LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A DIVIDED WORLD

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26

Contemporary Conflict Resolution Applications

Louis Kriesberg

It might seem obvious that the field of conflict resolution, at least for Americans, has little to contribute to countering terrorist attacks against the United States or to waging other international wars. It seems wrong to negotiate with terrorists and evildoers, with or without mediators. Indeed, people working in the conflict resolution field generally do not regard negotiation or mediation to be appropriate between perpetrators of a crime and their victims. Furthermore, it is true that conflict resolution practitioners, advocates, and theorists tend to take a broader approach than they would as militant partisans of one side, which would seem to minimize their role in working with the U.S. government in a state of war.

In actuality, however, as the conflict resolution (CR) field has developed, it offers many strategies and methods that are relevant for partisans in a fight as well as for intermediaries seeking to mitigate destructive conflicts. The new developments in CR are largely responses to the changing international environment. However, they also build on ideas from the early years of the field, as well as innovations within the field, developed as CR workers elaborate and differentiate their areas of endeavor. Furthermore, those new developments themselves actually affect the way conflicts are waged in societies and in the international system. In this chapter, the expanding and evolving CR field is depicted, then its current basic features are presented, after which the applications of CR ideas and practices to contemporary large-scale conflicts are examined, and finally, major current issues are discussed. Throughout this chapter, CR workers include academics, diplomats, workshop organizers, and heads of adversarial organizations when they analyze the CR approach or wittingly or unwittingly employ elements of it.

Development of the Conflict Resolution Field

Conflict resolution has many sources in practice, theory, and research, resulting in ongoing diversity and controversy within the field. Some of these sources are identified, along with related public events, in chronological order in table 1. The authors noted are from many areas of study, including anthropology, sociology, psychology, economics, peace studies, international relations, mathematics, law, and political science. The applications are also to be found in many settings, including industrial relations, international diplomacy, judicial proceedings, military affairs, and national struggles against injustice.

Although this examination relates particularly to developments in North America and Europe since the 1950s, the analysts and practitioners in this field have drawn from centuries of religious thought, social scientific analyses, and innovative as well as traditional practices in societies around the world. For example, nonviolent methods of struggle were used by Mohandas Gandhi in South Africa to oppose discrimination against Indians there, and later in India against British rule. Furthermore, as the CR developments in North America and Europe diffused into other regions, those ideas were modified and adapted to local conditions. Those adaptations and the knowledge of various traditional conflict resolution approaches in other societies also influenced the evolving CR approach in North America and Europe. For example, they helped raise recognition of the importance of relations between adversaries and community assistance in mending ruptures in those relations.[1]

The term "conflict resolution" began to be widely used in the mid-1950s, referring to mutually acceptable ways of ending conflicts. An early site for academic work that contributed significantly to the field's emergence was the University of Michigan, where the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* began publication in 1957 and the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution was founded in 1959.[2] Members of these organizations recognized that many conflicts were not to be resolved and hence thought the term "conflict resolution" was a misnomer, but some disliked the term "conflict management," with its connotations of manipulation, even more. In recent years, the terms "conflict transformation," "problem-solving conflict resolution," "conflict mitigation," "dispute settlement," and "principled negotiation" have also been used, often referring to particular arenas within the CR field.

The diverse sources of CR theory and practice have had varying importance at different periods of CR's development, as its areas of analysis and application expanded. At the outset of the rapid growth of the field, in the 1980s, mediation and negotiation were the primary foci of activity. Subsequently, earlier stages in the conflict cycle became additional matters of attention, particularly de-escalation and preparation to enter negotiations. Soon, attention also began to be given to CR at even earlier conflict stages: preventing destructive escalation and fostering constructive escalation. Most recently, a great deal of attention in the field has been given to postcombat and postsettlement concerns, to implementing peace agreements and building institutions to sustain peace. The discussion here takes up each arena of attention in that sequence, noting some of the many sources that contributed to them.

Utilizing Negotiation and Mediation

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, work in the field began to gather momentum, in many ways appearing to be a social movement.[3] The field was then highly focused on negotiation and mediation, and their utilization in everyday domestic disputes.[4] Training and practice grew, particularly in what came to be called alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Operating in the shadow of the law, community dispute resolution centers were established across the United States to handle interpersonal disputes. Practitioners and theorists also applied the CR approach to a variety of organizational, community, and national conflicts, for example, relating to the environment and other public disputes.[5] Workers in the field drew on formal theories about maximizing mutually beneficial

Table 1. Chronology of Publications, Developments, and Events Relevant to Conflict Resolution

Year	Publications Pertaining to Conflict Resolution	Institutional Developments in Conflict Resolution and Global Political Events
1942	M. P. Follett, *Dynamic Administration* Q. Wright, *A Study of War*	National War Labor Board established in United States
1945	M. K. Gandhi, *Teachings of Mahatma Gandhi*	World War II ends
1947		U.S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service established British sovereignty over India ends
1948		Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations signed
1956	L. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*	Successful ending of civil rights bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama
1957	K. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*	*Journal of Conflict Resolution* begins publishing, University of Michigan Pugwash Conferences begin, in Canada
1959		Center for Research on Conflict Resolution established, University of Michigan International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) founded, Oslo, Norway
1960	L. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* T. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*	Dartmouth Conferences begin
1961	T. F. Lentz, *Towards a Science of Peace*	
1962	K. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* C. E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender*	Cuban missile crisis
1964		*Journal of Peace Research* begins publishing, based at PRIO International Peace Research Association founded
1965	A. Rapoport and A. Chammah, *The Prisoner's Dilemma*	J. W. Burton and others organize problem-solving workshop with representatives from Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore
1966	M. Sherif, *In Common Predicament*	

Continued

Table 1. Chronology of Publications, Developments, and Events Relevant to Conflict Resolution *(continued)*

Year	Publications Pertaining to Conflict Resolution	Institutional Developments in Conflict Resolution and Global Political Events
1968		Centre for Intergroup Studies established in Capetown, South Africa
1969	J. W. Burton, *Conflict and Communication*	
1970		Peace Research Institute Frankfurt established in Germany
1971	A. Curle, *Making Peace*	Department of Peace and Conflict Research established at Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
1972	J. D. Singer and M. Small, *The Wages of War, 1816–1965*	Détente reached between Soviet Union and United States Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems signed
1973	M. Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict* Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*	Department of Peace Studies established, University of Bradford, United Kingdom Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) initiates conference
1975		Helsinki Final Act signed, product of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
1979	P. H. Gulliver, *Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective*	Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, mediated by President J. Carter Iranian revolution
1981	R. Fisher and W. Ury, *Getting to YES*	
1982		Carter Center established in Atlanta, Georgia National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR) initiated in United States Search for Common Ground established in Washington, D.C. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted

1984	R. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*	United States Institute of Peace founded in Washington, D.C. The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation initiates grant program supporting conflict resolution theory and practice International Association for Conflict Management founded
1985	S. Touval and I. W. Zartman, eds., *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* I. W. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*	The Network for Community Justice and Conflict Resolution established in Canada
1986	C. W. Moore, *The Mediation Process* (1st ed.)	International Alert founded in London
1987	L. Susskind and J. Cruikshank, *Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes*	
1989	K. Kressel and D. G. Pruitt, eds., *Mediation Research* H. W. van der Merwe, *Pursuing Justice and Peace in South Africa* L. Kriesberg, T. A. Northrup, and S. J. Thorson, eds., *Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation*	Berlin Wall falls Partners for Democratic Change founded, linking university-based centers in Sofia, Prague, Bratislava, Budapest, Warsaw, and Moscow
1990		Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 55-state institution, originated with the Charter of Paris for a New Europe Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) begins informal workshops
1992		Instituto Peruano de Resolución de Conflictos, Negociación, y Mediación (IPRECONM) established in Peru
1993	M. H. Ross, *The Management of Conflict*	PLO and Israel sign Declaration of Principles European Union established
1994	D. Johnston and C. Sampson, eds., *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* A. Taylor and J. B. Miller, eds., *Conflict and Gender*	Nelson Mandela elected president of South Africa UN Security Council creates the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
1995	J. P. Lederach, *Preparing for Peace*	U.S. brokers end of war in Bosnia International Crisis Group established in Brussels
1996	F. O. Hampson, *Nurturing Peace* Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*	South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission established

Continued

Table 1. Chronology of Publications, Developments, and Events Relevant to Conflict Resolution *(continued)*

Year	Publications Pertaining to Conflict Resolution	Institutional Developments in Conflict Resolution and Global Political Events
1997	P. Salem, ed., *Conflict Resolution in the Arab World*	
1998	E. Weiner, ed., *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*	U.S. Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution Act enacted Good Friday Agreement reached for Northern Ireland International Criminal Court established by Rome statute; entered into force in 2002
1999	H. H. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process* B. F. Walter and J. Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*	People of East Timor vote for independence from Indonesia
2000	E. Boulding, *Cultures of Peace* J. Galtung et al., *Searching for Peace* T. R. Gurr, *Peoples versus States*	Second intifada begins between Palestinians and Israelis
2001		September 11 terror attacks on United States
2002	D. Cortright and G. A. Lopez, *Sanctions and the Search for Security* D. R. Smock, ed., *Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding*	
2003	R. O'Leary and L. Bingham, eds., *The Promise and Performance of Environmental Conflict Resolution* E. Uwazie, ed., *Conflict Resolution and Peace Education in Africa*	U.S. and allied forces invade Iraq
2004	Y. Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*	Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies founded at University of Queensland, Brisbane Peace agreement between government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Army
2005	C. A. Crocker, F. O. Hampson, and P. Aall, eds., *Grasping the Nettle* D. Druckman, *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis*	PhD program in peace and conflict studies established at University of Manitoba, Canada

negotiation outcomes as well as experimental and field research about ways of negotiating.[6] They also drew on the long experience with collective bargaining, government mediation services, and international diplomacy to develop effective ways of negotiating and mediating.

Some of the methods and reasoning developed in relation to everyday domestic disputes were adapted and applied to large-scale international and intranational conflicts.[7] The negotiation principles include separating persons from positions, discovering and responding to interests and not simply to stated positions, and developing new options, often entailing packaging trade-offs. More general strategies also were developed, such as reframing issues, substantively as well as symbolically. Another principle is to consider what is the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), thereby knowing when breaking off negotiations may be worthwhile. This suggests the value of improving one's BATNA to strengthen one's bargaining position, without raising threats. In any conflict, furthermore, improving one's options independently of the opponent reduces vulnerability to the opponent's threats.

Mediation includes a wide range of services that help adversaries reach a mutually acceptable agreement,[8] including helping arrange meetings by providing a safe place to meet, helping formulate the agenda, and even helping decide who shall attend the negotiation sessions. In addition, services include facilitating the meeting by assisting the adversaries' communication with each other so that each side can better hear what the other is saying, by shifting procedures when negotiations are stuck, and by meeting with each side to allow for safe venting of emotions. Mediators can also contribute to reaching an agreement by adding resources, proposing options, building trust, and gaining constituency support for the negotiators' agreement.

Mediation is conducted by persons in a wide variety of roles, which vary in their capacity to provide specific services. Officials generally have recognized legitimacy to foster and channel negotiations; they also may have access to positive as well as negative sanctions to help reach and sustain agreements. Persons in nonofficial roles, however, may be able to explore possible negotiation options without necessitating great commitment by the adversaries. In addition, they are often involved in fostering and facilitating informal interactions between people of various levels from the opposing sides.

De-escalating and Preparing for Negotiation

As CR workers turned to civil and international wars and other large-scale conflicts, they gave increasing attention to ways intermediaries as well as partisans can reduce the intensity of a conflict and move it toward negotiations for an agreement acceptable to the adversaries.[9] CR analysts and practitioners drew from many academic and practitioner sources to develop methods and strategies that contribute to that change in the course of a conflict. They began to map out a variety of possible de-escalating strategies and assess their suitability for specific times and circumstances.[10]

Two often-noted de-escalation strategies are the graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction (GRIT) strategy and the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy.[11] According to the GRIT strategy, one of the antagonists announces and unilaterally initiates a series of cooperative moves; reciprocity is invited, but the conciliatory moves continue, whether or not there is immediate reciprocity. The TFT strategy was derived from game theory, experimental research, computer simulations, and historical practice. Such evidence indicates that the strategy most likely to result in cooperative relations and the one yielding the highest overall payoff is simply for one player to begin a series of games cooperatively and afterward consistently reciprocate the other player's actions, whether cooperative or noncooperative.

The GRIT and TFT explanations were compared in an empirical analysis of reciprocity in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), and between the Soviet Union and the PRC, for the period 1948–89.[12] The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced a change in policy toward the United States and Western Europe and made many conciliatory moves, conducting what the analysts call super-GRIT. It transformed relations with the United States and also led to normalized relations with China.

Several methods involving nongovernmental interventions have become features of many de-escalating efforts that help prepare for or that expedite negotiations. These occur at various levels, including between high officials, elites and professionals, and relatively grassroots members of the opposing sides. Such initiatives may be intended to foster mutual understanding between the adversaries or to develop possible solutions to the issues of contention between them. They include various forms of track-two or multitrack diplomacy.[13] Track-one diplomacy consists of mediation, negotiation, and other official exchanges between governmental representatives. Among the many unofficial, or track-two, channels are transnational organizations within which members of adversarial parties meet and discuss matters pertaining to the work of their common organizations. Another form of track-two diplomacy is ongoing dialogue groups, in which members from the adversary parties discuss contentious issues among their respective countries, communities, or organizations.[14]

Some forms of unofficial diplomacy began in the Cold War era and contributed to its de-escalation and ultimate transformation. For example, in 1957 nuclear physicists and others from the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union who were engaged in analyzing the possible use of nuclear weapons began meeting to exchange ideas about reducing the chances that nuclear weapons would be used again.[15] From the 1950s through the 1970s, the discussions at these meetings of what came to be called the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs contributed to the signing of many arms control agreements. Another important example of such ongoing meetings during the Cold War is the Dartmouth Conference, which began in 1960.[16] At the urging of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a group of prominent U.S. and Soviet citizens, many having held senior official positions, were brought together as another communications channel when official relations were especially strained.

With the support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a series of informal workshops were initiated in 1990 to develop habits of cooperation in managing the many potential conflicts in the South China Sea,[17] including regarding conflicting territorial claims, access to resources, and many other matters. Senior officials primarily from governments in the region were participants in their personal capacities, not as representatives of their governments. That nonofficial characterization enabled participants to meet and discuss issues that could not be touched when only official positions could be presented. The workshops helped achieve the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, committing the signatory states to settle conflicts peacefully, and the workshops helped establish many cooperative projects, relating to exchanging data, marine environmental protection, confidence-building measures, and using resources of the South China Sea.

Another important form of track-two diplomacy is the interactive problem-solving workshops, which involve conveners (often academics) who bring together a few members from opposing sides and guide their discussions about the conflict.[18] The workshops usually go on for several days. Participants typically have ties to the leadership of their respective sides or have the potential to become members of the leadership in the future, and workshops have usually been held in relation to protracted societal and international conflicts, such as those in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the Middle East. Participants themselves sometimes become quasi mediators on returning to their adversary group, but as workshop participants, they do not attempt to negotiate agreements.[19] Some workshop members later become negotiators, as was the case in the negotiations between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Israeli government in the early 1990s.[20] They also may generate ideas that help solve a negotiating problem.

As the CR approach has gained more recognition and acceptance, its practitioners have found increasing interest among members of one side in a conflict in learning how to negotiate better (among themselves and then with the adversary when the time for that comes). Such training helps build the capacity of the side with less initial negotiating capability, reducing the asymmetry in the conflict relationship.

These various unofficial, or track-two, methods, however, do not assure the transformation of destructive conflicts. They are often undertaken on too small a scale and are not always employed most appropriately; furthermore, at any given time, groups acting destructively can overwhelm them. Nevertheless, in the right circumstances, they can make important contributions to conflict transformation. Thus, during the 1990s many governmental and nongovernmental parties engaged in mediating a transformation of the seemingly intractable conflict in Northern Ireland. A series of track-two workshops brought together persons representing the several adversarial parties of Northern Ireland, acting as midwives for the formal negotiations.[21] The culmination of this multiparty mediation was the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which included establishing a power-sharing executive, north-south bodies, and an elected assembly, as well as scheduling the decommissioning of arms.

Avoiding Destructive Escalation

Some CR workers give attention to conflict stages that precede de-escalation, including interrupting and avoiding destructive escalation and advancing constructive escalation. Important work in averting unwanted escalation was undertaken during the later years of the Cold War between the Western bloc and the Communist bloc. This type of work has drawn from many sources, including traditional diplomacy, the work of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and peace research, to be relevant to conflict stages before negotiating a conflict settlement, melding them into the overall CR approach.

There actually are numerous ways to limit destructive escalation, many of which can and are undertaken unilaterally by one of the adversaries. These include enhancing crisis management systems to foster good deliberations and planning for many contingencies. They also include avoiding provocation by conducting coercive actions very precisely and by restructuring military forces to be nonprovocatively defensive. Coercive escalation often is counterproductive, arousing intense resistance and creating enemies from groups that had not been engaged in the conflict. The risks of coercive escalation are compounded by the tendency of the winning side to overreach; having scored great advances, it senses even greater triumphs and expands its goals. Therefore, simply being careful and avoiding overreaching is a way to reduce the chances of self-defeating escalation.

Another strategy that limits destructive escalation is avoiding entrapment, the process of committing more and more time or other resources because so much has already been devoted to a course of action.[22] Entrapment contributed to the U.S. difficulty in extricating itself from the war in Vietnam. President George W. Bush and his advisers experienced some of this difficulty after invading Iraq, as suggested by the speech the president gave on

August 22, 2005, to the convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Recognizing the members of the U.S. armed forces lost in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, he said: "We owe them something. We will finish the task that they gave their lives for. We will honor their sacrifice by staying on the offensive against the terrorists, and building strong allies in Afghanistan and Iraq that will help us . . . fight and win the war on terror."

More proactive strategies can also help avoid destructive escalation. These include agreements between adversaries to institute confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as exchanging information about military training exercises and installing direct communication lines between leaders of each side.[23]

Although some external interventions instigate and prolong destructive conflicts by providing support to one side resorting to destructive methods, many other kinds of interventions help prevent a conflict from escalating destructively. Diverse international governmental and nongovernmental organizations are increasingly proactive in providing mediating and other services at an early stage in a conflict. An important action is using various forms of media to alert the international community that conditions in a particular locality are deteriorating and may soon result in a grave conflict. In addition to expanding media and Internet coverage, particular NGOs issue reports and undertake intermediary activities to foster conciliation; for example, see the International Crisis Group (http://www.crisisgroup.org), International Alert (http://www.international-alert.org), and the Carter Center (http://www.cartercenter.org). The United Nations and other international governmental organizations provide CR services to alleviate burgeoning conflicts. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with fifty-five member countries, has a High Commissioner on National Minorities, which has been instrumental in helping to limit the interethnic conflicts that have erupted in countries that were part of the former Soviet Union, such as Latvia. When Latvia gained its independence, the government announced that naturalization of non-Latvians would be based on proficiency in Latvian and residency or descent from residents in Latvia before 1940. Because a third of the population—Soviet-era settlers and their families—spoke Russian, this policy would have made nearly a quarter of the country stateless. Over an extended period of consultation, mediation, and negotiation, an accommodation was reached that was in accordance with fundamental human rights standards.

Coercive interventions to stop gross human rights violations and other destructive escalations are also increasingly frequently undertaken. Sometimes this entails the use of military force or the threat of it. In many cases, this is coupled with negotiations about subsequent relations among the antagonistic parties and their leaders. The terms of those subsequent relations and the continuing involvement of external intervenors are often matters of dispute and require good judgment, broad engagement, and persistence to minimize adverse consequences. Coercive interventions may also be more indirect and nonviolent, as in the application of various forms of sanctions and boycotts. When it results in particular alterations of conduct by the targeted groups, such escalation can prove constructive.

Fostering Constructive Escalation and Conflict Transformation

For many years, analysts and practitioners in peace studies and nonviolence studies have examined how conflicts can be waged constructively and how they can be transformed.[24] In recent years, these long-noted possibilities and actualities have drawn much greater attention within the CR field.[25]

One form nonviolent action has taken entails recourse to massive public demonstrations to oust an authoritarian government. Outraged by fraudulent elections, corrupt regimes, and failed government policies, widespread nonviolent protests, for example, in the Philippines, Serbia, and Ukraine, have succeeded in bringing about a change in government and sometimes installed a more benign and legitimate one. The new information technologies help mobilize demonstrators and gain widespread attention, which then may produce external support.

Other governments often aid such popular movements. For example, the U.S. Congress established the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983. This nonprofit organization, governed by an independent, nonpartisan board of directors, is funded by annual congressional appropriations and also contributions from foundations, corporations, and individuals. It awards hundreds of grants each year to NGOs working to develop civil society in various countries. In addition, the U.S. government directly and publicly provides assistance to NGOs and projects abroad that foster democracy, particularly in countries that have suffered violent conflict and authoritarian rule.

Many transnational NGOs, notably the Albert Einstein Institution (http://www.aeinstein.org) and the Fellowship of Reconciliation (http://www.forusa.org), working as advocacy and service organizations, provide training in nonviolent action and help local NGOs to function more effectively. This help may include mediation, consultation, and auditing elections; for example, these functions were served by the Carter Center, in cooperation with the Organization of American States and the United Nations Development Programme, when it helped to manage the 2002–4 crises relating to the demonstrations demanding the recall of Hugo Chávez as president of Venezuela.

Diverse members of one adversary group can choose from several constructive strategies that may induce an opponent to behave more in accordance with their preferences. One widely recognized strategy is to try to define the antagonist narrowly, as a small core of a small group, separating the penumbra of sympathizers and supporters from the core combatants. Widely shared norms may be called on to rally international support, which can help lessen the opponent's legitimacy. Another general strategy is for members of one side to increase their independence from the opponent, reducing the threats it might use against them.

Whatever strategy may be selected, implementing it effectively is often difficult in large-scale conflicts. On each side, spoilers, opposing moving toward an accommodation, may try to undermine appropriate strategies. The strategies may also be hampered by poor coordination among different agencies, between different levels of government, and between governmental and nongovernmental organizations. CR work encompasses the growing attention to collaborative problem-solving methods and training in order to increase the capacity of conflicting parties to act constructively.

Implementing and Sustaining Peace Agreements

Most recently, considerable attention has been given to postcombat and postsettlement circumstances and possible CR applications.[26] Governments have not been prepared to handle the tasks involved and therefore have relied to a great extent on outsourcing to NGOs tasks to help strengthen local institutions. In addition, various nongovernmental organizations provide independent assistance in establishing and monitoring domestic arrangements for elections and other civic and economic development projects.

One major area of CR expansion and contribution during the postsettlement or postaccommodation stage of a conflict is aiding reconciliation between former enemies.[27] Reconciliation is multidimensional and occurs, insofar as it does, through many processes over an extended period of time; it occurs at different speeds and in different degrees for various members of the opposing sides. The processes relate to four major dimensions of reconciliation: truth, justice, regard, and security.

Disagreements about the truth regarding past and current relations are a fundamental barrier to reconciliation. Reconciliation may be minimally indicated when people on the two sides openly recognize that they have different views of reality. They may go further and acknowledge the possible validity of part of what members of the other community believe. At a deeper level of reconciliation, members of the different communities develop a shared and more comprehensive truth. Progress toward agreed-on truths may arise from truth commissions and other official investigations, judicial proceedings, literary and mass media reporting, educational experiences, and dialogue circles and workshops.

The second major dimension, justice, also has manifold qualities. One is redress for oppression and atrocities members of one or more parties experienced, which may be in the form of restitution or compensation for what was lost, usually mandated by a government. Justice also may take the form of punishment for those who committed injustices, adjudicated by a domestic or international tribunal, or it may be manifested in policies and institutions that provide protection against future discrimination or harm.

The third dimension in reconciliation involves overcoming the hatred and resentment felt by those who suffered harm inflicted by the opponent. This may arise from differentiating the other side's members in terms of their personal engagement in the wrongdoing, or it may result from acknowledging the humanity of those who committed the injuries. Most profoundly, the acknowledgment may convey mercy and forgiveness, stressed by some advocates of reconciliation.[28]

The fourth dimension, security, pertains to overcoming fears regarding injuries that the former enemy may inflict in the future. The adversaries feel secure if they believe they can look forward to living together without threatening each other, perhaps even in harmony. This may be in the context of high levels of integration or of separation with little regular interaction. Developing such institutional arrangements is best done through negotiations among the stakeholders. Such negotiations can be aided by external official or unofficial consultants and facilitators, for example, by staff members of the United Nations or the United States Institute of Peace.

All these aspects of reconciliation are rarely fully realized. Some may even be contradictory at a given time. Thus, forgiveness and justice often cannot be achieved at the same time, although they may be attained, in good measure, sequentially or by different segments of the population in the opposing camps.

Although these various CR methods have been linked to different conflict phases, to some degree they can be applied at every stage. This is so in part because these stages do not neatly move in sequence during the course of a conflict. Furthermore, in large-scale conflicts different groups on each side may be at different conflict stages, and those differences vary with the particular issues in contention.

THE CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION ORIENTATION

Given the great variety of sources and experiences, a clear consensus about CR ideas and practices among the people engaged in CR is not to be expected. Nevertheless, there are some shared understandings about analyzing conflicts and about how to wage or to intervene in them so as to minimize their adverse consequences and maximize their benefits.

General Premises

Three premises deserve special attention. First, there is widespread agreement in the field, not only that conflicts are inevitable in social life, but that conflicts often serve to advance and to sustain important human values, including security, freedom, and economic well-being. The issue is how to avoid conducting conflicts in ways that contribute to their becoming destructive of the very values that are being pursued. Unfortunately, fighting for security can often generate insecurities, not only for an adversary, but also for the party fighting to win and protect its own.

The second CR premise is that a conflict is a kind of social interaction in which each side affects the other. Partisans tend to blame the opponent for all the bad things that happen in a fight, and they even tend to regard their own bad conduct as forced on them by the opponent. From a CR perspective, such self-victimization reduces the possible ways to resist and counter the antagonists' attacks. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, each side is able to affect its opponent by its own conduct. Furthermore, it can strengthen its position in various ways, besides trying to destroy or harm the antagonist. Of course, relationships are never entirely symmetric, but they are varyingly unequal.

Third, given the destructive as well as constructive courses that conflicts may traverse, understanding the forces and policies that shape a trajectory is crucial in CR. A conflict needs to be carefully analyzed to improve the chances that particular policies chosen by partisans or by intermediaries will be effective and not turn out to be counterproductive. The analysis should include gathering as much good information as possible about the various stakeholders' interests and their views of each other. That knowledge should be coupled with theoretical understanding of conflicts generally, based on experience and research, which can suggest a wide range of possible options for action and indicate the probabilities of different outcomes for various options. Such an analysis can help parties avoid policies that seem attractive based on internal considerations but are unsuitable for contending with the external adversary. The analysis can also help parties avoid setting unrealistically grandiose goals, unattainable by any available means.

Specific Ideas

The CR field incorporates numerous specific ideas about methods and strategies that are relevant for reducing the destructiveness of conflicts, although persons engaged in CR differ to some degree about them.

Human Interests and Needs. Some CR theorists and practitioners argue that all humans have a few basic needs in common and that the failure to satisfy those needs is unjust and an important source of conflicts, while fulfilling them adequately is critical to justly resolving a conflict.[29] Other CR workers, however, doubt that a particular fixed set of needs is universal and stress the cultural variability in needs and how they are defined.[30] Thus, all humans may wish to be respected and not be humiliated, but how important that wish is and how it is defined and manifested vary widely among cultures and subcultures. One way to bridge these differences is to draw on the consensus that is widely shared and expressed in various international declarations and conventions about universal human rights, as shown in the earlier discussion of the OSCE's mediation in Latvia.[31]

Social Construction of Conflict Parties. Members of each party in a conflict have some sense of who they are and who the adversaries are; they have a collective identity and attribute one to the adversary. However, a conflict often involves some measure of dispute about these characterizations. The identities may seem to be immutable, but of course they actually change, in part as the parties interact with each other. Moreover, every person has numerous identities associated with membership in many collectivities, such as a country, a religious community, an ethnicity, and an occupational organization. The understanding of the changing primacy of different collective identities is particularly well studied in the creation of an ethnicity.[32] Conventional thinking often reifies an enemy, viewing its members as a single organism and so giving it a singularity that it does not possess. Actually, no large entity is unitary and homogeneous; the members of every large-scale entity differ in hierarchical ranks and in ways of thinking, whether in a country or an organization. They tend to have different degrees and kinds of commitment for the struggles in which their collectivity is engaged. A simplified image of one adversary in a conflict is depicted in figure 1, incorporating three sets of concentric circles. One set shows the dominating segment of the adversary in regard to a particular conflict, consisting of a small circle of leaders and commanders, a somewhat larger circle of fighters and major contributors, a larger circle of publicly committed supporters, and finally a circle of private supporters. In addition, however, some people in each collectivity dissent and disagree with the way the conflict is being conducted by the dominant leaders. They may disagree about the goals and the methods being used, favoring a variety of alternative policies. Some dissenters may prefer that a harder line be taken, with more extreme goals and methods of struggle, while others prefer a softer line, with more modest goals and less severe means of struggle. Two such dissenting groups are also depicted, one more hard-line and the other less hard-line than the dominant group. Finally, one large oval encloses the dominating and dissenting groupings and also numerous persons who have little interest in and are not engaged in the external conflict. Obviously, the relative sizes of these various circles vary greatly from case to case over time. For example, in the war between the United States and Iraq, which began in 2003, American dissenters differed widely in the goals and methods they favored and they increased in number as the military operations continued. More persons became engaged, and private dissenters became more public and vocal in their dissent. People

Figure 1. Components of an Adversary



who had been strong supporters of the prevailing policies weakened their support and some of them became dissenters.

Another related insight is that no conflict is wholly isolated; rather, each is linked to many others. Each adversary has various internal conflicts that impinge on its external adversaries, and each has a set of external conflicts, some linked over time and others subordinated to even larger conflicts. One particular pair of adversaries may give the highest importance to their fight with each other, but its salience may lessen when another conflict escalates and becomes more significant.[33]

Alternatives to Violence. The word "conflict" is often used interchangeably with "war" or other words denoting violent confrontations; or, if it is defined independently, it includes one party harming another to obtain what it wants from that other.[34] In the CR field, however, conflict is generally defined in terms of persons or groups who manifest incompatible goals.[35] That manifestation, moreover, may not be violent; indeed, each contending party uses various mixtures of nonviolent coercion, promised benefits, or persuasive arguments to achieve its contested goals. Conflicts are waged using a changing blend of coercive and noncoercive inducements. Analysts and practitioners of CR often note that great reliance on violence and coercion is risky and can be counterproductive.[36]

Intermediaries and NGOs. Adversaries wage a conflict against each other within a larger social context. Some of the people and groups not engaged as partisans in the conflict may be drawn in as supporters or allies of one side; that possibility can influence the partisans on each side to act in ways that do not spur the outsiders to help their opponent. CR workers generally stress the direct and indirect roles that outsiders exercise in channeling the course of conflicts, particularly as intervenors who mediate and otherwise seek to mitigate and settle destructive conflicts.[37] As may be envisaged in figure 2, intermediary efforts can be initiated between many different subgroups from each adversary, including official (track-one) mediation between the dominant leaders of the antagonistic sides, track-two meetings of persons from the core groups on each side, and dialogue meetings between grassroots supporters or dissenters on each side.

APPLICATIONS IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD

As the editors of this book note, some contemporary conflicts are like many past ones in most regards, while some exhibit quite new features. This discussion of contemporary conflicts focuses on conflicts that are especially affected by recent global developments, including the end of the Cold War and the decline in the influence of Marxist ideologies and the increased preeminence of the United States. They also include the increasing impacts of technologies

Figure 2. Adversaries and Intervenors

relating to communication and to war making; the increasing roles of nonstate transnational actors, both corporate and not-for-profit organizations; and the growing roles of religious faiths and of norms relating to human rights. Possible CR applications in these circumstances are noted for different conflict stages, undertaken by partisans and by outsiders.

Preventing Destructive Conflicts

Partisans in any conflict, using CR conceptions, can pursue diverse policies that tend to avoid destructive escalation. A general admonition is to carry out coercive escalations as precisely targeted as possible to minimize provocations that arouse support for the core leadership of the adversary. Another general caution is not to overreach when advancing toward victory; the tendency to expand goals after some success is treacherous. This may have contributed to the American readiness to attack Iraq in 2003, following the seemingly swift victory in Afghanistan in 2001.

More specific CR strategies have relevance for avoiding new eruptions of destructive conflicts resulting, for example, from al Qaeda–related attacks. Al Qaeda is a transnational nonstate network with a small core and associated groups of varyingly committed supporters, whose leaders inspire other persons to strike at the United States and its allies. Constructively countering such attacks is certainly challenging, so any means that may help in that effort deserve attention.

Some Muslims in many countries agree with al Qaeda leaders and other Salafists that returning Islam to the faith and practice of the Prophet Muhammad will result in recapturing the greatness of Islam's Golden Age.[38] Furthermore, some of the Salafists endorse the particular violent jihad strategy adopted by al Qaeda. The presence of large Islamic communities in the United States and in Western Europe threatens to provide financial and other support for continuing attacks around the world. However, these communities also provide the opportunity to further isolate al Qaeda and related groups, draining them of sympathy and support. The U.S. government's strategic communication campaigns to win support from the Muslim world, initiated soon after the September 11, 2001, attacks, were widely recognized as ineffective;[39] the intended audiences often dismissed U.S. media programs celebrating the United States. Consequently, in 2005 President Bush appointed a longtime close adviser, Karen P. Hughes, to serve as under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, and oversee the government's public diplomacy, particularly with regard to Muslims overseas. Despite some new endeavors, the problems of fashioning an effective comprehensive strategy were not overcome.[40]

Many nongovernmental organizations play important roles in helping local Muslims in U.S. cities feel more secure and integrated into American society. Some of these are longstanding organizations such as interreligious councils and American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) chapters, while others are new organizations, focusing on Muslim–non-Muslim relations. In addition, American Arab and Muslim groups, such as the American-Arab Anti Discrimination Committee (http://www.adc.org) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (http://www.cair-net.org), act to protect their constituents' rights, to counter discrimination, and to reject terrorist acts in the name of Islam.

Engagement by external actors is often crucial in averting destructive conflicts. The engagement is particularly likely to be effective insofar as the intervention is regarded as legitimate. Collective engagement by many parties tends to be seen as legitimate and is also more likely to be successful in marshaling effective inducements. Thus, in international and in societal interventions, multilateral sanctions are more likely to succeed than are sanctions imposed by a single power. This was true for the UN sanctions directed against Libya, led by Mu'ammar al-Gadhafi, which followed the clear evidence linking Libyan agents with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988.[41] The sanctions contributed to the step-by-step transformation of Gadhafi's policies and of U.S. relations with Libya.

More multilateral agreements to reduce the availability of highly destructive weapons to groups who might employ them in societal and international wars are needed. Overt and covert arms sales and the development of weapons of mass destruction are grave threats requiring the strongest collective action. The defensive reasons that governments may have for evading such agreements should be addressed, which may entail universal bans and controls. Those efforts should go hand in hand with fostering nonviolent methods of waging a struggle.

Interrupting and Stopping Destructive Conflicts

One adversary, or some groups within it, can act unilaterally to help stop and transform a destructive conflict in which it is engaged. At the grassroots level, such action may be efforts to place in power new leaders who will undertake to de-escalate the fighting. It may also take the form of opposing provocative policies that contribute to destructive escalation, as was visible in the resistance to the U.S. government policy in Nicaragua and El Salvador by Americans in the early 1980s and to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by the families of Soviet soldiers. At the elite level, some persons and groups may begin to challenge policies that are evidently costly and unproductive, compelling changes in policies and ultimately in the core leadership. These developments within the United States and the Soviet Union contributed greatly to the end of the Cold War between them.[42]

The actions that members of one side take toward their adversary certainly are primary ways to interrupt destructively escalating conflicts. This can occur at the popular level with people-to-people diplomacy, which may help prepare the ground for significant changes at the leadership level, or the actions may be conducted at the elite level and signal readiness to change directions. In confrontations as broad as those relating to the advancement of democracy, the renewal of Islam, or the countering of terrorism, engagement at all levels is extremely important. Demonizing the enemy may seem useful to mobilize constituents, but it often creates problems for the inevitable changes in relations.

Acts by leaders of one side directed at leaders on the other side or to their various constituent groups are particularly important in the context of rapidly expanding channels of mass and interpersonal communication. These channels convey a huge volume of information about how friends and foes think and intend to behave. Attention to that information and responding to it should be given very high priority.

Forceful interventions by external actors to halt disastrous escalations have become more frequent in recent decades. These include increasingly sophisticated and targeted sanctions, which require a high degree of multilateral cooperation to be effective. This is also true for police work to locate and bring to justice perpetrators of gross human rights violations, as well as to control the flow of money and weapons that sustain destructive conflicts.

De-escalating and Reaching Agreements

To bring a destructive conflict to an agreed-on end, it is important for the adversaries to believe that an option exists that is better than continuing the fight. Members of one side, whether officials, intellectuals, or popular dissidents, may envision such an option and so help transform the conflict. Communicating such possible solutions in a way that is credible to the other side requires skill and sensibility, given the suspicions naturally aroused by intense struggles; overcoming such obstacles may be aided by knowledge of how this has been accomplished in the past.[43]

Intermediaries can be critical in constructing new options by mediation, which may entail shuttling between adversaries to discover what trade-offs can yield a generally acceptable agreement or resolve a seemingly intractable issue. For example, in the 1980s, during the civil wars in Lebanon, groups associated with Hezbollah took hostage fifteen Americans as well as thirty-nine other Westerners. When George H. W. Bush took office as president of the United States in 1989, following President Ronald Reagan, he signaled an opening for negotiations to free the hostages.[44] UN diplomatic operations then did bring about the release of the remaining hostages. In particular, Giandomenico Picco, assistant secretary-general to UN secretary-general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, conducted intensive mediation, shuttling from one country to another in the region.

Implementing and Sustaining Agreements

The tasks to be undertaken after an accommodation has been reached, whether largely by imposition or by negotiation, are manifold.

Importantly, institutions should be established that provide legitimate ways to handle conflicts. This may entail power sharing among major stakeholders, which helps provide them with security. The CR orientation provides a repertoire of ways to constructively settle disputes and generate ideas about systems to mitigate conflicts. CR ideas also provide insights about ways to advance reconciliation among people who have been gravely harmed by others.

CURRENT ISSUES

The preceding discussion has revealed differences within the CR field and between CR workers and members of related fields of endeavor. Five contentious issues warrant discussion here.

Goals and Means

CR analysts and practitioners differ in their emphasis on the process used in waging and settling conflicts and their emphasis on the goals sought and realized. Thus, regarding the role of the mediator, some workers in CR, in theory and in practice, stress the neutrality of the mediator and the mediator's focus on the process to reach an agreement, while others argue that a mediator either should avoid mediating when the parties are so unequal that equity is not likely to be achieved or should act in ways that will help the parties reach an equitable outcome. The reliance on the general consensus embodied in the UN declarations and conventions about human rights offers CR analysts and practitioners standards that can help produce equitable and enduring settlements.

Violence and Nonviolence

Analysts and practitioners of CR generally believe that violence is too often used when nonviolent alternatives might be more effective, particularly when the choice of violence serves internal needs rather than resulting from consideration of its effects on an adversary, when it is used in an unduly broad and imprecise manner, and when it is not used in conjunction with other means to achieve broad constructive goals. However, CR workers differ in the salience they give these ideas and which remedies they believe would be appropriate. These differences are becoming more important with increased military interventions to stop destructively escalating domestic and international conflicts. More analysis is needed of how various violent and nonviolent policies are combined and with what consequences under different circumstances.

Short- and Long-Term Perspectives

CR analysts tend to stress long-term changes and strategies, while CR practitioners tend to focus on short-term policies. Theoretical work tends to give attention to major factors that affect the course of conflicts, which often do not seem amenable to change by acts of any single person or group. Persons engaged in ameliorating a conflict feel pressures to act with urgency, which dictates short-term considerations; these pressures include fund-raising concerns for NGOs and electoral concerns for government officials driven by elections and short-term calculations. More recognition of these different circumstances may help foster useful syntheses of strategies and better sequencing of strategies.

Coordination and Autonomy

As more and more governmental and nongovernmental organizations appear at the scene of most major conflicts, the relations among them and the impact of those relations expand and demand attention. The engagement of many organizations allows for specialized and complementary programs but also produces problems of competition, redundancy, and confusion. To enhance the possible benefits and minimize the difficulties, a wide range of measures may be taken, from informal ad hoc exchanges of information to regular meetings among organizations in the field to having one organization be the "lead" agency. As more NGOs are financially dependent on funding by national governments and international organizations, new issues regarding autonomy and co-optation arise.

Orientation, Discipline, Profession

The character of the CR field is a many-sided matter of contention. One issue is the degree to which the field is a single discipline, a multidisciplinary endeavor, or a general approach that should contribute to many disciplines and professions. A related issue is the relative emphasis on core topics that are crucial in training and education or on specialized knowledge and training for particular specialties within the broad CR field. Another contentious issue is the degree to which the field is an area of academic study or a profession, with the academic work focused on providing training for practitioners. Finally, there are debates about certification and codes of conduct and who might accord them over what domains of practice.

These contentions are manifested on the academic side by the great proliferation of MA programs, certificate programs, courses, and tracks within university graduate schools, law schools, and other professional schools in the United States and around the world (http://www.campusadr.org/Classroom_Building/degreeoprograms.html. About eighty graduate programs of some kind function in the United States, but PhD programs remain few.[45] The first PhD program in conflict resolution was begun at George Mason University in 1987, but since then only one other PhD program has been established in the United States, at Nova Southeastern University.

On the applied side, the issues of establishing certificates and codes of ethics and the frequently changing set of professional associations bespeak the unsettled nature of issues relating to the CR field's discipline and professional character. An important development, linking theory and applied work, is the assessment of practitioner undertakings. A growing body of empirically grounded assessments examines which kinds of interventions, by various groups, have what consequences.[46]

CONCLUSION

The CR field continues to grow and evolve. It is not yet highly institutionalized and is likely to greatly expand in the future, become more differentiated, and change in many unforeseen ways. In the immediate future, much more research assessing various CR methods and projects is needed. This is beginning to occur and is often required by foundations and other funders of NGO activities.[47] This work needs to be supplemented by research about the effects of the complex mixture of governmental and nongovernmental programs of action, and of the various combinations of coercive and noncoercive components in transforming conflicts constructively. Past military campaigns are carefully analyzed and plans for future war fighting are carefully examined and tested in war games. Comparable research and attention are needed for diplomatic and nongovernmental engagement in conflicts. So far only a little work has been done on coordination between governmental and nongovernmental organizations engaged in peacebuilding and peacemaking.[48]

The fundamental ideas of the CR approach are diffusing throughout American society and around the world. Admittedly, this is happening selectively, and often the ideas are corrupted and misused when taken over by people profoundly committed to traditional coercive unilateralism in waging conflicts. The CR ideas and practices, nevertheless, are not to be dismissed; they are increasingly influential and great numbers of people use them with benefit. Ideas and ideologies can have great impact, as demonstrated by the effect of past racist, communist, and nationalist views and those of contemporary Islamic militants, American neoconservatives, and advocates of political democracy. Although gaining recognition, CR ideas are still insufficiently understood and utilized. Perhaps if more use were made of them, some of the miscalculations relating to resorting to terrorist campaigns, to countering them, and to forcefully overthrowing governments would be curtailed.

It should be evident that to reduce a large-scale conflict to an explosion of violence, as in a war or a revolution, is disastrously unrealistic. A war or a revolution does not mark the beginning or the end of a conflict. In reality, large-scale conflicts occur over a very long time, taking different shapes and with different kinds of conduct. The CR orientation locates eruptions of violence in a larger context, which can help enable adversaries to contend with each other in effective ways that help them achieve more equitable, mutually acceptable relations and avoid violent explosions. It also can help adversaries themselves to recover from disastrous violence when that occurs. Finally, the CR approach can help all kinds of intermediaries to act more effectively to mitigate conflicts, so that they are handled more constructively and less destructively.

Many changes in the world since the end of the Cold War help explain the empirical finding that the incidence of civil wars has declined steeply since 1992 and interstate wars have declined somewhat since the late 1980s.[49] The breakup of the Soviet Union contributed to a short-lived spurt in societal wars, but the end of U.S.-Soviet rivalry around the world enabled many such wars to be ended. International governmental and nongovernmental organizations grew in effectiveness as they adhered to strengthened international norms regarding human rights. On the basis of the analysis in this chapter, it is reasonable to believe that the increasing applications of the ideas and practices of CR have also contributed to the decline in the incidence of wars.

NOTES

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