Assessing Past Strategies for Countering Terrorism, in Lebanon and by Libya

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Abstract

American strategies to deal with terrorist attacks against Americans in Lebanon in the 1980s and by Libya since the beginning of the 1980s are examined. The consequences of the various strategies employed by U.S. government officials over time and the strategies employed by American non-governmental actors and by international organizations are compared. In addition, alternative strategies that might plausibly have been employed are also discussed. Official actions that relied largely on military methods and were conducted unilaterally tended to be less effective, even counterproductive, compared to actions that were multilateral and relied significantly on diplomatic approaches, often aided by intermediaries.

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has been used by many U.S. government officials to designate responses to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Useful as that term was in mobilizing American support for the policies the government chose, the designation has been widely criticized as indicating an inadequate and misleading analysis of the event and its causes, and therefore to an inappropriate and ultimately failing strategy (Hoffman 2003; Lehman 2002, September 16). Those criticisms are generally deserved, if unacknowledged. Terrorism as the enemy is too vague and broad a target and it steers attention away from the specific organizations using many methods to achieve various objectives in opposition to the United States. To wage a war justifies undue military methods when the conflict necessarily requires applying a wide variety of methods of struggle. Five years after the attack, officials began to shift the designation of the conflict to the “long war;” but that does not adequately meet the criticisms (Safire 2006).

After briefly discussing terrorism as a method of waging a conflict, I discuss a broad conflict resolution approach that helps to analyze the recourse to terrorism and contributes to formulating constructive strategies to counter terrorist actions. In the second half of this article, two cases of American responses to terrorist attacks, one relating to Lebanon and the other to Libya are analyzed. This analysis compares the consequences of different American strategies in countering terrorism in those cases and also discusses the possible effectiveness of constructive strategies that were not employed.
Various American strategies were pursued, in the 1980s and afterwards, to deal with the terrorist blows in Lebanon and those occurring at the behest of the Libyan government. The long-run consequences of the attacks and of American responses have differed. This analysis will not only help assess different ways of countering terrorism, but should also contribute to understanding the reasons for the decisions would-be terrorists make and the decisions that those who counter them make presently. After all, American officials and perpetrators of terrorism both learn from past experience, inferring mistaken as well as correct lessons.

**Terrorism**

There is no consensus about the meaning of the word terrorism; even the governments constituting the UN cannot agree, and militant nongovernmental organizations add further dissenting views. The disagreements reflect the reality that “terrorism” is pejorative, generally used to condemn particular violent actions taken by enemies. Such usage provides information about the user, but is not suitable for analytic or policy purposes. For such purposes, it is best to understand the many defining features of terrorist actions that various contending groups employ; they differ in terms of the actions’ form, target, perpetrator, and context.

Violent acts or threats of violence generally are intended to frighten others and to compel compliance. One feature that may be used to designate an action as terrorist is its frightening manner, such as killing people cruelly and desecrating the body. For example, when the Ku Klux Klan acted to restore white domination of African Americans in the U.S. South after the Civil War, its members publicly lynched African Americans, leaving mutilated bodies hanging from trees.

Some government officials act to terrorize those who might resist their rule; they arrest and imprison, torture, and assassinate presumed opponents. These government actions are often conducted covertly and sometimes by nonofficial militia groups. Such operations are generally regarded as “state terrorism,” as carried out in the assassinations and disappearances of citizens in Argentina, Guatemala, and Chile. State terrorism also includes the massive killings, labor-camp incarcerations, and torture by “internal security” forces of Hitlerite Germany and of Stalinist Soviet Union.

Another feature often used to define terrorist actions is targeting noncombatants for violent acts. But intentions and definitions of noncombatants are often disputed. Soldiers conducting military actions, such as shelling, bombing, setting booby traps, or planting landmines that are directed against combatants do not regard themselves to be committing terrorist acts even if many noncombatants are the victims. The injured persons, however, often disagree, and blanket bombings of cities during the Second World War, the use of weapons of mass destruction are widely regarded as terrorist, even if the perpetrators justify it as regrettable, but necessary to save lives.

Perpetrators of targeted killing of noncombatants sometimes justify their conduct by arguing that they are merely reciprocating such atrocities committed by
the enemy or that the so-called noncombatants are actually fighters. For example, immediately after the 9/11 attacks, a senior al Qaeda operative who helped plan the attacks, Ramzi bin al-Shibb, defended them by denying that they were terrorist attacks:

...they are legally legitimate, because they are committed against a country at war with us, and the people in that country are combatants. Someone might say that it is the innocent, the elderly, the women, and the children who are victims, so how can these operations be legitimate according to sharia? And we say that the sanctity of women, children, and the elderly is not absolute. There are special cases ... Muslims may respond in kind if infidels have targeted women and children and elderly Muslims [or if] they are being invaded [or if] the non-combatants are helping with the fight, whether in action, word, or any other type of assistance, [or if they] need to attack with heavy weapons, which do not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants (Cullison 2004, p. 68).

Another standard used to distinguish terrorist from non-terrorist violence is the nature of the perpetrator. A defining feature of a state is that it holds a monopoly on legitimate violence. It follows that when agents of the state commit violence under orders from above, they are engaging in warfare or police action, which cannot be classified as terrorism. Governments usually declare that when agents of a nongovernmental actor, domestic or foreign, commits violence against officials of the state, they are committing a crime and a terrorist act. Thus, when the USS Cole was attacked in the harbor at Aden, Yemen, in October 2000, and seventeen U.S. Navy sailors were killed, the U.S. government and public regarded the action as a terrorist attack (Clarke 2004). This characterization of the attack was made because the Al-Qaeda network was responsible, and it is not a government.

Finally, the context of the violent actions also affects whether or not many people regard the actions as terrorist. An important aspect of the context is the transparency shown by the persons committing the action. If the perpetrators act openly, they are publicly claiming legitimacy and more evidently trying to advance political goals. However, some agents committing violent actions do so covertly, which makes it difficult to understand the perpetrators goals and how the conflict might be settled. Furthermore, persons engaging in covert operations generally are able to act with little accountability and little regard for "humanity."

Another aspect of context is the degree to which the violence is part of a wide array of other methods of struggle. A violent act may be incidental in a large-scale struggle in which various nonviolent methods are also being used, such as ideological, religious, or political appeals and mobilization. In such cases the violent actions are less likely to be regarded as terrorist, while if violence is the primary method of conducting a conflict, they are more readily labeled terrorist.

An additional aspect of the context is the extent to which the violent actions are carried out with the ultimate purpose of negotiating an agreement with the adversary. Violent actions may even be used to gain the attention of the inattentive.
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A cause is being announced, and indeed, an audience is gained as people try to understand why such actions are taken.

In short, violent actions vary immensely and there is no consensus about which features should be used to define terrorist acts. Since the focus of this article is on attacks against the United States and American responses, the official U.S. definition of terrorism should be recognized. The definition is contained in Title 22 of the U.S. code, Section 2656f(d):

The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience (http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/faqs.html).

The many other characteristics that various entities use to designate certain acts as terrorist should also be recognized. In this article, the terms used by the adversaries in conflicts will be used, but other analytic concepts will also be considered.

In examining how to counter U.S. government defined acts of terrorism, it will be useful to consider strategies that may isolate the perpetrators, mobilize international support against them, and thus construct American policies that are likely to be fruitful. For example, an approach that locates violent actions, regarded as terrorist, within a human rights framework might help accomplish those results. That context could be the basis for criminalizing terrorist actions. It would emphasize more reliance on police actions than on waging wars. That also is likely to result in more precise and accurate identification of perpetrators, and win greater international consensus for their arrest and trial. Such framing also has the benefit of constraining a government’s attempts to counter terrorism by committing its own human rights violations, which often are counterproductive. These considerations are more consistent with reliance on constructive ways of conducting conflicts, which is discussed next.

Conflict Resolution Approaches

This analysis draws concepts and propositions from the field of conflict resolution, broadly conceived, which are applicable to large-scale conflicts at each stage in the course of a conflict (Kriesberg 2003). The ideas help explain how constructive ways of waging a conflict are sometimes taken at various conflict stages: how the emergence of destructive conflicts are averted, how destructive escalations are limited, interrupted, or stopped, how destructive conflicts become transformed and mutual accommodations are reached, and how agreements and accommodations are made and sustained. The conflict resolution ideas also help explain how possible constructive ways of fighting often are not adopted, with mutually destructive consequences. I will suggest how such alternative strategies may be relevant for conflicts in which terrorist attacks occur and counter efforts are undertaken.
Seven basic and inter-related ideas in the conflict resolution field are relevant for constructively countering terrorist acts. First, conflicts are recognized to be inevitable in social life and often serve to advance and to sustain important human values, including security, freedom, and economic well-being. Unfortunately, however, conflicts often are conducted in ways that damage those values; thus, fighting for security can generate insecurities not only for an adversary, but also for the party fighting to win and protect its own.

Second, in the conflict resolution field, a conflict is regarded as a kind of social interaction in which what each side affects the other. Therefore each side is able to affect its opponent by its own conduct; it can strengthen its position in various ways, besides trying to destroy or harm the antagonist. In conventional behavior, adversaries in a conflict each tend to blame the opponent for the bad things that happen in a fight, and they even tend to regard their own bad conduct as forced upon them by the opponent. That is, each side tends to see itself as the victim; but such self-victimization actually reduces the possible forms of resisting and countering the antagonists’ attacks.

Third, all humans have basic needs and the denial of those needs is an important source of conflicts while recognizing and satisfying them at some level are critical to resolving a conflict (Burton 1990; Laue and Cormick 1978). However, the cultural variability in considering needs and how these are defined is very great (Avruch 1998). Thus, all humans may wish to be respected and not humiliated; just how important that wish is and how it is defined and manifested varies widely among cultures and subcultures. One way to bridge these differences is to draw on those components that have a wide consensus affirmed by international declarations and conventions about basic human rights (Babbitt Forthcoming).

Fourth, members of each party in a conflict have a collective identity, and they attribute an identity to the adversary. The identities seem to be immutable, but of course they actually change, in part as the parties interact with each other, and try to define each other. Moreover, every person has numerous identities associated with membership in many collectivities, such as a country, a religious community, an ethnicity, and an occupation. (Anderson 1991; Wilmer 2002). No large entity is unitary and homogeneous; the members of every large-scale entity differ in hierarchical ranks and in ways of thinking, and tend to have different degrees of commitment for the struggles in which their collectivity is engaged.

Fifth, a related insight is that no conflict is wholly isolated; rather each is linked to many others. Each adversary has various internal conflicts that impinge on its external adversaries, and each has a set of external conflicts, some linked over time and others subordinated to even larger conflicts. Changes in the salience of one conflict impacts the salience other related conflicts. Leaders of one adversary group may give undue attention to their relations with their constituency, to the detriment of giving appropriate attention to an external conflict.

Sixth, workers in the CR field generally define conflict in terms of persons or groups who manifest incompatible goals (Pruitt 1986; Wehr 1979). That
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manifestation, moreover, is not solely violent; rather, each contending party also may use elements of nonviolent coercion, promised benefits, and persuasive arguments to achieve its contested goals. Conflicts are waged using a changing blend of coercive and non-coercive inducements, and issues are settled by negotiations, sometimes even when terrorist actions are involved (Murray 1990). Analysts and practitioners of CR often note that great reliance on violence and coercion is risky and can be counterproductive (Johnson 2000).

Finally, adversaries wage a conflict against each other within a larger social context. Some of the people and groups not engaged as partisans in the conflict may be drawn in as supporters or allies of one side; that possibility can influence the partisans on each side to act so as not to move the outsiders to help their opponent. CR workers generally stress the direct and indirect roles that outsiders exercise in channeling the course of conflicts, particularly as interveners who mediate and otherwise seek to mitigate and resolve conflicts (Ury 2000).

These considerations indicate the importance of carefully analyzing a conflict to improve the chances that the policies chosen by partisans or by intermediaries will be effective and not turn out to be counterproductive. The analysis should include gathering information about the various stakeholders in the conflict, regarding their interests and their views of each other. That knowledge should be coupled with theoretical understanding of conflicts generally, based on experience and research. The theoretical understanding can suggest a wide range of possible options for action and indicate the probabilities of different outcomes for various options. Such an analysis can help avoid policies that seem attractive for internal considerations, but unsuitable for contending with the external adversary. In the following discussion of violent attacks related to Lebanon and Libya in the 1980s and 1990s, American responses to terrorist challenges will be reviewed and alternative policies considered.

Lebanon

Suicide bombers killed hundreds of Americans and many Americans were taken hostage in Lebanon during the 1980s. Those attacks and American responses to them cannot be understood without taking into account the context in which they occurred. Lebanon was the site of intense fighting among various Christian and Islamic militia groups during the 1970s and 1980s (Azar 1983). The severe differences worsened when the PLO and many Palestinians came to southern Lebanon to continue their struggle against Israel; this followed the Jordanian government's forcible expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970. Some of the militia had significant support from Syria and from Iran, which was ruled by revolutionary-minded Shi'a clerics who took power in 1979.

American policies. President Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, and viewed the issues in the Middle East, as in the rest of the world, in terms of the ongoing U.S.-Soviet rivalry (Quandt 1992). He tended to believe that disturbances in the Middle East were instigated by the Soviets and the U.S. must forge local
In early 1982, Israeli officials visited Washington to discuss an ambitious plan: to crush the PLO in Lebanon and help place a friendly Christian militia leader of the Phalangist party, Bashir Gemayal in the president's office. They believed, as did many in the region, that Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. gave a "green light" to the plan.

On June 6, 1982 Israeli military forces entered southern Lebanon and moved up to besiege Beirut, to which Arafat and the PLO had retreated. As the military operations escalated and encountered Syrian forces, many associates of President Reagan, but not Haig, sought to stop the fighting (Quandt 1992). George P. Schultz replaced Haig as Secretary of State in July and in August the United States helped arrange the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut to Tunisia. The U.S. marines joined French and Italian soldiers forming an international force to oversee the departure, and also to provide security for the Palestinian civilians staying behind. The PLO departure was completed by September 1, 1982, and the international force was withdrawn by September 10, 1982.

Upon becoming Secretary of State, Shultz persuaded Reagan to advance peace between Israel and the Palestinians. On September 1, 1982 Reagan proposed a plan that would entail some form of association between the West Bank, Gaza, and Jordan and a withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories, to an extent influenced by the agreed-upon security arrangements. The Israeli government expressed its disagreement but the response from the Arab governments was not as opposed.

Progress on this initiative might have placed American engagement in the region in a favorable context. However, violent events in Lebanon quickly undermined possible progress. On September 14, 1982, pro-Syrian elements assassinated Bashir Gemayel, who had been elected President on August 23 (Quandt 1992). Then on September 16th some members of a Phalangist militia entered Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps, which were surrounded by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), and massacred hundreds of people living there. Following the Sabra and Shatila massacre, the international force returned to Beirut.

On April 18, 1983, a suicide truck bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut killed 63 persons, including 17 Americans. Reagan administration officials believed that Hizbollah was responsible for the attack (Hajjar 2002). Hizbollah is a non-state actor whose members are Shi'a Lebanese; Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, influenced by Iranian clerics, provided spiritual leadership. The U.S. government made no immediate response; but intelligence was gathered in preparation for possible retaliation.

Climaxing this growing violence came the October 23, 1983 suicide truck bombing that devastated a Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 marines. President Ronald Reagan, in response, ordered the battleship USS New Jersey to shell the hills above Beirut; this may have demonstrated strength and resolve to the American public, but it gained only more antagonism from living there. Hizbollah again was regarded as responsible for the destruction of the Marine barracks, and the U.S. developed a plan to bomb the barracks of Iranian Revolutionary guards in Lebanon.
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thought to be training Hizbollah fighters (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html). But the plan was aborted, presumably due to concerns about harming U.S.-Arab relations. In four months, President Regan ordered the U.S. marines to begin withdrawing from Lebanon.

A December 12, 1983 suicide truck bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait was followed by other terrorist acts in Lebanon. The U.S. government did not retaliate, but the Kuwaiti authorities quickly arrested, convicted and imprisoned 17 persons believed to be members of Al Dawa, an Iranian-backed Lebanese Shi’a group, which was the forerunner of Hizbollah. Foreign nationals were taken hostage in Lebanon in order to win the release of the “Al Dawa 17.”

On March 16, 1984 CIA Beirut station chief William Buckley was kidnapped, he was tortured and his body was not found until 1991. On September 20, 1984, a truck bombing of the U.S. embassy annex near Beirut killed 24 people, including two U.S. military personnel. Again no direct retaliation was undertaken, but the CIA began training Lebanese and other foreign intelligence agents to strike at presumed terrorists (Wright 1986). On March 8, 1985, a truck bomb exploded the apartment building in Beirut where Sheik Fadlallah lived; over 80 people were killed, but not Fadlallah, who was not at home. The militant Shia blamed the CIA, which denied responsibility for the disastrous operation.

As a consequence of the numerous attacks and the lack of an effective counter strategy, the U.S. government basically ceased any official activities in Lebanon. Syrian control was solidified.

The presence and the work of the American University of Beirut (AUB) constitutes another way in which Americans were engaged in Lebanon. The AUB was founded in 1866 as a private, independent, non-sectarian institution of higher learning, chartered in the State of New York. It has been a preeminent university in the region, with many distinguished alumni. However, in the volatile Beirut of the 1980s it could not wall off the sectarianism, threats, and terror outside its buildings (Sutherland 1996). In July 1982, David Dodge, a past President of AUB was taken hostage, the first of many hostages taken in Lebanon in the 1980s. Then, on January 18, 1984, Malcom Kerr, President of AUB, was assassinated in the hall outside his office.

Overall, in the 1980s, 15 Americans were taken hostage, as well as 39 British, French German, and other foreign nationals; 6 were known have been killed. Most hostages were released, but many only after years of captivity.

The U.S. government, still avoiding coming to grips with the political and social problems of the region, launched the Iran-Contra operation. This operation was an elaborate, but misguided and illegal (according to U.S. laws) attempt to free the captives in Lebanon, and to raise funds for the Contras fighting in Nicaragua. In 1985 and 1986, a series of transactions were undertaken in which American arms were sold to Iran, through Israel and then private intermediaries, to induce the Iranian government to influence Lebanese Shi’a groups to release the hostages they were holding, and three hostages were released in the course of the arms-for-
hostages dealings. This operation occurred during the 1980-1988 war between Iran and Iraq, in which the U.S. government “tilted” in favor of Iraq. Furthermore, the profits generated by the sales were diverted to provide arms to the Contras who were fighting to overthrow the Sandinista-led government of Nicaragua. When this bizarre scheme was exposed, it was quickly halted; Congressional investigations followed, and then criminal indictments of U.S. National Security Advisor John Poindexter and his aide, Colonel Oliver North.

When George H. W. Bush took office as president of the United States on January 20, 1989, he said, “There are today Americans who are held against their will in foreign lands, and Americans who are unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here and will be long remembered. Goodwill begets goodwill.” (Picco 1999). That last sentence initiated and provided the basis for a UN diplomatic operation to free the remaining hostages in Beirut. In particular, Giandomenico Picco, assistant secretary-general to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar conducted intensive mediation, shuttling from one country to another in the region.

The mediation had considerable success, aided by several changes in the region. When the Iraqis invaded and seized control of Kuwait in 1990, its military forces unwittingly released the imprisoned Al Dawa 17 ending the demand for their release. More generally, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini on June 3, 1989 enabled more pragmatic Iranian clerics to try playing a larger leadership role and it loosened Iranian influence over Hizbollah and its spiritual leader, Sheik Fadlallah.

But it was the perseverance, courage, and extraordinary skills of Pico as well as his role as the representative of the UN Secretary-General that greatly contributed to the successes of the mediation. The operation exemplifies many of the contributions that mediation can provide to settle a conflict, as discussed in Chapter two. Pico was able to meet with representatives of parties who would not communicate directly with each other and who had profound mistrust of each other. The release of the hostages was part of a complex set of actions by the UN Secretary General, also the Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Israeli, American, British, and German authorities, Hizbollah, and the groups actually holding the hostages. Each gave what other parties sought. These were not disreputable bargains; rather, each side acted honorably, doing the right thing. With the notable exception of Israel, each received significant benefits that they sought.

Hizbollah and the hostage holders won the release of many Lebanese detainees held by the Israelis. The UN Secretary-General issued a statement based on an analysis of the outbreak of the Iraq-Iranian war, that Iraq initiated it. The citizens taken hostage in Lebanon, citizens of United States, Germany and other countries, were freed. The sequencing of bits of information about the conditions of the detained, of the assurances about their releases and future relations, and of the individuals released was extremely difficult to agree upon and implement. It required a demanding and risky engagement by the UN mediator. The achievements might have been the basis for further ones, but the international convergence of interests and commitments had weakened, and the “goodwill begets goodwill” approach was shelved (Picco 1999).
In short, the official American policies to counter terrorism against Americans in Lebanon ranged greatly during the 1980s and 1990s, and the results were mixed. The severe attacks in the early 1980s were in part attributable to over ambitious official goals in attempting to reshape Lebanon's political system. The U.S. became engaged as one of the party's in the civil wars, but did not do so openly or with official American commitments. When the costs in American lives rose and with no easy solution visible, the American military forces and other American personnel were withdrawn. Perhaps surprisingly, American public recriminations of this failed policy were muted. Yet, Hizbollah and other Islamic and nationalist militant groups in the region could reasonably believe that non-state violence had driven the United States out of Lebanon, and that suicide bombing was an effective tool. Furthermore, Hizbollah could interpret U.S. official conduct in Lebanon as confirming its analysis of American imperialist and anti-Islamic goals.

Some non-official American activities fared better. The AUB continued to function as an American university throughout the civil wars. It was under great duress, but it survived and remained a representative of American engagement and again manifests the value of non-sectarianism and independence on the part of non-governmental organizations.

Alternatives. Initially, the U.S. should have more consistently avoided large interventionist goals, and not tried so actively to shape internal Lebanese affairs. The attempt to work with Israel to establish an allied government in Lebanon was overreaching and likely to be counter proctive, even if initially successful. Popular Lebanese movements, with powerful regional allies could not be easily overcome. Perhaps, more cautious work with the more moderate Islamic groups and avoiding reliance on the more extreme Christian Phalange might have had some success, but under the circumstances in the 1980s in the region, even that was unlikely.

Given the highly ambitious U.S. goals and the American government's unwillingness to invest the resources that might, however improbably, attain them, withdrawal probably was the best policy. After all, Israel had much more at stake and stayed much longer in southern Lebanon, but it too finally withdrew unilaterally from Lebanon in 2000. The reasons for the American withdrawal, however, should have been more honestly discussed by the president and the public. Denials and distractions would not serve America well in the long run.

Ultimately, Lebanon and even Hizbollah began to change, in conjunction with changes inside Iran and Lebanon, and the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. Increasingly, Hizbollah was becoming a part of the social and political life of Lebanon. Although still on the Department of State's list of terrorist organizations, George W. Bush's administration began to recognize its evolving role in Lebanon, exemplified by Condoleezza Rice's urging that it cleanse itself of "its terrorist wing" (Hajjar 2002)

American cooperation with the UN to win the release of the hostages was quite successful, and prompted by Bush's inaugural speech observation, "Goodwill begets goodwill." But the story is uncelebrated. Newspaper accounts of how the hostages were freed were scanty. Even Secretary of State Baker in his memoirs
does not mention Pico's mediation or even the freeing of the hostages. Celebrating or at least acknowledging such successes would help build support for constructive conflict resolution approaches.

**Libya**

On September 1, 1969, Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi led a military coup that overthrew the constitutional monarchy governing Libya; the coup leaders, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), took control of the government. Qaddafi proclaimed an ideology blending his personal socialist philosophy, Arab nationalism, and Islamic traditions, while denigrating Western capitalism and Soviet Communism (St. John 2002). The RCC quickly moved to implement its nationalist program. The large American air base in Libya was closed; similarly, the British troops stationed in Libya soon withdrew. Furthermore, Qaddafi negotiated new terms with the foreign oil companies operating in Libya, beginning with Occidental Petroleum. Under the new terms, the Libyan government could control production and set prices; the oil companies therefore turned to make their profits in the distribution and processing of petroleum. The governments of the other major petroleum exporting countries followed a similar course. The RCC, however, went further and in 1973 nationalized the oil companies operating in Libya.

Libyan oil revenues soared in the 1970s's, as they did in other petroleum-rich countries. The Libyan government used the influx of money to build up the Libyan social and economic infrastructure. Indeed, education and medical care became more widely available and housing and transportation were greatly improved (Vandewalle 1998).

Qaddafi also used some of the increased funds to begin giving financial and other support to many organizations he regarded as revolutionary or waging national liberation struggles, and which the U.S. government saw as engaging in terrorist violence. In the late 1960s and 1970s, many political leaders and public intellectuals, romanticized the use of violence as a tool of national liberation (Conversi 1993; Debray 1967). Qaddafi strongly identified with and lent support to the Palestinian cause and the organizations engaged in the struggle against Israel. His support of revolutionary movements in many parts of the world was one way to advance his grandiose ambitions to be a major player on the world stage. It also led to cooperation with the Soviet Union, despite his anti-communist beliefs. However, government leaders of Arab countries and of many other countries of the world came to regard Qaddafi as bizarre, untrustworthy, and sometimes dangerous (Hudson 1977).

*American policies.* Official American policy was not initially hostile to the new Libyan regime. President Nixon and his administration initially regarded Qaddafi as a nationalist and anti-Communist, and eschewed hostile actions, which were likely to be counterproductive (St. John 2002). However, this began to change in the mid-1970s. Several Libyan actions troubled the U.S. government, such as concluding a major arms deal with the Soviets in 1974 and increasingly allying itself with the Soviet Union. By 1976, the administration of President
Gerald Ford was publicly suggesting that Libya was supporting international terrorism. Economic relations, nevertheless, continued to grow and the United States was the largest purchaser of Libyan oil, between 1977 and 1980.

Qaddafi initially welcomed President Jimmy Carter’s administration, believing it heralded a change in U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, he was soon disappointed by what he regarded as too little change. Furthermore, the Carter administration sided with Egypt in its July 1977 skirmishes with Libya and the administration blocked the sale of transport planes to Libya, accusing it of terrorism. Then in late 1977 the U.S. discovered evidence that Libya was sponsoring an attempt to assassinate Herman Frederick Eilts, U.S. ambassador to Egypt (1974-79). Carter, in a personal note, informed Qaddafi that he knew of the plot; Qaddafi denied its existence, and the plan was stillborn. Among many other issues of great contention, in December 1979 a crowd of two thousand Libyans sacked and burned the U.S. embassy in Tripoli (Davis 1990, 37).

As American-Libyan relations were deteriorating, Qaddafi pursued a campaign in 1978-1979 of people-to-people dialogue, in keeping with his ideology stressing direct popular participation (St. John 2002, 110-111). The campaign included promoting goodwill tours, creating friendship societies, and contacts with organizations representing African-Americans, Black Muslims, and Arab Americans. Billy Carter, President Carter’s brother, became embroiled in this Libyan campaign in a way that provided grounds to attack and embarrass the President. Billy Carter visited Libya as part of a delegation of Georgian farmers and businesspersons in 1978 and he returned in 1979. In 1980 it became known that he had received $220,000 from the Libyan government, as part of a loan, and he registered as an agent of a foreign country (Carter 1982, 546-550). The Libyan people-to-people diplomacy and related efforts had little effect on improving Libyan-American relations, being accompanied by too many other antagonistic interactions.

Ronald Reagan took office as president on January 20, 1981, determined to wage an aggressive policy against the Soviet Union and international terrorism directed at the United States. He chose Bill Casey to serve as Director of the CIA, who was eager to energize the Agency and he enthusiastically spurred it to wage a covert war against Communism. Casey’s first covert action was to support Chad’s military resistance against Libya’s forces in Chad (Woodward 1987, 93-97). This was part of a plan developed by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and Casey to discretely “bloody Qaddafi’s nose.”

A series of overt and covert hostile acts were exchanged throughout the years of Reagan’s two administrations. American officials denounced Libya’s support of international terrorism and a policy of assassinating Libyan dissidents living in several countries. In May 1981 the U.S. closed the Libyan People’s bureau in Washington.

In August 1981, the U.S. Navy challenged Libya’s extension of maritime claims to cover the Gulf of Sidra in the Mediterranean Sea and shot down two
Libyan attack planes (St. John 2002). In March 1982, the U.S. government placed an embargo on Libyan oil and restricted exports to Libya. During this period, the Libyan government was actually becoming more vulnerable to American pressure and less capable of pursuing aggressive and hostile policies. The Libyan government’s revenues and resources declined because the price of oil had gone down and the radical Libyan economic policies discouraged American and other foreign investors.

Nevertheless, Qaddafi did retaliate for U.S. actions in the Gulf of Sidra. During 1985, an extremist Palestinian group headed by Abu Nidal, which the Reagan administration believed Libya aided, carried out several terrorist attacks. These attacks including seizing an Italian cruise ship the Achille Lauro and murdering an elderly American passenger in a wheelchair; and also killing many civilians at the El Al (an Israeli airline) counters in Rome’s and in Vienna’s airports (St. John 2002, 131-132). In January 1986, the U.S. government froze Libyan assets in the United States and ended all economic activities in Libya. Reagan considered but withheld military retaliation due to disagreement within the administration about its advisability. Secretary of Defense Weinberger in particular cast doubts that a military action at the time would discourage future terrorist attacks (St. John 2002; Woodward 1987). Covert actions, however, were increased.

Then, on April 5, 1986 a Berlin nightclub received a Libyan bomb attack that killed two U.S. soldiers and injured 79 servicemen. The U.S. government retaliated on April 14, 1986, with air attacks on targets around Benghazi and Tripoli, including the military barracks where Qaddafi resided. Qaddafi survived, but his two-year old adopted daughter was killed. A climactic retaliatory escalation by Qaddafi followed two years later.

On December 21, 1988, a bomb secreted in stowed luggage destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 and killed the 259 people on board and 11 people on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland where the plane crashed. Identifying who had placed the bomb in the airplane required the cooperation of 70 law enforcement agencies in intensive scientific and traditional police work in four continents. American suspicion at first was directed at Iran because six months before the Lockerbie disaster, the USS Vincennes, an American warship patrolling in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger airplane, killing 290 Islamic pilgrims on their way to Mecca. It was widely suspected that the Iranian government had ordered the attack on the Pan Am 103, with the aid of Syria and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (http://www.bbc.co.uk/print/crime/caseclosed/lockerbie1.shtml).

After almost two years of investigations, the evidence implicated two agents of the Libyan government, Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah. In November 1991 the U.S. and British governments charged the agents with the Pan Am 103 bombing and asked for their extradition. In October 1991, a French magistrate had issued arrest warrants for the Libyan agents charged...
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with the 1989 bombing of a French airliner, UTA 772. The American, British, and
French governments now joined together to obtain a UN Security Council
Resolution calling on Libya to remand the named individuals for trial in the
countries in which they had been indicted. UN Security Council Resolution 731
was passed in January 1992, calling for Libyan cooperation with investigations of
the bombings.

In February, Qaddafi tried to avoid sanctions by turning over the UTA
suspects to a French court and the Lockerbie suspects to an international tribunal.
The U.S. and British governments insisted that the Lockerbie suspects be turned
over to U.S. or British courts. Qadaffi's next offer, to hand over the suspects to the
Arab League, was also rejected by the American and British governments, and then
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 748, on March 31, 1992 (Cortright
2000). It imposed limited sanctions, including embargoes on air travel and of sales
of aircraft and of arms.

Under continuing pressure from the families of the victims of Pan Am 103's
destruction, the administration of President Bill Clinton pressed for progress in
bringing the perpetrators of the bombing to justice (Albright 2003). Resolution 883,
adopted on November 11, 1993 by the UN Security Council, imposed additional
sanctions that tightened aviation sanctions, froze Libyan government assets, and
banned some oil-transporting equipment.

Nelson Mandela made a critical mediating contributions that helped the
negotiations to progress and the sanctions against Libya to be lifted (Boyd-Judson
2005 March). In October 1997, Mandela, President of South Africa, went to Libya
and presented Qaddafi the South African Medal of Good Hope and expressed
gratitude for the Libyan support for the South African liberation struggle. In visits
to Washington, London, and Tripoli, he conveyed the views and moral perspectives
of Qadaffi to American and British officials and theirs to him, communicating his
own recognition of each side's sense of morality regarding the Lockerbie case. This
helped create a moral space for Qadaffi to negotiate and enabled Mandela to
harshly urge Qaddifi to speak respectfully of the United Nations, as well as to work
for all sides' compliance to the agreements that were reached. Mandela's stature,
moral authority, and independence were resources that he strategically employed.

Qadaffi tried to act more respectfully, pulling back from supporting
terrorism and improving his relations with Arab and African governments. This
weakened the chances of renewing Resolution 883, which required review every
four months. In 1998, the US government came up with a new option, picking up
on Qadaffi's prior offer to turn the suspects over for trial in a neutral country: the
trial would be held in the Netherlands before a Scottish judge and under Scottish
law. After more negotiations, in March 1999 Qadaffi agreed to yield the two
suspects and UN sanctions would be suspended (but not lifted). The trial was held
and on January 31, 2001, the defendant Megrahi was found guilty of murder and
sentenced to prison for life, while his co-defendant was not found guilty and was
freed.
Libya took further steps to permanently end sanctions and restore normal relations with the United States. In 2003, Libya reached an agreement regarding compensation with the Pan Am families and accepted responsibility for its officials’ actions; with that, the UN sanctions were removed. Finally, negotiations yielded an agreement for both the ending of U.S. economic sanctions and the verifiable dismantling of its programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. With that, American-Libyan relations completed their transformation and their economic ties were renewed.

Flynt Leverett, senior director for Middle Eastern affairs at the National Security Council from 2002 to 2003 writes, this quid pro quo demonstrates that “to persuade a rogue regime to get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons of mass destruction, we must not only apply pressure but also make clear the potential benefits of cooperation.” (Leverett 2004; Tyler 2003)

Accounts for this transformation are controversial because different parties defend or criticize past policies and use their explanation to argue about future policies (Jentleson 2005). I present an interpretation that I regard as well supported by the evidence. The initial American unilateral economic sanctions may have had little effect. However, the targeted multilateral sanctions proved to be effective. They isolated Libyan officials and also hampered the maintenance of oil drilling and the exploration for new oil fields. Moreover, after the Reagan administration, the U.S. efforts to overthrow the Qaddafi regime were put aside. This significantly meant that if Qaddafi met specific requirements, his regime could survive and indeed economic benefits would result.

Of course many, many other factors contributed to the transformation of Libya and its relations with the United States. The cold war ended and the Soviet Union broke up, which weakened Libya’s global position. Global norms valuing human rights and devaluing revolutionary violence continued to win support and salience. Significantly, too, the economic conditions within Libya deteriorated (Anderson 2003, January 19; Porter 2004).

Alternatives. Certainly, during the first years of Qaddafi’s rule, constructive relations were made difficult by the Libyan government’s profound objections, not only to American airbases in Libya, but also to many American foreign policies and its readiness to violently oppose them. On the American side, the militant, frequently unilateral, covert and overt actions by the Reagan administrations were not effective in changing the Libyan government or its policies, and indeed may have helped intensify the dynamic of escalating destructiveness.

The U.S. government might have done more in the 1980s to mobilize the international community to isolate Qaddafi; this might have been more feasible if evidence of Libyan support for terrorist attacks had been early demonstrated by clear evidence and if the U.S. had abstained from unilateral violent actions to change the regime in Libya. Furthermore, if U.S. policies in the Middle East were framed with more attention to the views of the peoples in the region, and not largely in terms of American concerns such as the cold war and petroleum, the mobilization of other countries to isolate Libya might have been more plausible (Zunes 2001).
Recognition of the failure of past policies contributed to official policies becoming somewhat more constructive in the 1990s. In early 1991, officials of the Bush administration acknowledged the failure of covert actions to destabilize the Qaddafi regime (St. John 2002). Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Robert M. (Gates 1998), reasoned that the Pan Am bombing and other attacks followed the U.S. bombing of Qaddafi’s residence. U.S. actions took another course. Relying on multilateral diplomacy and international organizations proved effective. Convincing evidence was presented to U.S. courts about Libyan officials’ bombing of Pan Am 103 and UN Security Resolutions made specific demands of the Libyan government and then imposed specific multilateral sanctions. Furthermore, during the Clinton administrations, an agreement was reached so that the suspects for the bombing of Pan Am 103 were placed on trial. Finally, during George W. Bush’s administration, an agreement was negotiated for the Libyan dismantlement its weapons of mass destruction programs and American sanctions were lifted.

The manifest lack of success of Regan’s unilateral policies to combat terrorism based in Lebanon and in Libya is rarely acknowledged, nor are the unintended adverse consequences discussed by many public figures. The relative effectiveness of diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, and UN operations in ending and overcoming terrorist attacks are also not given their due. President George W. Bush in his 2004 State of the Union address asserted that, “Because of American leadership and resolve....the leader of Libya voluntarily pledged to disclose and dismantle all of his regime’s weapons of mass destruction...” Bush and his supporters give little credit to the multi-lateral diplomatic steps, in which they also engaged, in helping change American-Libyan relations; and instead, they claim that the decision to go to war in Iraq was decisive in changing Libya (Apostolou 2003). A more realistic portrayal of the history of relations between Libya and America by the Bush administration would have better served America (Jentleson 2005).

Nongovernmental organizations and institutions in America could have played a larger role in conducting a more constructive struggle against Libyan support of terrorist attacks against the United States. For example, the news media might have provided a more comprehensive portrayal of the changing relations with Libya, rather than largely reporting what government officials claimed without assessing the claims. When unfortunate events occurred, they were rarely connected to prior American actions, except in the most grievous cases. Furthermore, the success of diplomacy and of multilateral actions, received too little coverage; the effectiveness of the UN authorized sanctions in bringing about the Libyan handover of the indicted agents might have been received little attention.

American intellectuals and scholars, activist voluntary organizations, as well as other public interest organizations might have better recognized and drawn attention to the dangers posed by Qaddafi’s adventurism to regional and global order. Condemnations of the Libyan’s support of violent attacks conducted by organizations in other countries could be made without linking them to support for seeking to overthrow the Qaddafi regime.
Various public interest organizations might also have done more to critique the unilateral and provocative strategies pursued by the Reagan administration. Further, they might have done more to develop and promote alternative strategies. The people-to-people diplomatic efforts pursued by Qaddafi perhaps might have been turned by Americans to influence the Libyans themselves and over time alter the Libyan government. This pattern occurred successfully in the case of American-Soviet cultural exchanges, which contributed to the changes in Soviet elite thinking, and ultimately to the transformation and collapse of the Soviet Union.

Conclusions

Americans have had a great variety of experiences with terrorism. In this article, I have examined instances of terrorism that vary in method, agent, and target. The context and the sequence of interactions within which they were embedded also have differed. Moreover, and of particular interest here, the responses of American officials and non-officials in dealing with the attacks varied and so did the results.

The evidence about the diverse terrorist acts and responses to them over many years suggests a few generalizations, as these two cases illustrate. The generalizations are inferred from the evidence presented here and are guided by the results of research, theory-building, and experience in the practice of CR, as discussed in the first part of this article. The evidence indicates that if officials act covertly, rely largely on military options, and act unilaterally their actions tend not to have the desired effects. Conversely, officials’ overt actions, reliance on non-coercive as well as coercive measures, and utilization of multilateral institutions were less likely to have undesired effects. At times, U.S. government actions were regarded as provocative by those targeted, seeming to necessitate a more escalating response by them.

Furthermore, taking into account the needs and concerns of the antagonist, at least to some degree, facilitated making settlements that might otherwise have been unreachable or more costly to achieve. In the case of the hostage takers in Lebanon this may have been obtaining the release of some Lebanese prisoners, for Libya, it may have been the assurance that the regime’s survival was not threatened. A variety of intermediaries played important roles in mediation and in influencing the adversaries so as to bring about a settlement of particular issues and to help transform the conflict so that it would be conducted less antagonistically.

Non-officials generally did not play major direct roles in responding to the terrorist attacks, but they had some indirect effects. The discussion of alternatives suggests that many non-official groups should have been more critical of official policies. American interests are not well served by silent acquiescence when officials pursue mistaken policies. The alternatives noted here also entail non-governmental actors undertaking direct and indirect actions that would have been more proactive.
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Officials and non-officials made mistakes, which deserve to be recognized and reflected upon. Some under-utilized alternative ways U.S. officials and private citizens might have acted warrant discussion. Consideration of such alternatives should be a matter of course, in order to improve future policies (Hastings 2004). There is no way of knowing that the outcome would have been highly successful if a particular alternative policy had been followed. But conjectures about alternatives in the past can help broaden to options considered in the ongoing and future struggles against terror attacks. This analysis helps account for the failures of current official American policies to counter what it regards as terrorism and has implications for constructing more effective strategies.

References


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