CHAPTER 44
Challenges in Peacemaking:
External Interventions

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Interventions to end wars are now more frequent and more diverse than they were in the years of the cold war. During the cold war, the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies often supported opposing sides in civil and international wars, contributing resources to help the side each aided to end the war in victory. After the cold war, such interventions decreased, which helped explain the decline in wars around the world (Gleditsch 2008; Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Human Security Centre 2005). Furthermore, interventions directly aimed to make peace between antagonists greatly expanded, partly due to increased United Nations (UN) peace work made possible by the end of the cold war. These peacemaking interventions, together with many other global developments, also contributed to the decline in wars in the 1990s. The expansion of external peacemaking efforts probably also helps explain why civil wars are now more likely than in the past to end in negotiated settlements rather than unilateral impositions. However, negotiated endings are less likely to last than are imposed endings. Indeed, nearly 40 percent of negotiated agreements fail within five years (Harbom, Högblandh, and Wallensteen 2006). This indicates the importance of the qualities of the peace that is reached and how it is then sustained.

In this chapter, I first discuss the variety of peacemaker interveners in large-scale violent conflicts or oppressive relationships and the diverse kinds of peacemaking interventions made in such conflicts. Then, I examine a few peacemaking interventions to illustrate how they can contribute to the transformation and ending of large-scale violent conflicts or societal oppression. Finally, I examine the obstacles to effective peacemaking interventions and how the obstacles may be overcome.
Before proceeding, some observations should be made about the nature of the peacemaking stage of conflict. As discussed in other chapters, peacemaking often refers to efforts to resolve violent conflicts by negotiation, mediation, arbitration, reconciliation, and other processes. It is often used in distinction to an earlier stage of efforts to prevent violent escalation and a later stage of peacebuilding to sustain peace.

In this chapter, I discuss peacemaking very broadly to refer to a stage of conflict resolution in which adversaries, with or without interveners, act to help transform a violent or otherwise destructive conflict into one entering the peacebuilding stage. That usage does not reflect the wide range and variety of peacemaking actions. The very idea of peace ranges from the absence of large-scale direct physical violence, negative peace, to various forms of positive peace, which vary from minimal structural violence (small differences in life chances among large categories of people) to relatively harmonious societal functioning. I usually will refer to peace within or between societies as marked by low levels of direct physical violence and in which conflicts are managed constructively.

I also emphasize that the escalation prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding conflict stages overlap each other. An action in one stage often also affects the developments in the next stage. Thus, a peacemaking intervention to foster reconciliation between adversaries may be part of the de-escalation or of the peacebuilding process. Furthermore, different groups on each adversary side may be functioning in a somewhat different location in their conflict’s trajectory. Some may be engaged in trying to escalate a conflict while others are trying to de-escalate it. Different kinds of preventive or peacemaking undertakings would be appropriate for those different groups.

Finally, it should be recognized that conflicts are interconnected in many ways, including linked over time and smaller ones nested in larger ones. Consequently, one conflict may be transformed so that it moves from making peace to peacebuilding, while the larger conflict in which that one was embedded does not move very much toward peace. Similarly, one conflict may be resolved while a closely related parallel conflict verging on conflict escalation remains at that stage. For example, the U.S. government at various times has engaged in preventing violent escalations, peacemaking, and peacebuilding actions in the Israeli-Arab set of conflicts. During 1977–1979, the U.S. peacemaking mediation helped bring about a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, but it had limited impact in transforming the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

**PEACEMAKING INTERVENERS AND INTERVENTIONS**

Peacemaking interventions vary greatly and are conducted by numerous kinds of interveners. I focus on peacemaking efforts in large-scale violent conflicts and on interventions by state actors but consider them in the context of other actors and other conflict stages. Particular attention is given to interventions by the U.S. government, because it is such a major intervener.

The increasing number of interveners and scale of their actions is related to the intensifying global economic integration and interdependence, the greater
movement of people, and the spreading of shared norms. Thus, norms against perpetrating gross human rights violations are diffusing globally and increasingly accepted as binding. These developments increase the impact of violent conflicts in one place upon larger regions and the increasing need, expectation, and experience of external interventions into large-scale violent conflicts.

Many peacemaking interventions help transform conflicts from destructive warfare to lasting peace, but others escalate or exacerbate a violent conflict (Dayton and Kriesberg 2009). At times, interventions that perpetuate or escalate a conflict are intended to reduce asymmetry or defeat an oppressive party to achieve what the interveners deem a more just outcome. Typically, numerous interventions occur simultaneously and sequentially, in ever-changing combinations. The effectiveness of any constellation of actors and policies depends upon the conditions of a particular conflict at a particular time.

**Diverse Interveners**

Interveners increasingly include global intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations and its numerous components and associated specialized agencies. In addition, intergovernmental organizations are associated with economic issues: the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank. Regional intergovernmental organizations deal with a great range of economic and political issues—for example, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Organization of American States, and the African Union. This expansion is due in part to the enhanced capacity of the UN to act after the cold war's end. For example, the UN is more active in undertaking mediation missions and in conducting forms of sanctions as well as carrying out peacekeeping operations.

States, individually and in ad hoc coalitions, also act to stop mass violence within and between countries. Such actions include various forms of mediation, from facilitating meetings between the antagonists to largely imposing an outcome. They also take the form of imposing economic sanctions or bans on the sale of military weapons. Once the fighting has lessened or largely ended, the peacemaking actions may relate to reaching peace agreements and managing the transition to establishing stable institutions. Many of these actions are carried out in consort with several other governments, often under the aegis of the United Nations or other international governmental organizations.

A wide diversity of not-for-profit international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) continue to grow in number, size, and functions relating to mitigating and transforming large-scale violent conflicts (Dunn and Kriesberg 2002; Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997). They include many organizations providing humanitarian assistance for refugees from wars and organizations acting to protect the human rights of persecuted ethnic, religious, or political groups. In addition, some INGOs provide conflict-resolution services, including mediation and training in negotiation skills as well as furthering reconciliation between former antagonists. Still other INGOs intervene as aids to one side in a violent conflict, providing arms, fighters, or money; they may do so because they share religious, ethnic, or ideological identities or they do so as
advocates of human rights or the well-being of refugees, women, or oppressed peoples.

For-profit nongovernmental organizations also play important intervener roles in ways that advance, but sometimes undercut, peacemaking. They include transnational corporations, banks, and mercenary organizations. They often are allied with powerful local groups, buttressing their local dominance. Their roles in conflict transformation warrant more attention than they receive.

Finally, external peacemaking interveners include individuals and small groups advocating for peace and nonviolence and major foundations aiding in economic development and overcoming major diseases. They also include leaders and engaged persons who are part of transnational social movements such as the movement to foster human rights, women’s rights, and indigenous peoples’ rights and to counter threats to the environment (Smith and Johnston 2002). Organizations associated with religious communities are also active in providing services that may contribute to peacemaking. In addition, diaspora communities are growing in importance in the ongoing cultural and political lives of their countries of residence and of their previous homelands, some of which can also contribute to peacemaking. The magnitude and diversity of INGOs, private for-profit organizations, and advocacy organizations is not conveyed by gathering them together under the name nongovernmental organization.

**Diverse Interventions**

The kinds of peacemaking interventions that occur contemporaneously vary greatly in kind, magnitude, and duration (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002). They include providing humanitarian aid for refugees; various forms of mediation, training, and consultation to improve the functioning of political institutions, monitoring the terms of an agreement; and assistance in economic development. Clearly, different actors are able and likely to carry out a particular set of actions but not others. Governments are relatively likely to conduct peacemaking interventions that emphasize state building and security concerns. Their interventions often entail choosing sides in a conflict. This is notable in the conceptualization of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. This often presumes the problem is to manage the militant groups that had challenged a government.

Nonintervention is also a policy choice. Indeed, the lack of international peacemaking interventions in countries where mass murders and genocides may be occurring has become widely condemned. For example, this is the case for the Darfur region in the Sudan (O’Fahey 2004). As will be discussed later in this chapter, the international legal norms and practices about military interventions to stop genocide are increasingly debated. Back in January 1979, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia and ended the genocide and terror that the Khmer Rouge was perpetrating, the UN Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded the withdrawal of Vietnamese military forces. As new norms are coming into force, new dilemmas are added about what kinds of interventions under what auspices in which circumstances are legitimate.
From a constructive conflict perspective, peacemaking would benefit from greater attention to the needs of all primary stakeholders and to the use of nonviolent and noncoercive inducements. Popular attention to positive sanctions has recently been spurred by the discussions of the utility of soft power and of smart power (Armitage and Nye 2007; Nye 2004).

The end of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union produced rapid changes in the countries of Eastern Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union. These great changes were remarkably peaceful, considering the potentialities for violent escalations. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe intervened in ways that helped avoid violent escalation. Its high commissioner on national minorities (HCNM) had the authority to intervene at the earliest possible stage in response to a crisis related to national minority issues that threatened international peace. Max van der Stoel, as the first HCNM, 1993–2001, helped avoid escalating conflicts and resolve them consistent with international norms. For example, this was achieved regarding the language and education rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania and the citizenship rights of ethnic Russians in the newly independent Estonia (Möller 2006). The provision of basic human rights for all citizens was required to receive the benefits of good economic relations with the Western European countries and membership in Western intergovernmental organizations. Such peacemaking actions also help reduce conflict asymmetries (Kriesberg 2009; Mitchell 1995).

Positive inducements in the form of rewards for conduct desired by the interveners can also be covert, as when governments secretly provide funding for cooperative behavior from officials in other countries or from leaders of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who are challenging their government. This may occur when interveners support changing the regime that they and substantial numbers of the society regard as oppressive. This sometimes has occurred in the transformations away from highly authoritarian governments in Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The goals of peacemaking interventions differ in several ways, including the duration being considered, the interests being served, and the amount of change being sought. I consider the varying reasons for external interventions that may be important for the diverse members of each intervening party. There is always some mixture of internal reasons with concern for the people being assisted in peacemaking.

Peacemaking has expanded greatly in recent decades, significantly in conducting track-two activities. Some track-two processes may be viewed as functioning semiexternally, in the sense that a conflict is formally conducted by officials representing the adversaries and the track-two actions are taken by nonofficials from the opposing sides (Agha et al. 2003). In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, many track-two undertakings have been conducted by former government figures, academics, or persons in other spheres of work. Various external interveners are often combined, as in the instance of Norwegian government officials assisting semificial track-two negotiations during the Oslo peace process (Belin 1999). Many conflict-resolution nongovernmental organizations cooperate with governments to promote good governance, political
transparency, and reconciliation in the course of conflict transformation. From the perspective of many nonurban, poorly educated, and impoverished people, however, these may not be attentive to their greatest felt needs. The interveners and the relatively deprived people might well be better served by building infrastructure and economically productive capacities.

**Illustrative Cases of Intervention**

Successful peacemaking largely depends upon the conduct of the adversaries themselves and other people in their local area. They are not passive compliers to external interveners' directives. With due attention to the local conditions, interveners often make positive contributions to constructive conflict transformations. But sometimes the initial successes are short-lived and disappointing (Paris 2004). Moreover, international interveners often are ineffective and raise the costs of peacemaking; sometimes their efforts are even counterproductive for those they would assist and for themselves. Generally, the consequences are mixed, with varying costs and benefits for different elements engaged in the conflict. I briefly note a few cases in which external intervention aided conflict transformation and peacemaking or failed significantly to do so.

The transformation of the civil war in Mozambique is a celebrated case. Although the combatants in the war deserve considerable credit for its largely successful transformation, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the international intervention was very helpful (Bartoli, Civico, and Gianturco 2009). The Community of Sant'Egidio, a private Catholic organization based in Rome with a long history of providing humanitarian aid in Mozambique, began to facilitate negotiations between the FRELIMO-controlled government and the militant resistance, RENAMO. The talks helped transform each side so that they could form new shared institutions and build a relatively peaceful Mozambique.

In the late 1980s, the civil wars that had long ravaged Central American countries—particularly Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador—began moving toward peace. Oscar Arias, former president of Costa Rica, brought together the heads of the five Central American countries. Meeting in Esquipulos, Guatemala, they reached an accord that provided a framework for peacemaking. The accord included three components providing for ending the civil wars, promoting democracy, and fostering economic integration. The components were to be implemented simultaneously according to a fixed time schedule, which was negotiated in each of the countries suffering a civil war. For example, the government of El Salvador, dominated by military and economic elites, was controlled by the Nationalist Republican Alliance. The Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) militarily challenged the government. After more than 12 years of armed struggle, costing more than 75,000 lives, peace settlement negotiations began in 1989. The Esquipulos Agreement provided a context for the negotiations, which were assisted by UN mediators, and a peace agreement between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN was signed in 1992. According to the agreement, the armed forces would be reduced in numbers and reorganized, the FMLN would demobilize, and former
combatants of both parties would be given preference to receive state-owned
land for farming. Moreover, free elections would be held, and institutions to
protect human rights were to be established.

The peace agreements ending the civil wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua have not ended structural violence in those countries. Many of the
conditions that underlie the civil wars persist, but the political processes have
functioned well enough so that the civil wars have not recurred (Paris 2004).
Little progress may have been made toward positive peace, but negative peace
has been substantially attained, aided by a combination of interventions by
leading political figures and national and international governmental actors.

The many attempts by the U.S. government to mediate the Israeli-Arab
conflict and resolve it demonstrate some of the possibilities and difficulties
in external peacemaking efforts (Kriesberg 2001). For example, after the Oc­t­
tober 1973 war of Egypt and Syria versus Israel, U.S. secretary of state Henry
Kissinger mediated by shuttling between capitals to reach partial settlements
between the Israeli and Egyptian governments and between the Israeli and
Syrian governments. Kissinger, believing a comprehensive settlement was not
then possible, pursued a step-by-step peacemaking strategy. The adversaries
negotiated disengagements of their military forces, and Israel withdrew from
some of the Sinai that it occupied as a result of the war (Rubin 1981). Kiss­
inger helped construct the formulas for the settlements and promised U.S. re­
sources that would help ensure their implementation while minimizing the
risks if an opposing side violated the agreement. Even the powerful U.S. gov­
ernment, however, could not impose a settlement; its mediation efforts were
constrained by the incompatible requirements deemed necessary by the lead­
ers of the conflicting sides.

President Jimmy Carter attempted to mediate a comprehensive settlement of
the Arab-Israeli conflicts but was unable to even convene a multilateral peace
conference. The Egyptian president, Anwar el-Sadat, doubted that any peace
agreements could come from such a conference. Instead, he made the astound­
ing gesture of going to Jerusalem in November 1977, intending to break the
psychological barriers preventing peace (el-Sadat 1978). The negotiations that
followed foundered, and in 1978, President Carter invited President el-Sadat
and a small Egyptian delegation and Prime Minister Begin and a small Israeli
delegation to Camp David. Working in seclusion for 13 days, President Carter
with a few U.S. officials mediated two agreements (Quandt 1986). One was
the basis for the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the other was intended
to provide the basis for negotiations about the political status of the Palestin­
ians in the Israeli-occupied territories. The mediation blended traditional with
problem-solving mediation methods, and provided significant sweeteners to
make the treaty between Israel and Egypt palatable to the two governments.
U.S. mediation, however, was unable to make progress on reaching any agree­
ment between Israel and the Palestinians.

Direct negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian officials had to await
many changes within Israeli and Palestinian societies, in their relationship,
and in the global context. Those changes included the Middle East Peace Con­
ference, held in Madrid in October 1991, where negotiations were initiated
between Israeli officials and Palestinians approved by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), albeit indirectly and within parameters set by Israel. That conference was convened by the U.S. government following its success in leading a broad coalition of forces to free Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion and incorporation of Kuwait.

Those Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, despite U.S. efforts, floundered. A breakthrough for direct negotiations between the PLO and Israeli officials began in January 1993, with a meeting between two Israeli private citizens with two PLO officials. The initial meeting was arranged by a Norwegian citizen and then they were facilitated by the Norwegian foreign ministry, in secrecy, at a location near Oslo. As progress was made, officials from the Israeli government entered the negotiations. A formula for a Declaration of Principles was agreed upon, and it was announced in September 1993 in Washington, DC, with President Bill Clinton presiding over the event. With the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and of the PLO, the Oslo peace process was underway.

Slowly, and increasingly lagging behind the agreed-upon time schedule for next steps, some progress was made. In May 1994, the Cairo Agreement for Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho was announced. Belatedly, elections for the Palestinian Authority (PA) were held in January 1996, and Arafat was elected president. In September 1995, Israel and the PLO signed an interim agreement to transfer control of major Palestinian populated areas in the occupied territories to the PA. But few actions were taken to implement the agreement. The U.S. government engaged intensively in mediation efforts, and, finally, in October 1998, an agreement was reached between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government, led by Netanyahu. The agreement, known as the Wye River Memorandum, detailed steps to implement the 1995 interim agreement. A portion of the territories stipulated to be transferred from Israeli control to Palestinian control was done, but progress again was stopped as the Israeli government charged that the PA failed to take strong measures to halt terrorist attacks against Israelis.

In the May 1999 Israeli elections, Ehud Barak, leader of the Labor Party, defeated Netanyahu by a large margin. Barak, in his election campaign, had promised to withdraw Israeli military forces from southern Lebanon, and that lent priority to seeking a peace agreement with Syria. Barak believed that was possible in part because of prior diplomacy, including track-two diplomacy conducted in 1998 by Ronald Lauder, a U.S. businessman (Ross 2004). U.S. officials, including President Clinton, Secretary of State Albright, and Middle East Envoy Dennis Ross, engaged in intensive, secret mediation between the Syrian and Israeli governments. At various moments, a deal seemed very close to being consummated, but at a meeting including President Clinton and Syrian President Hafez-al-Asad, in March 2000, Asad indicated his lack of interest then in the peace agreement. The mediation had not succeeded in the brief periods when favorable conditions were aligned.

While Israel gave priority to the negotiations with Syria, negotiations with the PA were sustained. In September 1999, Barak and Arafat agreed to revise and revive the Wye River Memorandum’s terms. Following the collapse of the
Israeli-Syrian negotiations, Barak soon proposed to move directly to negotiations for a comprehensive final agreement. When those negotiations became stalemated, Barak sought a summit conference with Arafat and with President Clinton’s participation. Clinton invited Arafat and Barak to a conference to negotiate a final status agreement, beginning July 11, 2010, at Camp David. The conference ended on July 25 without reaching any agreement. In September, the Intifada II erupted with violence, and Israeli military forces tried to militarily suppress it. The Oslo peace process was over. In the Israeli elections in February 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister of Israel.

Diverse arguments have been made to explain what went wrong (Pressman 2003). For purposes of this chapter, it suffices to say that the failure of the Oslo process may be seen as a failure of the necessary peacebuilding work by the adversaries and the interveners, at the same time that peacemaking efforts were ongoing and incomplete. In retrospect, the peacemaking interventions were not adequate to overcome the substantial differences in the negotiation policies of the Palestinians and of the Israelis.

The international peacemaking interventions related to the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s are generally regarded as having been belated and inadequate. Clearly, they failed to prevent and then to stop extremely brutal warfare. Indeed, at times they arguably exacerbated the disastrous wars (Gibbs 2009). For example, consider the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of Serbia to comply with demands to change Serbian policies regarding Kosovo and make peace there. President Obama, in his December 2009 speech in Oslo accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, praised the U.S. intervention relating to Kosovo. But in actuality, much happened that was not praiseworthy. On March 24, 1999, NATO planes, 70 percent U.S. aircraft, began bombing operations in Serbia and Kosovo. This was justified in terms of a humanitarian emergency, but it was undertaken without UN authorization and the result was a humanitarian calamity. Serbian repression and ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo was unleashed; in the course of the war, 850,000 ethnic Albanians (half of the population) were driven out of Kosovo. What was supposed to be a short war to bring peace went on with escalating bombing until June 10. The terms of the settlement to end the war were hardly different than those Serbia was ready to accept at the February 1999 conference about Kosovo meeting in Rambouillet, near Paris. What was unacceptable to Slobodan Milosevic at that time was the provision that NATO troops would have the authority to move anywhere in Serbia. There is evidence that the U.S. government wanted a Serbian rejection so that NATO military action could ensue, demonstrating the capacity and value of NATO.2

The U.S. policy in Afghanistan went through many stages following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. At the outset, there was no grand goal, and the Central Intelligence Agency objective of damaging the Soviet Union, paying back for U.S. losses in Vietnam, was the guiding directive on the ground (Coll 2004). The Soviet Union was defeated in Afghanistan, but the U.S. officials’ support of radical Islamic militants and their short-sighted goals resulted in severely damaging long-term U.S. interests. After the September 11, 2001, attacks by al Qaeda, a wide array of goals and policies were announced and
pursued, most of which were badly conceived and executed. The follow-up after the initial quick defeat of the Taliban regime and overrunning al Qaeda camps might have been more successful with more limited goals. At first, U.S. actions made space for the UN and local actors to be actively engaged in state building and U.S. military activities focused on al Qaeda. But soon the fight became more narrowly conducted by the U.S. government and more militarized. Goals expanded while resources were drawn off to fight in Iraq, and the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated.

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was portrayed in many different ways by President George W. Bush and his associates. Sometimes it was explained as part of the war the United States was fighting against terrorism. Sometimes it was justified in terms of preventing future wars that Iraq would initiate against the United States and other countries. Other government leaders argued the United States was ending an oppressive regime, a kind of peacemaking. Once Saddam was overthrown, the United States was engaged in what some officials and analysts claimed was peacebuilding or nation building.

In regard to peacemaking in Iraq, President Bush and his closest associates set grandiose objectives that were pursued arrogantly, with little attention to how they might be realistically attained (Kriesberg 2007b). The U.S. leaders' hopes of state building in Iraq were soon dashed, but the realities were denied for years. Greed, incompetence, blinding ideology, and hubris produced a disaster for the United States and worse for the people of Iraq (Beinart 2010; Diamond 2005).

ASSESSING PECAMAKING INTERVENTIONS

To assess how external interventions sometimes succeed in various ways and sometimes fail in other ways to help de-escalate and overcome violent conflicts, it is useful to understand what is needed so that external interventions do help peaceful conflict transformation (Kriesberg 2007a). A comprehensive analysis of a particular conflict should be made by potential intereners prior to choosing an intervention option, that analysis should give attention to the fluidity as well as the rigidity of the conflict conditions. Conflicts change over time, moving through stages of escalation and de-escalation, settlements and implementation. However, different actors move at different speeds, and larger or smaller backward steps occur at each stage.

Conflict Analysis

A comprehensive analysis encompasses several components. First, the major parties in a conflict need to be identified, recognizing their internal heterogeneity and the varying conflict engagement by the diverse components of each party. Oversimplifying reifications of the contending sides should be avoided. Too often adversaries are viewed as homogeneous, and the internal differences are given scant consideration. Thus, attention should be given to what is sometimes derogatively called "spoilers of peace"; these are groups who commit acts that may disrupt major official peace negotiations. They do
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this to modify the terms of the coming agreement or to prevent its conclusion or implementation, which they regard as misguided.

Second, the salient issues in contention and also the underlying concerns need to be recognized, such as one contending party having power over another or one having illegitimate control of resources. At the same time, shared interests, values, and identities should be identified and given prominence.

Third, the structural relations and asymmetries among the parties in a conflict warrant examination. They relate to demography, economic resources, political power, coercive resources, normative claims, and other factors. Conflicts vary in the degree to which they may be characterized by asymmetries, but it should be stressed that conflict asymmetries change over time, and certain changes toward greater symmetry are often conducive to constructive conflict transformation and peacebuilding (Kriesberg 2009; Mitchell 1995).

Fourth, the contemporary and historical emotional and subjective relations among the adversaries should be examined, including empathy as well as past atrocities and ongoing feelings of fear and mistrust. Again, it should be recognized that such feelings and beliefs about the past and future are malleable and they shift in salience, depending on conditions and leaders.

Finally, the analysis by protagonists should be extended to include the probable conflict interveners and their likely actions. Would-be external interveners should undertake self-reflective analyses to minimize inopportune and counterproductive policies and maximize choosing and implementing constructive transformative policies.

Changes Needed for Sustainable Peace

Two broad kinds of changes are needed to move toward a lasting peaceful accommodation. One is to reduce the grievances by improving conditions or even raising the prospects for improvement. The other is to enhance the ability of the society members, and their institutions of governance, to transform the handling of conflicts so it is deemed legitimate and equitable.

Reducing the sense of grievance is a basic requirement for peacemaking. This may entail reducing inequities, some degree of reconciliation, and assurance of physical security (Bar-Siman-Tov 2003). It also entails increasing the realities and the perceptions of common interests and values. For example, this may be to protect basic human rights for individuals and collectivities.

All grievances cannot be ended entirely in any country; therefore, societal and governmental institutions and practices are needed to settle disputes legitimately. Generally, peacemaking entails strengthening societal governance and developing effective means of conducting conflicts without recourse to violence. Numerous arrangements have been discussed to accomplish this. Many methods relate to political institutions, including elections and rules for political parties (Lyons 2005). Agreements ending violent struggles may effectively ensure some degree of power sharing among the major contenders, at least for some period of time. The task, which can take a very long time, is to develop ways for the government institutions to be resilient and responsive to societal needs.
MANAGING OBSTACLES TO CONSTRUCTIVE PEACEMAKING

Three interconnected obstacles to peacemaking warrant attention (Richmond 2004). First, certain kinds of interests that interveners have for their interventions can impair effective peacemaking undertakings. Second, reliance on certain ways of thinking about the conflict and transforming it can lead the interveners astray and obstruct peacemaking. Third, particular structural conditions relating to the conflict and its context hamper intervention being useful for peacemaking. Various strategies can be employed to reduce or overcome these obstacles.

The Interveners' Interests

A major set of obstacles to effective peacemaking interventions are related to the reality that external interveners generally have interests in the conflict, which can hamper constructive peacemaking. Interveners are rarely disinterested outsiders. When their stake is large, they are likely to be considered parties to the conflict. For example, recall the complex roles of the U.S. government in the Vietnam War and also the roles of the Chinese and the Soviet governments in that war. Moreover, the stakes are diverse as different elements in the intervening entity have different concerns about the conflict.

Interveners are particular persons who can commit a government or some agency within it or a nongovernmental organization to try to affect the course of the conflict. Some interests may be held by those persons themselves, while other interests are held by the constituents or segments of the constituency. In the latter case, the leaders with authority may decide that such interests within their constituencies should be given great weight. This may be in response to diaspora communities, corporate leaders in particular industries, or particular agencies of government.

Such internally guided interventions can produce inappropriate and ineffective actions for various reasons. They may result in too little attention to the complex realities of the countries where peacemaking intervention may be undertaken. Particular interest groups may encourage foreign policies that serve to meet their own concerns and ignore broader considerations. They may raise the salience of particular issues and bits of evidence. On the other hand, some internal groups may provide information and considerations that contribute to appropriate interventions.

One way to overcome some of the risks of overly self-serving interventions is for those who contemplate intervention to engage in self-examination and self-reflection. It is useful to think about the possible mistakes that can result from giving too much weight to internal considerations and from neglecting to appreciate the realities of the conflict in which peacemaking intervention may be undertaken.

A more fundamental way to overcome overly self-serving interventions is to internationalize them. Of course, this was crucial in establishing the UN and the rules regarding international intervention, which are embodied in the
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Security Council. Considerable international consensus is necessary to authorize significant interventions.

Recent international developments related to the idea of the responsibility to protect (R2P) are responses to the lack of interventions when needed and their inadequacies when undertaken (Hall 2010; Mills and O'Driscoll 2010). They are consistent with the previous points, and locate them in a comprehensive framing for effective peacemaking intervention. The heated debates around the world about whether and how to intervene while mass atrocities were underway during the wars in the former Yugoslavia propelled action to reach consensus about the policies that should be undertaken to deal with such circumstances. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, addressing the General Assembly in 1999 and in 2000, called for consensus in the international community about not allowing gross violations of human rights and not assaulting state sovereignty. In September 2000, the government of Canada, joined by major foundations, announced the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.

The commission, co-chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, released its report on September 30, 2001, enunciating and analyzing several core principles. The two basic principles are: (1) “State sovereignty implies responsibility and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.” (2) “Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.” These basic principles are founded on provisions of the UN charter, legal obligations under international and national laws, developing state practice, and the obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty.

The responsibility to protect embraces three elements: (1) the responsibility to prevent the kind of harms previously identified by addressing root causes and direct causes of those harms, (2) the responsibility to respond to the situations of compelling need appropriately, and (3) the responsibility to rebuild. The responsibility to prevent should have the highest priority. Military intervention should be the last resort and be of the minimal amount needed to reach the objective. Security Council authorization should be sought in all cases, and if the Security Council does not authorize action, the General Assembly may be asked to consider the proposal.

The standing of the idea that the international community has a responsibility to protect human populations under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the report has speedily grown (von Schorlemer 2007). R2P was recognized at the September 2005 United Nations World Summit by the world’s heads of state and governments.

Much more progress is needed to strengthen the normative and institutional character of R2P to improve peacemaking interventions. An international coalition of NGOs is engaged in doing this (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org). Furthermore, it is important for the peoples of the world to accept responsibility to protect themselves and each other against genocide and gross violations of human rights and to ensure that their governments so act.
Inappropriate Theorizing

A major problem in external peacemaking intervention is that it is often strongly guided by inadequate yet prevailing ways of thinking among the persons directing the intervention. These ways of thinking, which derive from cultural and ideological premises, shape beliefs about reality and values about preferences. This was manifested most strikingly and disastrously by U.S. policy during George W. Bush’s administration, but it has been evident in other U.S. administrations and in many other countries. One major set of contemporary beliefs evident in the United States relates to the presumed universally correct societal arrangement of the U.S. form of political democracy and of free-market capitalism.

The problem of achieving peace settlements that are based on transforming societies and yielding a stable peace is a global challenge (Boulding 1978; Kacowicz et al. 2000). In seeking to achieve such outcomes, external interveners sometimes set overly ambitious goals, which then are counterproductive. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq during the administrations of George W. Bush is increasingly held up by many observers as examples of such overreaching. The terms nation building and state building often are used to justify policies of imposition of external solutions to societal problems. These concepts can take forms that hamper effective peacemaking intervention.

Nation building typically has been used in the past to refer to the consolidation of a shared identity as a people manifested in the conviction of members of a collectivity that they have a shared ethnicity with a common origin and a shared destiny (Smith 1991). This is an expression of ethno-nationalism and is exclusive. Nationalism, however, may also be based on people living in a territory with equal and shared political rights and allegiance to similar political procedures. This is civic nationalism, which is inclusive and not based on common ethnic ancestry.

Nation building has taken on additional meanings and connotations since the end of the cold war. Currently, it often refers to external efforts to stabilize and reconstruct societies after wars or state failures. As described in a Rand report, nation building involves using armed force as part of a broader effort to foster political and economic reforms conducive to peace (Dobbins et al. 2007). This broader effort includes promoting security, humanitarian relief, effective governance, democratization, and economic development.

State building in the past has referred to establishing political territorial entities in Europe and on the power enforcement by the government in society (Tilly 1975). The power enforcement depends upon specialized personnel and enduring institutions with control over territory, in which they have the monopoly of legitimate violence. In recent years, analysts of the state have stressed short-term state-building processes in countries with failed or fragile systems of governance. Recently, as articulated in a report of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2008, 7), the goal of international engagement in fragile states is the building of “effective, legitimate and resilient states.”

The concept of peacemaking had its origins in the peace studies field and stressed more than the absence of wars, which is designated as negative peace.
Many workers in the field stress the need to strive for positive peace, overcoming structural violence (Galtung 1969). Structural violence refers to the societal circumstances in which categories of people suffer grave diminishments in basic living conditions that are available to many others in the society. Numerous works examine the complex issues relating to building sustainable peace (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001; Schmelzle 2009; Zelizer and Rubinstein 2009). Persons engaged in peacemaking in this tradition tend to give significant attention to people at the grassroots and subelites to basic human needs, cultural diversity, and long-term conflict transformation.

Nation building, state building, and peacemaking occur within societies largely by the actions of the members of those societies. External intervention can help but also can hamper those developments in varying degrees. In focusing on external intervention here, it should be recognized that the external actors frequently view peacemaking as a step toward nation building, state building, and peacebuilding to incorporate their own preferred values and conditions. Currently, more or less explicitly, many international interveners assert that they are trying to advance democracy, human rights, and free-market capitalism, often very narrowly conceived. In addition, many of the intervening governmental actors support the establishment of governments that are friendly to them and not to their adversaries. As noted earlier in this chapter, such self-serving considerations by external actors profoundly affect whether and how they intervene and also the consequences of their interventions.

Peacemaking interventions, particularly by governments, also are hampered by reliance on various elements of conventional thinking in both goals and in means. The goals too often are formulated in terms of clichés about free markets and democracy and presumed universal standards. The methods tend to place great reliance on coercion, including especially the use of military force, even in situations ill-suited for it.

A comprehensive constructive approach, incorporating ideas and practices from the conflict resolution, peace studies, and conflict transformation fields, can provide a wider array of methods to advance peacemaking. This approach suggests new ways of thinking about the goals and the means for peacemaking. The approach gives attention to the concerns of multiple stakeholders and the heterogeneity within various actors. It emphasizes nonviolent and even non-coercive inducements. In choosing policies applying this approach, long-term as well as immediate consequences of various options are taken into account. A few suggestions are proffered in the next section about ways to increase the chances of choosing goals and means that are relatively constructive.

Considerable discussion has begun regarding the applicability of international law for nonconventional warfare (Schmitt 2007). Presently, wars usually are not waged between states but between a state and nonstate organizations, but international law is generally formulated in terms of interstate conduct. Discussions are growing about creating new international laws about acceptable conduct in violent conflicts involving nonstate actors rather than relying on existing national and international laws. These matters are unsettled, with many international norms being widely violated.

Some gains have been made by expanding the rules limiting the way any military actions may be conducted. That expansion can help contain the damage
from civil as well as international wars. This has been achieved in good measure by efforts of nongovernmental organizations, as exemplified by establishing prohibitions against the use of land mines and against children serving in armed forces. Such prohibitions can affect the behavior of nongovernmental militants as well as state military forces as the militants seek legitimacy.

**Structural Problems**

Many structural issues affect the undertaking of peacemaking interventions and the quality of the interventions. The issues pertain to the nature of the conflict and its context and to the constraints and capacities of the interveners. Violent conflicts are rarely between purely good and bad sides, since members of each side will usually fight on what they regard as good moral grounds and yet varying numbers of them commit self-aggrandizing actions and commit atrocities against their opponents. The interveners, as already discussed, have many internal factors affecting whether and how they intervene that shape how effective the interventions will be.

Without examining the various structural problems challenging the utility of peacemaking interventions, some general considerations will be discussed that help overcome the challenging problems. Some problems may be overcome by changing the organizational orientation of the external interventions. For more effective external intervention, greater attention should be given to the local people's highest priorities. Activities that improve the circumstances of their impoverished lives might well be accompanied with activities that enhance governance and civil society functioning. For example, establishing local cooperatives to handle local service and production functions would also foster conflict resolution capabilities. In large construction and production undertakings, trade union organizations should be promoted since they can help build a strong civil society.

Expanding NGO capacities would help improve peacemaking interventions. This expansion should involve means more than increasing the number and size of transnational organizations. Coalitions and working alliances among several nongovernmental organizations could enable them to undertake and sustain larger projects. Ensuring local autonomy in many of the transnational nongovernmental organizations will help maintain knowledge about and experience with local actors. Greater financial resources and organizational autonomy would obviously be advantageous, and greater variety of income sources should be secured.

Changes in governmental structures and missions would help in conducting more effective peacemaking operations. A reduction in military expenditures and an increase in external expenditures for humanitarian, development, and civil society assistance could help increase the capacity for transforming conflicts and making peace. That change in the balance of military and non-military capacities would make it less likely for governments to resort to military force believing there is no other ready option.

The multiplicity of interveners in many cases produces unwanted consequences, as when they compete with each other, are played off against each
other by local actors, or unintentionally undercut each other’s peacemaking efforts. The growing attention to these issues has identified mechanisms that minimize undesired consequences (Nan and Strimling 2006). At one extreme, the mechanism is simply for organizations with a broad shared objective to have regular meetings at which they exchange information about their specific activities. At the other extreme, one organization may be given the leadership to directly coordinate the relevant activities of other organizations. In addition, many ad hoc arrangements may be made to sequence the work of different organizations or for them to cooperate on specific peacemaking projects.

Finally, new transnational institutional structures would help overcome the hazards of traditional thinking and the self-serving character of much peacemaking work. More peacemaking undertakings might be associated with UN agencies and organized on a regional basis. The people working in these peacemaking organizations might include youths serving for brief periods and also persons engaged for many years in a few countries, learning the cultures and needs of people where they live and work. These peacemakers would work closely with local people, learning how they live and helping them do what they are striving to do to make their lives better for themselves, their families, and their countries.

CONCLUSIONS

Good intentions do not ensure good conduct and outcomes. Those who are to be the beneficiary of the good intentions may be too narrowly defined so that a great many people are severely harmed. Furthermore, for many of the reasons discussed in this chapter, the actual consequences of peacemaking interventions in terrible conflicts are too often disappointing. They are frequently ineffective and many times counterproductive, causing widespread injury. And yet, in so many circumstances interventions are greatly needed (Ury 2000).

Intervening constructively requires good analyses of the problems that require solutions, including understanding their sources and consequences as well as assessing what policies might overcome those problems. In addition, attention needs to be given to the local capabilities that can contribute to the solutions as well as those capabilities that support undesired solutions. Then, careful assessments need to be made of what contributions various external interveners realistically can make. It is impossible to have all the information and knowledge of relevant social processes to accurately make all such assessments. Yet thoughtful assessments can help guide actors to pursue policies that are likely to be somewhat more effective and not be counterproductive.

External peacemaking interventions are likely to become ever more frequent with the growing integration of the world. This analysis should make it clear that no single entity can or should be the universal intervener. Many different kinds of interventions are appropriate for diverse conflicts and stages of conflicts, and they are best undertaken by interveners with particular kinds of capabilities. Consequently, collaboration and cooperation among different peacemaking interveners is crucial for the best outcomes.
Various potential peacemakers should enhance standby capacities for intervention in conflicts of particular kinds and at different conflict stages. Regrettably, at present in most countries, the only major standby capacities are those within the military forces, and therefore they are called upon for various kinds of interventions, even when they are not the most appropriate interveners.

More attention needs to be given to these issues by researchers and by governmental and nongovernmental practicing interveners. More reflection is needed before and after peacebuilding interventions are undertaken to improve policy making and avoid being more harmful than beneficial. Transforming large-scale violent conflicts and making peace is necessarily a long process. External peacemaking interventions can contribute to that process over the long term. Recognizing that time perspective is challenging, but it can also be reassuring.

REFERENCES


Challenges in Peacemaking


NOTES

An earlier draft of some of these ideas was presented at the conference on External Intervention in State and Nation Building in Conflict Situations, hosted by the Walter Lebach Institute for Jewish Arab Co-existence at Tel Aviv University, January 12, 2010. I benefited from the discussion of the paper at the conference. I want to thank Bruce W. Dayton, Azra Hromadizic, and William Banks for their comments and suggestions for this chapter.

1. Asad was seriously ill and focused on arranging his son’s succession to the presidency of Syria.

2. John Gilbert, who was the chief of intelligence for the United Kingdom defense minister, observed of the Contact Group negotiators: “I think certain people were spoiling for a fight in NATO, . . . we were at a point when some people thought something had to be done [against Serbia], so you just provoked a fight.” David N. Gibbs, 2009. *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia.* Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, p. 190.


4. In 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Francis Deng to be special representative of the secretary general, at the under-secretary-general level, and he appointed Edward Luck as a special adviser, working together on the responsibility to protect.

5. The Ottawa Treaty (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction) came into force in 1999, largely as the result of leadership of the Canadian government and of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, a UN treaty, entered into force in 2002. Major non-
governmental organizations formed the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers in May 1998, which mobilized support for the Protocol and continues to work for its full compliance.

6. Jo Becker, advocacy director of the Children’s Rights Division at Human Rights Watch, working to advance the prohibition against child soldiers, reports some instances of this conduct. Presentation at Syracuse University, September 21, 2010.