant that Democratic administrations have generally spent more on military forces than have Republican administrations.[23] In addition to these factors, support for military expenditures was increasing from extremely low support at the end of the Vietnam War, and Carter did move to favor increased military spending toward the end of his term.[24] But the early years of his administration established a context that may have made the public hesitant to give him approval when he took conciliatory foreign policy actions. This hesitancy may have been aggravated by the failure of Carter to convincingly articulate the value of conciliatory moves. Of course, we must add that the Soviet leaders did not act in ways that would have made conciliatory moves appear effective.

The U.S. public sometimes gives wide and strong support to militant action and involvement in confrontation. That support is given for action taken against what appears to be a threatening adversary. It is also given in a context provided by a President who is not perceived to be too confrontational and thus likely to risk great conflict escalation.

International events involving the president do significantly affect the public's approval of the president's handling of the job. The drama often associated with foreign policy and the prominence of the president in making and implementing foreign policy actions both contribute to this impact. But presidents cannot expect that whatever they do will arouse the public to support them in the name of rallying-around-the-flag. People assess how well the policies worked and whether conflict and violence escalated or not. In this light, conciliation involvements appear to promise rewards. The findings indicate that generally presidents gain approval by being involved in peaceful and conciliatory international events and not always by involvement in confrontational ones.

NOTES

1. We wish to thank John E. Mueller for making available for reanalysis the data he used in his research. We also wish to acknowledge the support provided by a grant from the Syracuse University Senate Research Committee. In addition, we wish to acknowledge the help provided by the Roper Center.

2. Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vols. 1 and 11 (New York: Vintage Books, 1955) (originally published in 1835 and 1840); Raul Naroll, Vern L. Bullough, and Frada Naroll, *Military Deterrence in History: A Pilot Cross-Historical Survey* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974); M. Small and J.D. Singer, "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 1 (Summer 1976) :50-69; Louis Kriesberg, *Social Conflicts*, 2d ed. (Greenwich, Conn.: Prentice-Hall, 1982); R.J. Rummell, "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (March 1983) :27-71; Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are the Freer Countries More Pacific," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (December 1984) :617-48.

3. Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry* (New York: Morrow, 1943); Gabriel A. Almond, *The Public Presidency* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1950).

4. William H. Blanchard, *Aggression American Style* (Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1978).

5. John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973).

6. Barry B. Hughes, *The Democratic Context of American Foreign Policy* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1978), p. 38.

7. John E. Mueller, op. cit.

8. Edwin C. Hargrove, *The Power of Modern Presidency* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974), p. 122.

9. Lee Sigelman, "The Commander in Chief and the Public: Mass Response to Johnson's March 31, 1968 Bombing Halt Speech," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 8 (Spring 1980) :1-14

10. John E. Mueller, op. cit.

11. Samuel Kernall, "Explaining Presidential Popularity," *The American Political Science Review* 72 (June 1978) :506-22; Robert Y. Shapiro and Bruce M. Conforto, "Presidential Performance, The Economic Conditions," *The Journal of Politics* 42 (February 1980) :49-81; George C. Edwards, III, *The Public Presidency* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

12. We realize that it is possible to substitute economic and political indicators for the coalition of minorities in office variable. It is not our intent in this paper to investigate these determinants for each individual president. We have followed Mueller's analysis in that we are using time as a proxy measure for other variables. The very high R^2s found by Mueller and others indicate that time is an effective proxy measure. Our intention in this paper is to focus on the nature of the rally events given the particular circumstances of each presidential term which determine the rate of decline in popularity over time.

13. Samuel Kernall, op. cit.

14. Dan Golenpaul, ed., *Information Please Almanac, 1969* (New York: Information Please Almanac, Atlas and Yearbook, 1968); George E. Delury, ed., *The World Almanac and Book of Facts* (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1975).

15. We did this because the original list of events included only one conciliation event for Kennedy and this occurred very early in his term. This resulted in an extremely high correlation between the conciliation variable and the coalition variable during the Kennedy term. The addition of these events had very little effect on the other coefficients.

16. James A. Stimson, "Public Support for the American Presidency: A Cyclical Model," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 40 (Spring 1976) :1-21.

17. Note that the time in office variable is present in the equation to control for declines in approval which are simply a matter of the passage of time in office. The economic slump variable remains nonsignificant as a predictor of presidential approval.

18. Hazel G. Erskine, "The Cold War: Report from the Polls," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 25 (Summer 1961) : 00-15; George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, Vol. III* (New York: Random House, 1972).

19. Approval of the way Carter was handling the crisis was highly related to overall approval of the president. Thus, 80 percent of the people who approved of the way he was handling the crisis also approved of his handling the job of the president, compared to 26 percent among those who disapproved of his handling of the Iran crisis. There is a symmetric Somers d of .185 for approval of President Johnson and approval of his bombing halt; and a symmetric Somers d of .336 for approval

of Nixon's handling the job of president and approval the the bombing of Laos and Cambodia in 1973 (see Sigelman, op. cit.).

20. Louis Kriesberg, Harry Murray, and Ros Klein, "Elites and Increased Support for U. . Military Spending," *Journal of Political and Military Sociolog* 10 (Fall 1981); Louis Kriesberg, "Recent U.S. Public Views of Foreign Policy: Data for Peace Action," *Peace and Change: A Journal of Pea e Resear h* VIII (Fall 1982) :39-56; Louis Kriesberg and Abu Abdul-Quader, "L' pinion Publiqu Americaine et l'U.S. .R.: les Anées 70," *Etudes Polémologiques* 29 (1, 1984) :5-36.

21. Bruce M. Russett, "The Revolt of the Masses: Public Opinion on Military Expenditures," in J hn P. Lovell and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds., *New Civil-Military Relations* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1974), pp. 57-88; Bruce M. Russett, "The Ameri ans' Retreat from World P wer," *Political S ience Quarterly* 90 (Spring 1975) :1-21.

22. Jerry W. Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983).

23. Alan Wolfe, *The Rise and Fall of the 'Soviet Threat': Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus* (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1979).

24. Alan Wolfe and Jerry Sand rs, "Resurgent Cold War Ideology: The Case of the Committee on the Present Danger," in Richard Fagen, ed., *Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), pp. 41-75.

Chart 1 Rally Points for the Truman-Carter Period

Date	Event	Category
April 1945	Death of FDR, Truman takes office	Conciliation, Confrontation
August 1945	Potsdam Conference, Japan surrenders	Conciliation, Confrontation
March 1947	Truman Doctrine announced	Confrontation
June 1948	Beginning of Berlin blockade (reelection campaign, no polls)	Confrontation
November 1948	Truman reelection	Conciliation
September 1949	Truman announces Soviet A-bomb test	Confrontation
June 1950	Korean invasion	Confrontation
September 1950	Inchon landing	Confrontation
November 1950	China enters Korean War	Confrontation
July 1951	Korean peace negotiations begin	Conciliation
January 1953	Eisenhower inauguration	Conciliation
July 1953	Final resumption of Korean talks, truce signed	Conciliation
July 1955	Geneva conference of the Big Four	Conciliation
November 1956	Eisenhower reelected	Conciliation
October 1957	Sputnik I launched	Confrontation
July 1958	United States troops sent to Lebanon	Confrontation
September 1959	Talks with Khrushchev at Camp David	Conciliation
May 1960	U-2 incident, Paris summit	Confrontation
January 1961	Kennedy inauguration	Conciliation, Confrontation

April 1961	Bay of Pigs invasion	Confrontation
June 1961	Vienna Meeting with Khrushchev	Conciliation
August 1961	Berlin wall erected, USSR resumes testing	Confrontation
October 1961	Berlin crisis, tank confrontation	Confrontation
October 1962	Cuban missile crisis	Confrontation
June 1963	Kennedy's American University Speech	Conciliation
July 1963	Partial Nuclear Test Ban Agreement	Conciliation
November 1963	Kennedy assassination, Johnson takes office	Conciliation, Confrontation
August 1964	Bay of Tonkin episode (reelection campaign)	Confrontation
November 1964	Johnson reelected	Conciliation, Confrontation
February 1965	Retaliatory bombing of North Vietnam begun	Confrontation
April 1965	United States troops sent to Dominican Republic	Confrontation
June 1966	Extension of bombing to north of Hanoi	Confrontation
June 1967	Glassboro summit	Conciliation
January 1968	Tet offensive	Confrontation
April 1968	North Vietnam agrees to beginning of Vietnam talks after partial bombing halt	Conciliation
October 1968	Full bomb halt, talks to get substantive	Conciliation
January 1969	Nixon inauguration	Conciliation Confrontation
April 1969	U.S. reconnaisance plane downed by North Korean planes	Confrontation
July 1969	First U.S. troops leave Vietnam in scheduled withdrawal of 25,000	Conciliation
November 1969	U.S. and Soviet Governments begin SALT negotiations	Conciliation
January 1970	U.S.-China talks resume in Warsaw	Conciliation
April 1970	Nixon announces U.S. military incursion in Cambodia	Confrontation
July 1970	Rogers Plan for Mideast peace	Conciliation
October 1970	Nixon offers ceasefire in Vietnam	Conciliation
February 1972	Nixon arrives in China	Conciliation
May 1972	Nixon visits Moscow	Conciliation
October 1972	Nixon and Gromyko sign ABM treaty	Conciliation
October 1972	Kissinger reports "peace at hand"	Conciliation
December 1972	U.S. bombs Hanoi and mines Haiphong	Confrontation
January 1977	Carter inauguration	Conciliation, Confrontation
August 1977	Carter agrees to transfer Panama Canal	Conciliation
September 1977	Nuclear Proliferation Pact signed	Conciliation
April 1978	Carter defers production of Neutron bomb	Conciliation
April 1978	Senate votes to turn over Panama Canal by 2000	Conciliation
September 1978	Camp David Framework for peace in Middle East	Conciliation
December 1978	U.S. and China agree to begin diplomatic relations	Conciliation
June 1979	Carter and Brezhnev sign SALT II	Conciliation
September 1979	Carter decides on MX missile	Confrontation
September 1979	Carter announces Soviet army troops in Cuba have no combat function	Confrontation

November 1979	Iranian students seize U.S. embassy	Confrontation
December 1979	Soviet troops enter Afghanistan	Confrontation
April 1980	Aborted effort to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran	Confrontation

Table 1
Approval of the President Regressed with all Variables Truman to Johnson

Equation	Original (Mueller)	Modified
Independent Variables Rally-Round-the-Flag		-6.17 (1.03)*
Conciliation		-2.03 (.59)
Confrontation		-3.70 (1.02)
Economic Slump	-3.72 (.64)	-3.17 (.68)
Dummy Variables for Terms		
Truman, second	-12.42 (3.53)	-11.68 (3.70)
Eisenhower, first	- 2.41 (2.98)	- 4.20 (3.10)
Eisenhower, second	- 4.35 (3.10)	- 2.56 (3.02)
Kennedy	7.18 (3.10)	8.25 (3.21)
Johnson, first	4.20 (3.89)	4.53 (4.00)
Johnson, second	- 1.06 (3.21)	- .27 (3.32)
Time in Office Variable for Terms		
Truman, first	- 8.92 (1.33)	- 7.98 (1.46)
Truman, second	- 2.82 (1.35)	- 3.63 (1.51)
Eisenhower, first	2.58 (.81)	13.59 (1.84)
Eisenhower, second	.22 (.62)	.35 (.63)
Kennedy	- 4.75 (1.15)	- 4.84 (1.18)
Johnson, first	2.53 (8.43)	1.81 (8.62)
Johnson, second	- 8.13 (.79)	- 7.77 (.82)
Dummy Variable for War		
Korea	-18.20 (3.39)	-13.20 (3.66)
Vietnam	.01 (2.77)	.70 (2.92)
Intercept	72.38	72.00
R^2	.86	.85
Total F for the eq. N=299	107.66	90.68

*Standard error for each variable within the parenthesis

Table 2

Approval of the President Regressed with All Variables, Truman to Carter

	Equation
Conciliation	-1.91 (.56)*
Confrontation	-4.83 (.57)
Economic Slump	-3.63 (.61)
Dummy Variables for Terms	
Truman, second	-11.79 (3.58)
Eisenhower, first	- 4.61 (3.05)
Eisenhower, second	- 2.21 (3.00)
Kennedy	7.65 (3.17)
Johnson, first	3.94 (3.96)
Johnson, second	- .78 (3.29)
Nixon, first	-12.44 (4.09)
Carter	- 5.72 (2.81)
Time in Office Variable for Terms	
Truman, first	- 7.98 (1.45)
Truman, second	- 2.77 (1.36)
Eisenhower, first	6.66 (1.00)
Eisenhower, second	.51 (.62)
Kennedy	- 4.57 (1.16)
Johnson, first	2.27 (8.56)
Johnson, second	- 7.66 (.81)
Nixon, first	2.91 (.89)
Carter	- 8.08 (.58)
Dummy Variables for War	
Korea	-15.32 (3.51)
Vietnam	.91 (2.89)
Intercept	72.61
R^2	.84
Total F for the eq. N=450	101.40

*Standard error for each variable within parentheses

Table 3

Approval of the President Regressed with Selected Variables for Each Administration, Truman to Carter

	Truman	Eisenhower	Kennedy	Johnson	Nixon	Carter
Independent Variables						
Time in Office	-10.36 (2.04)*	.22 (.43)	- 3.99 (1.03)	- 9.21 (.47)	- .78 (.92)	- 8.21 (.95)
Conciliation	- 2.85 (2.09)	-1.81 (.69)	1.44 (.97)	- 3.81 (.67)	- 5.73 (1.31)	1.30 (3.56)
Confrontation	- 1.93 (3.50)	1.63 (.54)	-11.18 (2.50)	.05 (1.55)	2.50 (1.03)	- 6.45 (1.03)
Economic Slump	- 5.15 (2.02)	-3.98 (.55)	Excluded**	Excluded**	- 3.58 (.72)	-17.05 (8.38)
Intercept	70.10	67.37	79.41	75.83	63.03	67.98
R^2	.51	.57	.78	.88	.72	.74
Total F for the eq.	16.75 N=69	37.94 N=115	42.77 N=39	184.15 N=76	34.48 N=59	62.55 N=92

*Standard error for each variable within the parentheses

**Lack variation

Table 4

Public's Views of Proud and Dark Moments in U.S. History

Event	Proud Moment	Dark Moment	Neither	Not Sure	Totals %	(N)
U.S. Role in the founding of the United Nations (1)*	82	4	9	5	100	(1496)
The founding of the Peace Corps (10)	81	2	10	7	100	(1494)
U.S. sending emergency food to Bangladesh (12)	76	3	11	10	100	(1494)
U.S. role in World War II (9)	69	12	11	8	100	(1495)
Nixon's trip to Communist China (3)	60	9	24	6	99	(1495)
The Marshall Plan of aid to Europe (11)	56	6	15	23	100	(1494)
The Berlin airlift (5)	53	7	15	25	100	(1494)
Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis (7)	53	7	14	15	100	(1494)
American support of Israel during the October, 1973 war (13)	43	11	29	17	100	(1491)
U.S. role in the Korean War (2)	22	41	27	10	100	(1496)
U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic (8)	10	20	27	43	100	(1493)
U.S. role in the Vietnam War (4)	8	72	15	5	100	(1495)
CIA involvement in Chile (6)	7	41	19	34	101	(1493)

*Order in which the item was presented to the respondents.

SOURCE: National survey conducted for the Chicago council on Foreign Relations by the Louis Harris organization in November and December, 1974.

The question asked was; "Here's a list of international events that the United States has been involved in in recent history. For each, please tell me whether you think it was a proud moment in American history, a dark moment, or neither a proud moment nor a dark moment."

Figure 1
Evaluative Ratings of Russia, 1953-1983



SOURCE: Gallup polls and NORC surveys (1974 1975 1977 1982 1983)

Figure 2

Proportions Thinking U.S. Is Spending Too Much and Too Little for Arms, 1971-1983



SOURCE: Surveys on depsoit at Roper Center and National Opinion Research Center Social Surveys