

THE RELEVANCE OF RECONCILIATION ACTIONS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF ISRAELI–PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATIONS, 2000¹

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The breakdown of Israeli–Palestinian negotiations toward a final status agreement and the subsequent eruption of violence stunned many partisans of the conflict as well as intermediaries and observers. Although some partisans on each side had argued from the outset that successful negotiations were impossible, leaders of the Palestinians and the Israelis had negotiated directly for several years as if they were possible. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict had become partially transformed but perhaps insufficiently so to support a negotiated agreement acceptable to both sides. The possible role of what might be regarded as reconciliation actions in that partial transformation of the conflict is examined here. The negotiation and mediation processes prior to the breakdown are reviewed, and then different views of the impact of reconciliation actions, or their absence, are assessed.

For a decade, beginning with the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations have taken place. The course of the negotiations has been torturous, with steps of progress marked by recurrent stumbles, backsliding, noncompliance with agreements, and deadly violence. Explanations for the difficulties abound, and observers as well as partisans dispute the correct explanation. I examine here the possible effects of reconciliation moves, or the lack of them, in explaining the collapse of the negotiations and the subsequent violence beginning in September 2000.²

Reconciliation often is considered to be what happens after a conflict is over. An outcome may be unilaterally imposed, and then reconciliation may follow, as was the case between Germany and the victorious countries of World War II. Very often, however, conflicts may become transformed so that they are conducted constructively, and in that context an agreed-upon accommodation may be established.³ In South Africa, for example, the bitter struggle over the apartheid system was transformed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the peoples of that country negotiated a new accommodation. Reconciliation was

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part of that transformation and was integral to the accommodation and ongoing relations among the peoples of South Africa.

Many different views can be put forward about how steps toward reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians affected the initiation and conduct of negotiations and also their breakdown and accompanying eruption of violence. Clearly, the leaders of each side did not present themselves as doing reconciliation work, nor did they view the other side as doing so. Nevertheless, they took some actions that may be considered acts of reconciliation. Some analysts and partisans might argue that the failure to take greater reconciliation actions contributed to the breakdown. Other observers may argue that the reconciliation steps that were made encouraged members of one or both sides to raise their expectations and demands. Other partisans and analysts may argue that the reconciliation actions contributed to misunderstandings by members of one or both sides about the peace terms that the other side would accept. Still others may argue that the few reconciliation moves taken were inadequate or were implemented poorly. Finally, still others may argue that the reconciliation actions were largely irrelevant—that the leaders of one or both sides never intended to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.

Before considering the way reconciliation actions may have affected the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, I will mention a few of the major Israeli–Palestinian efforts to reach an accommodation, many of which are listed in Table 1. The most transforming set of events were the back-channel negotiations conducted near Oslo between Palestinian and Israeli representatives, culminating with their official mutual recognition and the signing of a Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September 1993.⁴

In accord with the DOP, interim agreements subsequently were signed but were executed slowly and only incompletely. Negotiations for the final status agreement began in earnest only in 1999, but they quickly stalemated. In July 2000, the two parties made an extreme effort to reach a final agreement in negotiations at Camp David II, mediated by President Bill Clinton. They confronted issues that previously had been left aside for later negotiations: Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, borders, and Jewish settlements. Gaps in positions seemed to be narrowed but not closed, and they reached no agreement.

The Camp David II negotiation and mediation efforts were undertaken and were conducted under severe pressures. Prime Minister Ehud Barak's governing coalition was crumbling, partly due his failure to engage other political leaders and the Israeli electorate to formulate and to pursue policies for negotiating a peace agreement with the Palestinians. He believed that if the Palestinians were offered major concessions, they would agree to a final end of their conflict with the Israelis, thus enabling him to win acceptance from the

Table 1: Events in Israeli–Palestinian Conflict Transformation, 1974–2001

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| November, 1974 | The Arab states at Rabat declare that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people |
| April, 1976 | Palestinian nationalists win municipal elections on West Bank |
| September, 1978 | A Framework for Peace in the Middle East signed at Camp David |
| February, 1985 | Jordanian–PLO accord on negotiations with Israel |
| December, 1987 | Intifada I (Palestinian uprising) begins |
| July, 1988 | King Hussein announces Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank |
| December, 1988 | US and PLO enter into direct communications |
| October, 1991 | Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid |
| January, 1993 | Start of secret meetings in Oslo, Norway, between PLO officials and unofficial Israeli representatives |
| September, 1993 | The PLO and the Israeli government sign the Declaration of Principles; Arafat and Rabin shake hands |
| May, 1994 | Cairo Agreement for self rule in Gaza and Jericho |
| August, 1994 | PLO and Israeli government sign Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities in the West Bank |
| October, 1994 | Israeli–Jordanian peace treaty signed |
| September, 1995 | Israel and PLO sign interim agreement to transfer control of major Palestinian populated areas in the occupied territories |
| October, 1998 | Wye River Memorandum signed by Netanyahu and Arafat |
| September, 1999 | Barak and Arafat agree to revision of Wye Memorandum and its implementation and to resume Permanent Status negotiations in an accelerated manner |
| July, 2000 | Camp David II negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian delegations, mediated by Clinton |
| September, 2000 | Intifada II begins |
| February, 2001 | Sharon elected Prime Minister of Israel |

Israeli electorate. The approaching end of President Clinton's term of office constituted another deadline. President Yasser Arafat was reluctant to undertake final-status negotiations at Camp David II but felt he could not refuse an invitation from President Clinton. In addition, he faced growing discontent

from Palestinians about the failure to make substantial progress toward their goals. The pressures were enough to go to Camp David II, but the inducements were not great enough to accept the proposed package.⁵

With no agreement forthcoming, the leaders of the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority (PA) faced an upsurge in the already rising opposition from their constituencies. Many Palestinians, particularly in Arab countries, consistently had rejected the possibility of negotiating an accommodation acceptable to Zionist Israelis. Many other Palestinians, however, had come to support the idea of a two state solution, of a Palestinian state existing alongside Israel. Initially, they enthusiastically supported the DOP and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership that had negotiated it.

After the early euphoria upon establishing the PA, the realities were disappointing. By July 1995, even as they were anticipating the extension of PA control over Palestinian population centers in the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians were wary. A survey of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank found that 56 percent supported that proposed redeployment but that only 31 percent positively evaluated the PA's management of the negotiations and that 81 percent did not trust Israeli intentions regarding the peace process.⁶ Over time, many Palestinians felt that their economic conditions did not improve and even worsened for some, while Palestinians who came with the PLO leadership from Tunis seemed to prosper. Palestinians experienced the continuing expansion of flourishing Jewish settlements in the West Bank. They felt that Israeli authorities persisted in humiliating them by implementing policies to control and contain them.

Many Israeli Jews, on the other hand, felt that terrorist attacks periodically erupted and were not prevented or punished adequately by the PA. They understood that the PA had much larger and better-armed security forces than had been allowed in the signed agreements. They were concerned that new school texts and other materials depicted Israeli Jews in hate-evoking ways.⁷ The failure to reach an agreement at Camp David II, when most Israelis thought Israel's government had made unprecedented, even excessive, concessions, undermined their faith that the Palestinians were willing to make an accommodation on any terms that would be acceptable to them.⁸

Some people on each side had said that war would erupt if no agreement were reached. Participants exchanged warnings of a Palestinian declaration of independence and of Israeli responses to such a declaration. Each side prepared for war and by the logic of conflict escalation; each side's preparations to counter the other side's preparations justified its own. The catalyst for the eruption was the September 28, 2000, visit by Ariel Sharon with armed police escorts to the Haram al-Sharif, or Temple Mount.⁹ A Palestinian riot followed that met a

deadly Israeli police reaction. The subsequent violence spread quickly and escalated. Palestinian resistance took the form of stone-throwing confrontations and gunfire, without any clear condemnation of the violence by the PA.¹⁰ This quickly became designated as another intifada.¹¹ Indeed, Palestinians who had been jailed for violence against Jews were released, and more rejectionist Palestinian groups such as Hamas conducted suicide bombings. Palestinian confrontations and attacks often targeted Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while suicide bombings initially claimed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad were extended into cities within the 1967 Israeli borders.

The Israeli government conducted air strikes on Palestinian targets and imposed closure on the Palestinians, denying them employment in Israel and the ability to move from one population center to another. Nevertheless, episodes of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations continued into January 2001. The Israeli electorate repudiated Barak's leadership and on February 6, 2001, elected Ariel Sharon of the Likud party as prime minister.

Sharon formed a broad political coalition that included the Labor party; he ended negotiations with the PA, and the violence continued with subsequent severe escalations. The violence escalated with spreading Palestinian use of suicide bombings against civilian as well as military targets throughout Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza and with the Israeli military forces conducting assassinations of Palestinian militia leaders, including some associated with Tanzim, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.

In March 2001, a national survey of Israeli public opinion found that 71 percent of the Jewish respondents favored the policy of closure and encirclement of Palestinian towns and villages and 72 percent favored increased military force.¹² About three-quarters of the Jewish public felt that the PA did not desire peace with Israel, and 72 percent believed that the majority of the Palestinians did not accept the existence of Israel and would destroy it if they could. Many of the Israeli Jews who had been committed to the peace process felt betrayed by the Palestinian conduct and believed that they had been mistaken in their previous hopes.

Understanding what went wrong may help determine what actions might overcome the legacies of such violence and the pervasive mutual mistrust, fear, and anger so that negotiations might be renewed fruitfully.

THE VARIETIES OF RECONCILIATION

Before considering the impact of reconciliation actions on the developments summarized, I should explain what I mean by reconciliation, since the term is used increasingly in diverse senses. I adopt a broad meaning, emphasizing four

dimensions of reconciliation, pertaining to shared truths, justice, mutual regard, and mutual security. These dimensions in some ways reinforce each other, but in other ways, at given times, they are contradictory.¹³ Furthermore, they vary in relative primacy in different kinds of relationships and over time as a conflict de-escalates and is transformed.

Reconciliation in each of these dimensions also varies in terms of the persons and groups in the reconciliation process. They may be official leaders of different communities representing their constituencies or they may be private individuals or groups. They may be acting unilaterally or cooperatively and by negotiated agreement or tacit understandings.

Shared Truths

Sharing truths is an important part of reconciliation since antagonists in a conflict or in an oppressive relationship typically have different experiences, narratives, and understandings. Many people on each side generally blame their presumed antagonists for the injuries they have suffered; their beliefs can justify hostility and even vengeance. Furthermore, the truth about misdeeds often is known among the members of the victims' side but is hidden and denied by persons on the perpetrators' side. This discrepancy produces resentments that fuel destructive conflicts.

Truths, as they relate to reconciliation, refer especially to the development of shared beliefs about what happened in the past and what is happening currently between adversaries. The comprehensiveness of the truths tends to vary in different stages and contexts of reconciliation. The truths also vary in how widely they are shared; sometimes only small groups within the opposing sides know certain truths. For the truths to be widely shared, official statements do not suffice. Newspapers, novels, songs, films, textbooks, sermons, and other media of popular communication must convey the information about what had happened that needs to be overcome. The development of widely shared truths in a society takes time—often decades and even generations in some instances.

Justice

Some people stress the attainment of justice as the primary component of reconciliation. After all, feeling that they are suffering injustices often drives partisans engaged in a conflict. Reducing the sense of injustice then is essential to transforming or to ending many conflicts. Adversaries, however, are not likely to agree about who is acting unjustly against whom.

Justice varies in several significant ways. It often encompasses punishing those who have inflicted injuries, where individuals or the collectivities they are considered to represent are punished. Justice may include compensation and restitution to individuals and collectivities for the losses they suffered. It often also refers to correcting the unjust structural conditions, so they do not persist or recur in the future; this may include ending discriminatory and other oppressive conditions. However, such policies can result in collective punishment or discrimination against the previously oppressive social strata or collectivities and hence can be the basis for backlashes and a new conflict.

Mutual Regard

I use regard broadly for the third dimension of reconciliation. Minimally, it includes reducing negative stereotypes, recognizing the humanity and collective identity of the other people, and treating others respectfully. More profound expressions of regard or respect are emphasized in many discussions of reconciliation, including offering apologies and expressing forgiveness.¹⁴ Members of one side, feeling remorse about the harms done to members of another side, acknowledge the wrongs they or their people committed. Members of the other side, to lessen the burden of feeling anger, hatred, or resentment, may forgive at least some people of the injury-inflicting side.

These sentiments of regard are manifested varyingly in speech, acts of compensation, or other ways. Regard also varies in the extent to which it is shared. The sense of remorse for injuries inflicted and the readiness of the injured to offer forgiveness may be possessed by only a few people or by almost everyone in one or more parties to a conflict. The few people may be leaders acting as representatives of their constituencies or they may be grass-roots citizens acting on their own sentiments. The degree to which the leaders actually represent the will of their constituents varies considerably, owing to the often controversial nature of official forgiveness.¹⁵

Mutual Security

Finally, the fourth dimension of reconciliation is security. At the minimal end of the continuum, members of the formerly antagonistic entities believe they are safe from physical injury by the other side, similar to the concept of negative peace.¹⁶ Greater security entails the absence of structural violence and the attainment of positive peace. Even greater security incorporates a higher level of well being for individuals and for collectivities. This kind of security may be assured by constitutional provisions and by changes in the policies and

composition of government agencies, such as police and military forces. At the higher levels of security, members of the formerly antagonistic parties would live in cooperation and in a considerable degree of harmony.

ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION ACTIONS

Reconciliation moves by Palestinians and Israelis have been quite limited, but some actions can be discerned. First, I review them as they pertain to mutual security, justice, mutual regard, and mutual truths. Then I assess their contribution to inhibiting or perhaps to fostering the violent disruption of what had seemed to be progress toward a mutually acceptable accommodation between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis.

Mutual Security

Being assured of security is a very high priority for Israeli Jews. Some early Palestinian actions may be regarded as enhancing Israelis' sense of security, including the statement made by Arafat in December 1988. He referred to the PLO's earlier acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and also of the 1947 General Assembly Resolution 181, calling for the partition of Palestine. He also said, "We totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group, and state terrorism."¹⁷ The United States government accepted the statement as adequate to enter a substantive dialogue with Palestinian representatives. Israelis, however, generally did not find such statements, made to satisfy the United States, to be convincing.

Later private discussions were sufficient for Israeli officials to negotiate and to conclude the DOP. Subsequent agreements negotiated between the PLO and the Israeli government provided for concrete measures to prevent terrorist attacks upon Israeli targets. These measures included close cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli security forces.

For the Palestinians, security entails having physical safety from intimidation and from harassment by Israeli police and officials. Israelis, however, did not take clear reconciliatory actions in these matters. Rather, Israeli policies to increase Israel's security often reduced Palestinian individual and collective security, as with recourse to collective punishments and closures of Palestinian towns and territories. Palestinian security concerns also relate to their social and economic well being and, after the signing of the DOP, Israeli officials did encourage and support economic investments in the territories coming under the PA jurisdiction.¹⁸ These actions were limited, however, and Israel also imposed restrictions that hampered Palestinian economic development. For example,

trade had to pass through Israeli channels, and there were delays in opening a Palestinian airport in Gaza.¹⁹ Furthermore, land confiscations for the construction of Jewish settlements and bypass roads inflicted economic hardships.

Following the DOP, official and nonofficial actors from around the world began many peacemaking efforts. These undertakings included economic development ventures in the Palestinian territories under the jurisdiction of the PA. They also included a variety of people-to-people dialogue programs. For example, the architects of the 1995 Interim, or Oslo II, Agreement informally asked the Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, based in Norway, to develop and to implement the People-to-People-Program referred to in the agreement.²⁰ With funding from Norway and from the Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropist Foundation and under the direction of an official and a non-governmental body, by the spring of 2000 the program had supported approximately 130 nongovernmental cooperative projects.

Justice

Attaining greater justice is of the highest priority for the Palestinians. Justice incorporates gaining control of their land by ending Israeli occupation (beyond the 1967 armistice lines). Justice also would include the right of return of Palestinian refugees to where they or their progenitors had lived previously. For many Palestinians, justice would require Israeli acknowledgement of the injustice they had inflicted and compensation that would be costly to the Israelis. The DOP and the subsequent interim agreements provided some redress but not in regard to claims about refugees.²¹

For many Israeli Jews, the need for justice includes Palestinian and Arab acceptance of the establishment of a Jewish state on that portion of the land upon which they live, and Arab and Palestinian assurances of that kind had been ambiguous. Arafat's rejection of Barak's peace proposal offered at Camp David II and the initiation of an armed Intifada seemed to confirm their darkest fears regarding Palestinian and Arab intentions. Furthermore, many Jews viewed the Palestinian armed struggle that included attacks on civilians and even on Jews outside of Israel as morally reprehensible. An acknowledgment of such wrongs might be a convincing indication that they would not recur.

Particular notice also should be given to the efforts of peace movement organizations in Israel. Such movements emerged particularly strongly in the late 1970s, and their popular support has varied greatly; they also differ in purpose and methods. Some have organized large public demonstrations to pressure the Israeli government to strive for agreements with Palestinians; such demonstrations also were intended to influence the general public. In addition

many such organizations provided dialogue settings and other channels for meeting and working with Palestinians so as to influence Palestinian and Israeli publics.²²

Various nonofficial organizations, some of which were staffed by Palestinians and Israelis, worked to develop detailed solutions to various contentious issues in making peace. Thus, many working groups and discussions about the future status of Jerusalem took place under the auspices of the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, the Orient House, the Truman Institute, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Palestine–Israel Journal, and other organizations.

Mutual Regard

The regard each party gives the other is also a highly important dimension of reconciliation for both Palestinians and Jews. The desired regard refers to collective recognition and acceptance as a people and also to individual respect. Although people from each side often object to the absence of such regard, some actions may be seen as demonstrating acceptance and respect. The most significant and seemingly transforming recognition of each other was manifested in the agreement reached in Oslo, Norway. The mutual recognition, however, may be regarded as asymmetrical, being between the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and the State of Israel; therefore, the recognition of the PLO might not be seen as recognition of the Palestinian people and their rights.²³

The recognition that did occur resulted from a gradual process of change among both Palestinians and Israelis. Although Israeli Jews remained committed to Zionism, maintaining Israel as a Jewish state and also as a democracy had been increasingly seen as problematic if Palestinian Arabs were incorporated into a greater Israel. Partition has been increasingly regarded as a way of resolving that dilemma and also as a way of gaining security.²⁴

A variety of reconciliation actions possibly expressing respectful regard of each other by Israeli Jews and by Palestinian Arabs may be identified at the grass-roots and mid-level of elites. For example, they established interfaith and other kinds of dialogue groups. Several peace movement organizations also conducted dialogue meetings and joint actions in support of peace agreements and opposition to Israeli settler and government policies in the occupied territories. In addition, Herbert Kelman and others organized many interactive problem-solving workshops, engaging mid-level Israeli and Palestinian elites.²⁵

Nevertheless, the Palestinians generally have experienced the Israeli occupation as humiliating; their movements in and out of Palestinian areas and

often among Palestinian towns were subjected to Israeli military and police control. The establishment of the PA greatly reduced that humiliation for many Palestinians. However, the creation of the PA did not end all such conditions, and some Palestinians regarded Israeli pressure for PA cooperation in assuring security for Israelis as humiliating.

Significantly, President Arafat was never invited for an official visit to Israel, and no Israeli prime minister officially visited Palestinian territory. The meetings that have occurred were held in other countries or near a military check post, without Middle Eastern host-guest rituals.²⁶

After the signing of the DOP, Palestinian leaders made some gestures of regard, such as the condolence visit that Arafat made to Leah Rabin following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995.

Shared Truths

There has been little truth telling or truth sharing by members of one side about the injuries suffered by people on the other side for which they had significant responsibility. Rather, members of each side usually point to how they have been injured and victimized by people from the other camp.

Members of each side are quite aware of the atrocities committed by persons in the other camp—persons they regard as terrorists, assassins, and violators of human rights. Members on each side are less familiar with such conduct when done by their people; indeed, in certain cases, they honor them for their heroism. This is a classic pattern in protracted conflicts. Attribution theory helps explain such processes.²⁷ People tend to attribute undesired behavior by their adversaries to internal characteristics and their own unattractive behavior as compelled by circumstances.

The official Israeli account of Jewish–Arab relations in Palestine/Israel stresses Israeli efforts to find an accommodation with Palestinians while the Palestinians rejected such efforts.²⁸ Israeli accounts give little attention to Palestinian views that Palestine was the home of Palestinians living and working on farms and in cities before the Jewish immigration in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Nevertheless, some significant reconciliatory truth-telling actions have been made. Jewish analysts and scholars increasingly have published work that undercut previous Israeli views, such as Benny Morris' account that during the 1948–1949 war, Palestinians who fled were following the instructions of Arab governments to temporarily leave areas into which Israeli military forces were moving. Morris' work, however, has not been presented or viewed as contributing to reconciliation.²⁹

In 1994 the Israeli Ministry of Education began work to develop new textbooks for Israeli school children that would recognize previously denied realities for Palestinians.³⁰ The project continued under the Benjamin Netanyahu administration, and after the Labor party regained power new textbooks became available beginning in September 1999. The Knesset later overruled this.

Palestinians generally have not acknowledged truths that are important to the Jews of Israel. These include the significance for Jews of Jerusalem and other religious sites throughout Palestine and Israel, as well as the continuous presence of Jews in that territory. They also include the violence and suffering the Jews experienced from Palestinians before and after the establishment of the State of Israel. Palestinians generally view their resistance against occupation as legitimate, and some Jews acknowledge that, if only privately.³¹

EFFECTS OF RECONCILIATION ACTIONS

The primary question here is this: What effects did the few reconciliation actions that were taken have on the deterioration of Palestinian–Israeli negotiations and the subsequent violence? The answer is based on a general approach to understanding the course of destructive and constructive conflicts. Conflicts arise when parties form collective identities distinguishing themselves from others; when one or more parties have a grievance; when they formulate a goal to change another party so as to reduce their grievance; and when they think they can induce the other party to change in the desired direction. The degree to which a conflict is constructive or destructive is shaped greatly by the nature of the identities fashioned, the grievances felt, the goals set, and the methods for struggle chosen.³² This is set forth in Table 2.

Thus, in conflicts between communal groups, identities framed in ethno-nationalist terms are more likely to engender relatively destructive conflicts than are identities framed in terms of civic nationalism.³³ Grievances arising from existential threats are more likely to foster relatively destructive conflicts than are those about the allocation of divisible resources. Thus too, insofar as adversaries formulate goals so that what they seek must come at the expense of the other side, the conflict will tend to be destructive. Finally, when people in one or more sides believe that extreme violence is the most effective method to secure their goals, the conflict tends to be relatively destructive.

Many actions contribute to conflict transformation and to reaching a mutually acceptable accommodation by affecting the components of a conflict for one or more sides. Thus, the actions members of one side take may reduce members of the adversary's sense of grievance; the actions may reduce the xenophobic quality of the party's collective identity; they may lessen the

Table 2: Conflict Conditions and Destructiveness

| Conditions | Destructive | Constructive |
|------------|--|---|
| Identity | Exclusive of other Ethno-nationalism Defining self by opposing other | Inclusive of other Civic nationalism |
| Grievance | Believe existence is threatened Feel humiliated by others | Believe existence not threatened Issues appear negotiable |
| Goals | Regarded as in zero sum conflict Seeks destruction of other | Regarded as in mixed-sum conflict Other side's goal given legitimacy |
| Methods | Seeks revenge Believe violence only recourse Indiscriminate violence allowed | Believe noncoercive means possible Use of violence greatly limited |

exclusive nature of a party's goals; and they may reduce a party's reliance on violence to achieve its goals. The effects may occur within the party that is the recipient of the action, but, as discussed later, the action also may affect the party undertaking the action.

The Israeli and Palestinian identities, grievances, goals, and means of struggle have altered over the last half of the 20th century. The changes, however, were not primarily the result of reconciliation efforts. They have resulted in large degree from developments within each camp, from changing relations between them, and from the international context. My interest here, nevertheless, is on the possible contribution of reconciliation actions upon each conflict component. Table 3 sets forth a wide array of reconciliation actions and their possible effects. Clearly, neither side has taken many reconciliation actions.

Identities

First, I consider whether the collective identities have changed in ways that made their conflict less destructive. The identities of persons within each collectivity became more differentiated, for example with increasing religious and ethno-nationalist cleavages. On the Israeli side, differences about future relations with the Palestinians were becoming polarized among peace

Table 3: Effects on Conflict Conditions by Reconciliation Actions

| Reconciliation Actions | Effects on Conflict Conditions | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| | Identity | Grievance | Goal | Method |
| Truths | | | | |
| Truth commission | Revise history and self concept | Lower injury | More shared | Less purely coercive |
| Cultural media | | Raise for others | | |
| Curricular material | | | | |
| Scholarship | | | | |
| Justice | | | | |
| Trials and punishment | More inclusive | Lower injury | More delimited claims | Judicial, political alternatives |
| Restitution | | Raise for others | | |
| Future equity | | | | |
| End oppression | | | | |
| Peace demonstrations | | | | |
| Regard | | | | |
| Official apology | Includes sense of responsibility | Mitigates past grievance | More shared | Considers others' humanity |
| Group dialogue | | Reduces humiliation | | |
| Interpersonal forgiveness | | | | |
| Recognition | | | | |
| Security | | | | |
| Laws protecting rights | More overarching | Reduces fear | More mutual | De-legitimize violence Judicial procedures |
| Autonomy | | | | |
| Rejection of violence | | | | |
| Peace demonstrations | | | | |

activists and their supporters, nationalist and religious activists striving for Jewish dominion over more of Eretz Israel, and many other groupings in between. On the Palestinian side, as the PLO moved to seeking an accommodation with Israel, differences increased with other organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Significantly, many members of each side came to recognize that the other side was not homogenous in its opposition to them and their goals.

The changes, however, came about largely as a consequence of contention rather than by acts of reconciliation. Furthermore, the basic nature of each group's identity has not been transformed radically, and their narratives have remained intact. The changes may have been adequate to enable the DOP to be reached and to be politically supported initially in each camp. However, they were not adequate for the end of conflict proposal suggested at Camp David II to be credible and acceptable for Arafat and his negotiation team.

Indeed, the reconciliatory actions that had been taken even may have had negative effects on each side's self identity. As suggested by attribution theory, each side may regard its recognition of the other as an indication of its own inherent goodness, but any worthy actions of the other side are regarded as compelled by circumstances. Each side can feel virtuous and can regard the other as begrudgingly yielding to pressure to concede recognition.

Another possible counterproductive effect may be associated with the internal differentiation within Israel. Their political opponents often denounced peace movement activists and even Labor party leaders as traitors, seeking to intimidate and to marginalize them. Survey data indicate that the "universalistic, liberal approach that underlies the reconciliation endeavor has been rejected in particular by the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox sectors, as well as by the vast majority of Israeli of Mizrahi (Middle Eastern) origin, the younger age cohorts, and by those of low income and education."³⁴

Dissonance theory suggests a possible reinforcing effect.³⁵ Having taken certain actions, such as recognizing the other side's legitimacy, people on each side tended to align their attitudes to be consistent with their conduct. Thus, after negotiations had begun and prior to the second Intifada, about 70 percent of Israeli Jews had come to expect that a Palestinian state would be established, and about 55 percent believed that was morally justified.³⁶

Furthermore, some Jews and some Palestinians probably came to view the other camp as more accommodative than they had previously viewed them to be once the act of recognition had been made. This may have contributed to their being more accommodating. However, it also may have contributed to some misunderstandings, including underestimating the magnitude of the differences between the two sides about the terms of an acceptable settlement.

Grievances

The grievances of each side also declined, particularly due to signing of the DOP. For the Palestinian Arabs, the defeat of the neighboring Arab countries in 1967 and the subsequent Israeli occupation and establishment of Jewish settlements had exacerbated their prior grievances. Palestinian grievances were alleviated only somewhat by the 1993 recognition by Israel of their existence as a people and the subsequent development of the PA and its control within portions of the West Bank. Many other grievances remained, however, and some rose in salience, such as the poor economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza.

For the Jews of Israel, some grievances were reduced, such as the growing acceptance of a Jewish state in the region as evidenced by the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. The threat that a Palestinian state might pose seemed lessened by some Palestinian gestures. The DOP agreement in 1993 and the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan promised the possibility of a significantly reduced existential threat. Recurrent violent attacks on Jews, however, evoked issues of personal and collective security.

On the whole, each side in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict continued to regard themselves as victims. The Palestinians had experienced a disaster by the establishment of Israel, and for many their losses had not been overcome adequately. Israeli Jews had faced the rejection and assault on their presence as a Jewish state in the region, and by the actions of some Arabs and important Arab states this rejection continued.

Goals

The goals of each side had been modified sufficiently to make the DOP possible. The mainstream Palestinian organizations, led by Arafat, had come to accept the division of British-mandated Palestine and the establishment of a small Palestinian state alongside Israel. Most Israelis had come to believe that their democratic and Jewish way of life could be secured best if they did not rule over or incorporate all the land and people of Palestine in Israel and therefore would withdraw from most of the Palestinian territory occupied after the 1967 war. Goals about other matters, however, pertaining to the status of Jerusalem, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, and the Jewish settlements established beyond the 1967 armistice lines demarking Israel, were not transformed, so they rose in prominence.

Goals were modified not because of major reconciliation actions leading up to the signing of the DOP or in the course of its implementation but because

the most desired ones were impossible to attain. No shift toward more shared goals, aside from separation, occurred. There was no sentiment among Israeli Jews to abandon Zionism. Only marginal discussions had begun about Israel after Zionist goals largely have been achieved.³⁷ Post-Zionist Israel, predominantly Jewish in population, would retain Hebrew as its national language, and Jewish culture, religion, and history largely would shape the country's institutions. In post-Zionist Israel, however, citizenship rights would be less related to ethnicity, and the democracy would become more pluralistic.

The negotiations and the progress toward the establishment of two states in what had been Palestine under the British mandate constituted some movement toward reconciliation. Signs of mutual acceptance and minimal regard between the leaders of the Palestinian Authority and of Israel became visible.

In accord with dissonance theory, some people on each side may have come to believe that the other side had changed its goals more than was the case in order to be consistent with the actions they had taken in supporting the negotiations. This may have contributed to the failure at Camp David II and to the resulting shock. Thus, many Israelis had come to think Palestinians knew and accepted the impossibility of Israel agreeing to an absolute right of return for Palestinian refugees to the homes their families had left. This occurred despite assertions by many Palestinians insisting on the right of return.

It is possible that peace movement activities, such as dialogue work, and negotiations contributed to Palestinian expectations that their more ambitious goals could be achieved if they held firm. In addition, United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolutions supporting their goals and international support for the legitimacy of their claims reduced the need to be responsive to Israeli concerns and goals.

What became evident during the Camp David II negotiations was that the goals of the adversaries remained very different. Seemingly incompatible goals became evident: They pertained to which group would be sovereign over which parts of Jerusalem; what recourse Palestinian refugees from the 1948 and 1967 wars would have; what the borders of the Palestinian state would be; and what the future of Jewish settlers in the formerly occupied territories would be.

Methods

Consistent with the small changes in objectives, the methods of struggle used by each side also underwent some changes. The Oslo accords included fore-swearing any resort to violence and gave greater emphasis to negotiations and

to creating acceptable tradeoffs. In addition, they gave more reliance to efforts at persuading the other side as well as to persuading other parties in the region and the world as a whole. The Palestinians stressed arguments based on international law, human rights, and UN General Assembly resolutions and sought international support for their positions. The changes, however, were tactical and superficial. Each side credited its past use of violence and coercion as the cause of the other side's concessions.³⁸ The leaders and public on each side certainly continued to honor and to celebrate their fighters who had died in armed struggle.

On the Palestinian side, the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence headed by Mubarak Awad made efforts to foster reliance by nonviolent means of struggle. Gene Sharp visited the region beginning even before the first Intifada and discussed the uses of nonviolent actions with Palestinian and Israeli officials. The efforts, however, did not receive support from the official Palestinian leadership.³⁹ The leaders did not interpret even the first Intifada, with its large nonviolent components, to be a nonviolent strategy that was effective.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Israeli officials seemed fearful of the possible adoption of a nonviolent strategy and suppressed it forcefully, channeling Palestinian resistance into violent methods, which was easier to contain both in confrontations and in the court of public opinion.

Among Jewish Israelis, there was the high consensus that military strength, skill, and the will to use them were essential in order to preserve their country. That consensus was significantly broken by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon in an effort to smash the PLO. Support for negotiating an accommodation with the Palestinians emerged among a major proportion of Israelis as a result of many other developments.⁴¹ These included the changing international context after the Cold War ended and the heightened United States and Arab cooperation in response to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Palestinians themselves were influential by waging the first Intifada beginning in December 1987 and by moderating their goals.

When the negotiations failed, resort to violence was an obvious fall-back strategy for both Jewish Israelis and for Arab Palestinians. Violence threatened and exploded in September 2001. The violence of the other side justified each side's escalation of violence to defeat the other. The several efforts to establish ceasefires failed as groups on each side sought to escalate the struggle they previously thought would be necessary. Nevertheless, even then negotiations continued, such as the meetings at Taba, Egypt, as late as January 2001. But time had run out. On February 6, 2001, the Israeli electorate voted overwhelmingly against Barak and elected hard-line Likud leader Sharon as prime minister.

CONCLUSIONS

Making peace is a messy process. Each side in a large-scale conflict is usually a diverse coalition consisting of contending groups competing with each other in how to deal with the enemy. Thus, groups within the Palestinian camp, including Islamic activists and pragmatists, vary in their demands and strategies to achieve them. Groups also differ in the Israeli camp; they include religious activists, nationalists, and peace activists.

Some groups within each camp have tried to undermine peace agreements that are or that appear to be imminent. This has been true for some members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and of some extremist Jewish organizations. Many persons in such groups tend to regard reconciliatory actions by the other side as steps to an outcome they will not accept. If such groups were firmly dominant in either camp, then reconciliatory actions would be ineffective. I do not think that was the case in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict since at least the signing of the DOP. With that signing, most Israelis recognized Arafat to be a partner for peace, but the eruption of violence characterizing Intifada II resulted in a profound shift in Israeli public opinion on that judgment.

Even for groups that are not essentially and enduringly hostile, reconciliatory actions can fail to move adversaries to a mutually acceptable agreement. Members of one camp may perceive a reconciliation action by the other side as a sign of weakness and as an opportunity to raise demands, resulting in an escalated conflict. A reconciliation action also may be viewed as admitting the illegitimacy of a prior position, which leads to a heightened level of demand and to an escalated conflict.⁴²

On the other hand, even small actions toward reconciliation may generate increased trust and understanding and reciprocated actions. Furthermore, such actions may produce commitments by those undertaking the acts and may help transform the recipients in ways that are irreversible, generating further moves at a later time. This may happen, for example, among the persons engaged in actual negotiations or in joint peace affirming actions, but increased trust and understanding require cumulative actions that are not undermined by powerful contrary acts.

In the case of Israeli–Palestinian relations, there have been very few significant reconciliation actions by major leaders on either side. Indeed, some important personages in each camp often have denounced reconciliation actions that have been taken. Reconciliation actions at the nonofficial and subelite level also have been sparse. This probably has contributed to the tough, begrudging negotiations that occurred even after the breakthrough DOP agreement. Perhaps a mutually negotiated exchange of statements expressing

regrets about past events and conduct would have avoided the breakdown. It may yet contribute to progress toward a new and more equitable and more stable accommodation.⁴³

The reconciliation moves that were taken, even in the course of the final status negotiations, had limited credibility because of the context provided by each side's conduct. From the perspective of many Palestinians, although Barak brought issues and possible solutions to the table that had not been done in prior official negotiations, previous Israeli conduct and Barak's own behavior seemed to belie the offers. Palestinians experienced delays and incomplete fulfillment of past agreements. During Barak's time as prime minister, no additional Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank occurred, although they had been agreed to in the Wye agreement signed by Prime Minister Netanyahu in October 1998.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Israelis expanded Jewish settlements, built more bypass roads, and demolished Palestinian homes.

From the Israeli perspective, Palestinians were unyielding in their demands, threatening unilateral action such as a declaration of independence and most significantly failing to work consistently to prevent violent attacks on Jews. Furthermore, they had a larger number of armed police than had been agreed upon, and the rhetoric against Jews and Zionism seemed unabated.

Most devastatingly for Jewish Israelis, what they regarded as extraordinarily large concessions that Barak proposed at Camp David II were deemed inadequate by the Palestinians. The Israeli dismay, distrust, and anger greatly increased with the outbreak and persistence of violence in Intifada II. Barak, facing the collapse of his policy and government, tried violently to suppress the resistance while at the same time attempted desperately to negotiate an end-of-conflict agreement. Both efforts failed.

The leaders of neither side planned the breakdown in the negotiations and the subsequent eruption of intense violence and resulting warfare.⁴⁵ Each sought to retain political authority with their constituents and to gain a deal with the other side that might sustain them, but the deal that each seemed to proffer to the other was not deemed adequate.

Earlier, the conflict had been transformed sufficiently to allow the adversaries to begin negotiations and even to reach significant agreements. However, the transformation was not sufficient to reach a more stable accommodation. A fundamental transformation of the conflict to be less destructive must rest on more substantial changes relating to justice, shared truth, mutual regard, and mutual security. Those changes must occur at the elite levels but also to a significant degree at all other levels of each society. They probably must rest on other changes within each side, between them, and also in their sociopolitical context.⁴⁶

Even without much reconciliation, however, and despite the present violence and recriminations, there are signs that a conflict transformation yet may be advanced and that a mutually acceptable accommodation is ultimately attainable. Some Palestinians and Jewish Israelis are continuing dialogue work and joint efforts to alleviate the harms of the ongoing violence. Some informal explorations about ways to overcome the violent impasse are being made.

The breakdown in negotiations and the eruption of severe violence was tragic, and the reversal in progress toward a constructive transformation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was severe. Leaders on each side might have avoided and better have contained those reversals. The accusations that each side makes about the leaders on the other side actually have some merit, but the responses are defensive and accusatory, ignoring the possible merit and the underlying anguish.

Responsibility, too, must be borne by external actors who encouraged resort to Palestinian violence to win their objectives and did little to alleviate the grievances experienced by Palestinians. Other external actors, supporting Israel, did not encourage adequately responsiveness to Palestinian claims. In particular, external actors might have been more insistent that leaders on both sides fully adhere to and implement the agreements reached in the Oslo peace process. External religious, intellectual, economic, and other nongovernmental actors also were not engaged sufficiently in fostering reconciliatory actions by Israelis and Palestinians.

While some people in the region can foresee no negotiated mutually acceptable settlement, many see that there is no alternative. Undoubtedly, the present violence and its legacies compound the difficulties of any steps toward reconciliation and toward a constructive transformation of the conflict. Given the recent experiences, members of each side are likely to fear that reconciliatory gestures will be misunderstood and will prove to be counterproductive. For example, Israelis fear that to accept responsibility for creating Palestinian refugees would delegitimize the state of Israel. Acceptance of some responsibility is more likely if Israelis are assured that the existence of the state of Israel will not be jeopardized. Joint understandings, aided by mediation, are needed.

Under these circumstances, external interventions are particularly important. External officials and nonofficials can help orchestrate synchronized steps by adversaries that interrupt destructive escalations and help de-escalate a conflict. They can help reframe the conflict, for example, by including additional negotiating partners so that new solutions become plausible. In this case, that may be particularly true for issues relating to refugees and to Jerusalem.

Some conflict outcomes are unilaterally imposed by one side, as happened after World War II; then reconciliation may follow. If the outcome of a protracted conflict is to be negotiated, however, its quality will be improved

when it is accompanied by some significant reconciliation. Moreover, the reconciliation is more likely to be mutual than if one side is able essentially to impose an accommodation on the other.

Elements of reconciliation go hand in hand with a nonimposed conflict transformation. They depend upon conflict transformation and can contribute to it. The independent effects of actions purporting to express reconciliation are limited, however, particularly when a negotiated peace agreement has not been concluded. In the Palestinian–Israeli case, reconciliation actions flowed from changes within each side as members assessed the external reality. Neither side’s reconciliation acts were of a magnitude sufficient to influence the other camp directly and substantially. Actions that contribute to reconciliation must be carried out consistently and mutually in order to be convincing and to minimize misunderstandings and thus to avoid being counterproductive.

NOTES

1. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the 42nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, February 20–24, 2001, in Chicago, Illinois. In addition to the cited publications, this article is based upon numerous conversations and interviews conducted with people in Israel, the emerging Palestine, and neighboring countries over many years. Most recently, I visited Israel February 4–10, 2001, and June 7–16, 2001. The period analyzed in this paper ends before September 11, 2001. I thank Jacob Bercovitch, Raymond Cohen, Pat Coy, Diana Francis, Amal Jamal, Edy Kaufman, Rami Khouri, and Gerald Steinberg for their comments on a draft of this paper, but I am responsible for the interpretations presented here.

2. Of course, many other factors were important, but I will not analyze them closely here. They include external parties such as high officials of the United States, Egypt, Jordan, and many other countries; the personal styles and qualities of Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak; and the negotiation and mediation methods that were used.

3. Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

4. Mahmoud Abbas, *Through Secret Channels. The Road to Oslo: Senior PLO Leader Abu Mazen’s Revealing Story of the Negotiations with Israel* (Reading, PA: Garnet Publishing, 1995); Uri Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East* (New York: Random House, 1998); Yossi Beilin, *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1999); and Menachem Klein, *Jerusalem: The Contested City* (New York: New York University Press, 2001).

5. Accounts of the proposals include one by a Palestinian, Akram Hanieh, who was present and one by the Israeli foreign minister in the Barak government, Shlomo Ben Ami. Akram Hanieh, “The Camp David Papers,” (Ramallah, Palestine: Al-Ayyam Newspaper,

2000), 1–98; Shlomo Ben Ami, “Ben-Ami’s Camp David Diaries—Part I and Part II” (The Middle East Media Research Institute [MEMRI], 2001; <http://www.mcomri.org>. Special Dispatch Series, No. 207 and No. 209. Last accessed August 3, 2002). For interpretations of what went wrong, see Ron Pundak, “From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong,” 1–26; Nadim N. Rouhana, “Reconciliation in Protracted National Conflict: Identity and Power in the Israeli–Palestinian Case” in *The Social Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict: Theory, Application, and Practice*, A. H. Eagly, R. M. Baron, and V. L. Hamilton, eds. (Washington DC: APA Press, forthcoming); and Gershon Baskin, “Negotiating the Settlements: The Success of Right-Wing Political Entrapment Against Peace,” <http://www.ipcri.org>. Last accessed August 3, 2002.

6. Khalil Shikaki, “Results of Public Opinion Poll #18” Last accessed August 3, 2002 (Nablus, West Bank: Center for Palestine Research and Studies, 1995).

7. Many analyses have been made of textbooks authorized by the Palestinian Authority. See for example Goetz Nordbruch, “Narrating Palestinian Nationalism: An Inquiry into the New Palestinian Textbooks” (MEMRI, www.memri.org/sr/SR00501.html, 2001); and Shlomo Sharan, “Israel and the Jews in the Schoolbooks of the Palestinian State” (Ariel Center for Policy Research [ACPCR], www.acpcr.org.il, 2001).

8. Tamar Hermann, “Reconciliation: Reflections on the Theoretical and Practical Utility of the Term,” in unpublished conference paper presented at Reconciliation, Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, June 12–13, 2001.

9. That site is sacred for believers in the Jewish and Islamic faiths. On a rock there, Abraham was prepared to sacrifice his son, and in later generations Jews built a temple nearby, on a platform sustained by extensive walls. When the Romans destroyed the temple, some of the walls remained, and one part of the western wall became the Wall, the holiest shrine for Jewish believers. The very rock where Abraham’s sacrifice was to have been made is the place from which Mohammed rose to heaven, and when Muslims controlled Jerusalem they constructed a great mosque over the rock, called the Dome of the Rock. Nearby is a particularly holy Muslim site, the Al Aksa mosque. The flat area on which the mosques rest is a kind of platform buttressed by the Wall. That platform is known as the Haram al-Sharif in Arabic or the Temple Mount, which is the Hebrew term translated into English.

10. The degree to which the uprising was planned and directed by the PA is a matter of dispute. Some statements by Palestinian leaders suggest that the uprising was welcomed as a way to increase the pressure on Israel to gain better terms. It might lead to an internationalization of the conflict, bringing foreign intervention and support for the Palestinian cause. Some observers speculated that Palestinian dissatisfaction with Arafat and the PA leadership was about to break out, and diverting dissatisfaction against the Israelis would serve the interests of the PA leadership. Other interpretations are noted later in the paper.

11. Various names for the Palestinian actions have been used. Some Israelis refer to it as the wave of violence; some Palestinians use the term Al Aksa Intifada, referring back to the first Intifada (the uprising that began in December 1987) and to the Mosque associated with the initial outbreak of violence in September 2000. Others refer to it as Intifada II or as resistance to the occupation. The term adopted here is Intifada II. Each name has problems.

12. Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, "Peace Index—March 2001" (Tel Aviv: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University, 2001).

13. See John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); Louis Kriesberg, "Paths to Varieties of Inter-Communal Reconciliation," pp. 105–129 in *Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process, and Structure*, Ho-Won Jeong, ed. (Fitchburg, MD: Dartmouth, 1999); Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998).

14. Michael Henderson, *Forgiveness Factor* (London: Grosvenor Books, 1996).

15. An observation suggested by Pat Coy.

16. Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 3 (1969); Carolyn M. Stephenson New, "Peace Studies, Overview" in *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict*, Lester Kurtz, ed. (San Diego, CA: The Academic Press, 1999), 809–820.

17. *New York Times*, December 15, 1988, "Arafat's Statement on Plans for Peace in the Middle East," A 19.

18. In December 1993, I participated in a group organized by the United States Interreligious Committee for Peace in the Middle East, which visited Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Israeli, and then-occupied territories. In Israel we met with Yossi Beilin, then-deputy foreign minister, who described efforts to attract economic assistance for the Palestinians in the territories under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority.

19. Israeli officials attributed the delay to security concerns about the importation of weapons.

20. Lena C. Endresen, "Contact and Cooperation: The Israeli–Palestinian People-to-People Program" (Oslo: Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, 2001), 3–52.

21. Most Jews believed that satisfying these claims would destroy the state of Israel. They were not made consistently in ways that were convincingly reassuring of the contrary. The boundaries of the Israeli-occupied territories widely became understood to refer to the British-mandated Palestine, minus the territory of Israel prior to the June 1967 war. Even that would deny Israel East Jerusalem and the old city and surrounding developments. The right of return sounded threatening to the Jewish character of Israel, which the right to return to the Palestinian homeland would not have.

22. Hermann, "Reconciliation."

23. Amal Jamal, "Palestinians in Israeli Peace Discourse," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30:1 (2000), 36–51.
24. Mark A. Heller, *A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
25. Herbert C. Kelman, "Contributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli–Palestinian Breakthrough," *Negotiation Journal* 11 (1995): 19–27.
26. Endresen, "Contact and Cooperation," n. 40.
27. Harold H. Kelley, "The Process of Causal Attribution," *American Psychologist* 28 (1973): 107–128; Christopher Mitchell, *Gestures of Conciliation: Factors Contributing to Successful Olive Branches* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
28. Jamal, "Palestinians."
29. Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Comment on lack of contribution based on private communication from Raymond Cohen, April 22, 2001.
30. Ethan Bronner, "Israel's History Textbooks Replace Myths with Facts," *New York Times* (1999).
31. Henry Siegman, "Israel: A Historic Statement," *The New York Review of Books* 48 (February 8, 2001).
32. Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts*.
33. Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991).
34. Hermann, "Reconciliation," 17. Hermann also observes that "the peace activists (and particularly the women) were blamed for being unpatriotic ('Arab lovers'), for neglecting Israel's national security, and over identifying with the enemy by accepting its historical narrative as legitimate."
35. Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1957).
36. Hermann, "Reconciliation," 17.
37. Herbert C. Kelman, "Israel in Transition from Zionism to Post-Zionism," *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 555 (January 1998): 46–61.
38. When Barak ordered the unilateral Israeli military withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Hezbollah and many Palestinians celebrated it as a demonstration of the effectiveness of military action against Israelis, not as an act of moderation by the Israeli government.
39. Gene Sharp has been a world leader in developing the strategy of nonviolent action and has consulted about adopting nonviolent strategies in many countries. The Israeli government in June 1988 expelled Mubarak Awad, a Palestinian American. The Israeli responses to nonviolent actions convinced many—even moderate—Palestinians that nonviolent action was not a viable method of struggle. Interviews with Gene Sharp

on April 18, 2001, and with Mubarak Awad on April 24, 2001, helped me understand these developments.

40. The Palestinian uprising that began in December 1987 usually is characterized in terms of youths throwing stones at Israeli soldiers. The Palestinian boycott of Israeli goods and other forms of nonviolent resistance, however, demonstrated widespread participation in the uprising, which was not evident in the second uprising. Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari, "The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30 (2001): 5–25.

41. Karin Aggestam, *Reframing and Resolving Conflict: Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations, 1988–1998* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1999); Louis Kriesberg, "Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 38 (2001): 373–392; Michael Watkins and Kirsten Lundberg, "Getting to the Table in Oslo: Driving Forces and Channel Factors," *Negotiation Journal* 14 (1998): 115–135.

42. Among many examples, the case of the Sudeten Germans is illustrative. Ethnic Germans living in the Czech Sudetenland were expelled from this territory at the end of World War II. See Timothy Ryback, "Dateline Sudetenland: Hostages to History," *Foreign Policy* No. 105 (1996–97): 162–178. Vaclav Havel, as the new president of Czechoslovakia, denounced the expulsions as deeply immoral. Czech leaders made other reconciliatory gestures, but this reconciliation process broke down in an escalating exchange of charges and demands between Sudeten Germans living in Germany and Czech officials. Public exchanges of recriminations endangered warming relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. At secret meetings, senior Czech and German officials fashioned a declaration that could be acceptable to both countries. On January 21, 1997, Czech premier Vaclav Klaus and German chancellor Helmut Kohl signed a joint declaration, which was approved by both countries' parliaments.

43. Raymond Cohen, "The Role of Apology in Conflict Resolution: The Israeli–Palestinian Case," in *The Peace Process and Future Visions of the Middle East* (Lund, Sweden: unpublished, 1997).

44. The Wye agreement, among other matters, provided for further Israeli redeployment that was planned as part of a prior agreement. Barak suspended the Wye agreement and rolled its provisions into the final status negotiations.

45. This is the conclusion of the international commission chaired by former United States senator George Mitchell.

46. Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts*.